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Petitioners Joseph Kitchen and Richard Phillips,
through their legal counsel, James R. Black and Susan Black
submit the following petition for writ of certiorari:

PARTIES
Petitioners Joseph Kitchen and Richard Phillips brought
a cause of action for their personal injuries against
defendants C.R. England & Sons, Inc., a Utah corporation and
Cal Gas Company, Inc., a California corporation.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Were there genuine issues of material fact in this

case regarding defendant Cal Gas' negligence that should
have been submitted to the jury for determination and not
resolved by the trial court as a matter of law.
2.

Does the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in relation

to the actions of defendant Cal Gas apply in this case?

OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
See attachment 8 of complete Court of Appeals decision
in this case.
VI.
JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT
1.

The Court of Appeals entered a decision in this

matter on the

day of

,

1991.
2.

The Utah Supreme Court granted petitioners motion

for an extension of time to file this petition.

Said

extension was until January 20, 1992. January 20, 1992 wa a
legal holiday.

Therefore, this petition was timely filed on

January 21, 1992.
3.

There was no cross-petition for writ of certiorari

filed in this matter.
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4.

The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has

jurisdiction to consider this petition pursuant to Rule 45
and 4 6 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
VII.
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES OR REGULATIONS
There are no specific provisions of constitution,
statutes, ordinances or regulations that this matter
involves, but rather the general principles of tort law.
VIII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The petitioners filed this suit to recover damages they
suffered on February 6, 1986, when the tractor-trailer they
occupied overturned 600 feet west of Milepost 19 on
Interstate 80 in Tooele County.

Immediately prior to the

time petitioners' vehicle overturned, a Cal Gas tankeroverturned 800 feet west of milepost 19 on Interstate 80.
Petitioner Kitchen was the driver of an ANR Garrett tractor
with two trailers.

It is his testimony that he saw the

defendant Cal Gas tanker truck overturned ahead of him on
the roadway.

The tanker was blocking \ \ lanes of the two

eastbound lanes so petitioner began to slow his truck
anticipating he could stop prior to coming into contact with
the Cal Gas tanker.

Traveling immediately behind the

petitioners was a CR England tractor and trailers.

It is

the testimonies of the petitioners that as their truck
- 2 -

slowed down, the CR England truck hit them from behind
causing them to roll over.

There was no contact between the

ANR Garrett truck and the Cal Gas truck.
petitioners were taken.

The depositions of

The deposition of Richard Foreman,

C.R. England's driver, was taken.

The driver of the Cal gas

vehicle, Blaine Beckstead, died of causes unrelated to the
accident shortly after it occurred.

Various expert

witnesses1 depositions for the parties were taken as well.
These depositions plus the pleadings constitute the record
in this appeal.

Petitioners reached a settlement with

defendant C.R. England prior to trial so no issues on appeal
deal with C.R. England.
Defendant Cal Gas filed a motion for summary judgment
claiming there was no proximate causation between the Cal
Gas truck accident and the ANR Garrett truck accident.
trial court denied that motion.

The

Defendant Cal Gas then

filed a motion for summary judgment claiming there was no
evidence of negligence on the part of the Cal Gas driver.
The trial court granted Cal Gas' Motion.

Hence, this appeal

was filed, since it is petitioners' position there are
clearly disputed factual issues that should be determined by
a jury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Petitioners, Joseph Kitchen and Richard Phillips

were drivers for ANR Garrett Freight lines as of February

- 3 -

1986.

On February 6, 1986, they were transporting freight

from the Los Angeles, California area to Salt Lake City,
Utah.

The tractor they were operating had a sleeping

compartment so one of them would drive while the other
slept.
2.

At about midnight on February 6, 1986, they pulled

into the Wendover, Utah Weigh Station.
to drop their third trailer.

They were instructed

They were told the road

further ahead had patches of black ice all the way to Salt
Lake City.
3•

(Kitchen deposition p. 43 and p. 44.)

After the ANR Garrett truck had left the Wendover

Weigh Station, it was passed by the defendant Cal Gas tanker
at a rapid rate of speed.
east as well.

The Cal Gas truck was heading

Petitioner Phillips verified what petitioner

Kitchen had said.
4.

Petitioners proceeded east on 1-80 in the right lane of

the roadway at 2 0 to 25 miles per hour up to the point in the
road where the accident occurred.

There were two eastbound

lanes of traffic (Kitchen deposition, p. 49; Phillips
deposition, p. 32, 33).
5.

In the area where the accident took place, the roads

were icy and slippery.

(Kitchen deposition, p. 46; Phillips

deposition, p. 10, 13.)
6.

In the area of milepost 19, a white Toyota Pickup truck

was traveling ahead of the ANR Garrett truck in the left-hand
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lane of traffic.

In the Toyota's headlights, Kitchen saw the

shadow of something blocking the left and part of the right
lanes of traffic ahead of him.

(Kitchen deposition, p. 49, 50,

79, 121.)
7.

The overturned Cal Gas truck was blocking the left lane

and part of the right lane on the roadway directly ahead of
Kitchen.
8.

(Kitchen deposition, p. 51 and P. 94.)
Perceiving the problem the Cal Gas tanker presented in

the roadway ahead of him, Kitchen took his foot off the
throttle, causing his vehicle to slow.

(Kitchen deposition,

pages 123, 124.)
9.

As petitioners' vehicle slowed, petitioners felt an

impact to the rear of their vehicle, which impact caused
petitioners' vehicle to overturn.

(Kitchen deposition page 125;

Phillips deposition pages 36-38, 50-52.)
10.

Foreman testified that the C.R. England vehicle did not

hit petitioners' vehicle and that he saw petitioners' vehicle
overturned and blocking the roadway as he approached Milepost 19
on 1-80 and therefore drove off the roadway to avoid hitting it.
11.

The driver of the Cal Gas truck died shortly after the

accident of causes unrelated to the accident.

The wife of the

Cal Gas Driver who was accompanying her husband cannot be
located to give her testimony according to counsel for Cal Gas.
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12.

After the accident, petitioner Kitchen walked the short

distance up to where the Cal Gas tanker was to see if anyone
needed help.
13.

(Kitchen deposition, p. 55.)

Section 41-6-46(1)(e) U.C.A. states in pertinent part:
SPEED RESTRICTIONS
41-6-46. Speed regulations — Safe and
appropriate speeds at certain locations —
Prima facie speed limits — Emergency power
of the governor.
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle
at a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the existing conditions, and
giving regard to the actual and potential
hazards then existing, including, but not
limited to when:
* * * * *

(e) special hazards exist
regarding pedestrians or other traffic,
or due to weather or highway conditions.
14.

It is petitioner's contention the Cal Gas driver was

unable to maintain proper and immediate control over his vehicle
as he was driving too fast for the conditions as they then
existed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There are genuine issues of material fact involving the
negligence of the Cal Gas driver that precipitated this triple
truck accident.

Additionally, under the doctrine of res ipsa

loquitor, defendant's negligence can be inferred.

Therefore, it

was inappropriate for the trial court to grant defendant Cal

- 6 -

Gas1 motion for summary judgment and for the Court of Appeals to
uphold the trial court's decision.
IX.
ARGUMENT
Point I
There are genuine issues of material fact on the
issue of Defendant Cal Gas1 Negligence,
therefore Summary Judgment was improper
The Utah Supreme Court as well as Courts throughout the
United States have repeatedly emphasized the very restrictive
standard of when Summary Judgment is appropriate.
In Bowen v. Riverton City. 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982), the
Utah Supreme Court discussed the propriety of summary judgment
and the approach courts must take to motions for summary
judgment as follows:
Summary judgments are more frequently given
in contract cases . . . . However, when it
comes to determining negligence, contributory
negligence, and causation, courts are not in
such a good position to make a total
determination for here enters a prerogative
of the Jury to make a determination of its
own, and that is: Did the conduct of a party
measure up to that of the reasonably prudent
man, and, if not, was it a proximate cause of
the harm done?
(See Case in its entirety in Attachment 1)
With the Bowen standard in mind, it is clear by its prior
ruling on defendant Cal Gas1 motion for summary judgment on the
issue of proximate cause that the trial court was of the opinion
- 7 -

there is disputed evidence in this case.

The court determined

that there was a jury question as to whether the overturned Cal
Gas truck was a proximate cause of the collision between the ANR
Garrett truck and the C.R. England truck.

Since the issues of

proximate cause and negligence are so intertwined it is
illogical to find there is an issue of material facts regarding
proximate cause and no such dispute regarding negligence.

The

necessity of having a jury consider all the factual disputes in
the present case is especially clear when the facts of the case
are viewed in a light most favorable to the petitioners.
Since these are all disputed issues of material fact,
summary judgment was inappropriately granted.

This matter

should be tried to a jury.
Point II
There is substantial evidence from which a jury
could infer defendant Cal Gas1 negligence
In earlier Memorandum on this point, defendant cited the
landmark Utah Supreme Court case of Horsley v. Robinson, 112
Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (1947) for the proposition that "The mere
occurrence of an accident, considered alone, does not support an
inference that the Cal Gas driver was negligent."
It is petitioner's contention that the Horslev decision
supports their position that Cal Gas negligence is an issue for
jury determination.

The facts of Horslev are analogous to the

facts in this case in many respects.
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The Utah Supreme Court in

Horsley supported the trial court's submission to the jury of
the issue of negligent operation of a bus that collided with an
oncoming automobile which skidded into its path on an icy road.
The court held that the jury could infer excessive speed for the
existing circumstances without evidence of stopping distances.
After making the statement upon which defendant relies, the
court went on further to explain:
* * * *

But negligence may be inferred from facts and
circumstances which according to human
experience tend to show and from which
reasonable minds might be convinced that in
operating the bus as they did under the
surrounding facts and circumstances the
defendants should have anticipated that they
were endangering the safety of their
passengers. . . .
* * * *

Here the driver had driven more than 20 miles
under similar road and weather conditions
which he encountered at the time of the
accident. He had ample time to fully realize
the amount of control or lack thereof which he
could exert over the bus in case of an
emergency. . . . The evidence was sufficient
from which the jury could find the defendants
were negligent.
* * * *

It is universally recognized that negligence
may be inferred from the happening of the
accident and the surrounding facts and
circumstances where the facts are such as to
reasonably justify such inference even though
there is no direct testimony to establish the
exact grounds of negligence which caused the
accident. (Citations omitted.)
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186 P.2d at 596, 597, 599 (emphasis added).

(See case in its

entirety in Attachment 2.)
In the present case, as in Horsley. supra, there are issues
of fact which preclude summary disposition.

There can be no

doubt that based on Horsley, the jury may infer negligence on
the part of the Cal Gas truck driver.

While the mere occurrence

of an accident may not imply negligence, whether or not it is
negligent to overturn a tractor/tanker on a slippery road and
thereby block the traffic lanes is a question of fact to be
determined by a fact finder.

As in Horsley, the trier of fact

could infer from the accident and the surrounding facts that the
Cal Gas driver was driving too fast for the existing conditions
and failed to keep proper control of his vehicle.
In the case of Kelly v. Montoya, 470 P.2d 563, (Ct. of App.,
New Mexico, 1970).

The New Mexico Court specifically stated

that blocking a highway in violation of statute may cause other
persons to have accidents.

(Utah has a similar statute embodied

in Utah Code Ann. 41-6-103 (1953) as amended.)

Issues of fact

as to foreseeability, proximate cause, and negligence were to be
resolved by the trier of fact.

(See case in its entirety in

Attachment 3.)
In Weber v. Sprinaville Citv, 725 P.2d 1360 (Utah 1986) the
Court described four elements of a negligence action.

Each of

those four elements as applied to the present facts creates an
issue for the jury.

First, does a driver of a truck have a duty
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of care to maintain control over his vehicle so as not to block
the traffic lanes of the highway, especially in winter driving
conditions?

Second, did the Cal Gas truck driver breach that

duty when he overturned his truck and left it laying in the road
blocking the eastbound lanes?

Third, did the accident of the

defendant Cal Gas truck case petitioners' injuries in whole or
in part and fourth, did petitioners suffer damages as a result
thereof?

The proper body to resolve these issues is the jury.

In the case of Hall v. Blackham. 417 P.2d 664 (Utah 1966),
another often cited decision, the court rendered a decision on
appeal by petitioners from the portion of a jury verdict in
favor of one of the defendants in the case, Deleeuw.
Petitioners had alleged that Deleeuw handed a sandwich to
another defendant, the driver of the car which collided with
petitioners' decedent's car, and that the handling of the
sandwich to the driver distracted his attention.
665.

417 P.2d 15

The jury was asked two questions regarding Deleeuw:

was

he negligent, and, if he was, was his negligence a proximate
cause of the accident.
negative.

The jury answered both questions in the

417 P.2d at 667.

The decision stands for the proposition that negligence and
proximate causation are questions for the jury.

They are not

questions for the Court on a motion for summary judgment.
Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983),
considered a jury instruction which directed a verdict on

- 11 -

petitioner's negligence and, in effect, directed a verdict on
the issue of proximate cause.

671 P.2d at 219.

After a

discussion of the law of superseding causation, in which the
Court pointed out that it has adopted the rule stated in
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 447, on the issue of
superseding causation, the Court stated,
In the present case, the disputed instruction
was erroneous because it failed to submit the
proximate cause issue to the jury for
determination. . . .
Where the evidence is in dispute, including
the inferences from the evidence, the issue
should be submitted to the jury.
* * *

We do not mean to imply that rulings by the
trial court which decide a factual contention
as a matter of law are never appropriate. But
the right to trial by jury is a basic
principle of our system that cannot be allowed
to be eroded by improper intrusions on the
jury's prerogative.
671 P.2d at 220 (citations omitted.)
Also, of relevance to the present case, the Harris Court
stated that a person's negligence is not superseded by the
negligence of another if the subsequent negligence of another is
foreseeable.

The Court adopted the Restatement Rule which it

applied as follows:
The fact that an intervening act of a third
person is negligent in itself or is done in a
negligent manner does not make it a
superseding cause of harm to another which the
actor's negligent conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about, if
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(a) the actor at the time of his
negligent conduct should have realized that a
third person might so act, or
(b) a reasonable man knowing the
situation existing when the act of the third
person was done would not regard it as highly
extraordinary that the third person had so
acted, or
(c) the intervening act is a normal
consequence of a situation created by the
actorfs conduct and the manner in which it is
done is not extraordinary negligent.
(671 P.2d at 219)
Although the factual issues presented in Harris were
opposite of the facts in the present case, the court's
discussion of intervening and/or superseding causation is
significant and instructive:
Instruction no. 14 appears to have been based
on the rule stated in Hillyard v. Utah
By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 151, 263 P.2d
287, 292 (1953); and restated in . . .
Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co.. 24
Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970).
. . . [T]he test in Hillyard is two-pronged:
(1) where a motorist sees a stationary object
in the road and negligently fails to avoid it,
his negligence is, as a matter of law, a
superseding cause, but (2) if the motorist
negligently fails to see the stationary object
in time to avoid it, the issue of whether the
motorist's negligence is a superseding cause
is for the jury.
The strong drift away from deciding the issue
of superseding causation in automobile
accidents as a matter of law is evident in
Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Co.. Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980), and
Watters v. Ouerry. Utah 588 P.2d 702 (1978).
Indeed, Jensen all but overruled the first
prong of Hillyard sub silento.
- 13 -

* * *

FTIhe first prong of Hillvard cannot stand
analysis from a theoretical point of view.
There is no valid distinction between one who
negligently fails to keep a proper lookout and
rear-ends another car and one who keeps a
proper lookout but negligently fails to avoid
a collision. The two situations are similar
to the doctrines of assumption of risk and
contributory negligence—which are now treated
for the most part simply in terms of whether a
defendant failed to act as a reasonably
prudent person under the circumstance.
*

*

•

Finally, the unsound distinction made in
Hillyard serves to frustrate the purpose of
the Comparative Negligence Statute by
precluding the kind of comparison of fault
that a jury ought to make.
The allocation of
liability should be made
on the basis of the
relative culpability of
both parties. To do that
the jury must assess the
reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the
second driver's actions in
light of all the
circumstances, including
whatever action it takes
to avoid a collision, his
initial speed, the initial
speed of the first car,
road conditions, traffic
conditions, and the like.
To avoid further confusion in the doctrine of
superseding causation in cases such as this,
we hereby overrule the first prong of the
Hillyard test as stated in Hillvard, . . . and
Anderson.
671 P.2d at 221, 222 (emphasis added.)
The Harris decision, a relatively recent decision by the
Utah Supreme Court, stands for the principle of trial by jury.
- 14 -

Following that tenet the issues of negligence and proximate
cause especially in an automobile accident case are within the
purview of the jury.

The jury may draw inferences of the

neglect of a party from the evidence as it sees fit.

(See copy

of the Harris decision in its entirety in attachment 4.)
In the present case, the Court ruled as a matter of law on
the issue of negligence prior to the submission of any evidence
to a jury.

The facts as elicited from the petitioners in a

light most favorable to the petitioners demonstrates negligence
on the part of defendant Cal Gas. Without question, a jury
could reasonably infer that Cal Gas was negligent by failing to
drive at an appropriate speed; by failing to maintain proper
control; by overturning and blocking almost all of the traveled
portions of the roadway.

The Court of Appeals decision in

upholding the trial court's decision in these circumstances was
erroneous.
Point III
Defendant's Negligence can be inferred
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor
The Utah Supreme Court has on numerous occasions held that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable in certain cases
and juries should be so instructed where it is appropriate.
is petitioners' position that their case is one in which the
doctrine should apply.

- 15 -

It

In Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Utah Sup. Crt.
1980), petitioner brought a claim against the owners and
operators of a business whose device was used to exhibit sheet
metal samples.

The device collapsed causing serious injuries to

the petitioner.

Neither party could demonstrate what caused the

device to fail.

The jury was instructed on the theory of res

ipsa loquitor but, still returned a verdict in defendant's
favor.

While the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's

rulings, it discussed the doctrine and its applicability which
may be insightful in reference to the case on appeal.
In Anderton, the court cited approvingly the case of Lund v.
Phillips Petroleum Co.. 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 952 (1960)
wherein the court stated:
to permit one who suffers injury from
something under the control of another, which
ordinarily would not cause injury except for
the other's negligence, to present his
grievance to a court or jury on the basis that
an inference of negligence may reasonably be
drawn from such facts; and cast the burden
upon the other to make proof of what happened.
(607 P.2d 833)
The Court further described the criteria under which res
ipsa loquitor could be implemented:
(1) that the accident was of a kind which, in
the ordinary course of events, would not have
happened had due care been observed; (2) that
the plaintiff's own use or operation of the
agency or instrumentality was not primarily
responsible for the injury; and (3) that the
agency or instrumentality causing the injury
was under the exclusive management or control
of the defendant.
- 16 -

(607 P.2d 833)
Of most importance in reference to this present case, the
Utah Supreme Court emphasized that the application of the
doctrine to a given situation was a question of fact to be
determined by the jury:
It is to be noted that the weighing of
evidence presented to establish the above
elements, like all other questions of fact, is
within the province of the jury; where the
trial court determines that the evidence,
viewed in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, could establish the prerequisites
to the application of the doctrine, an
instruction to that effect is proper. It then
becomes the jury's responsibility to apply, or
refuse to apply, the doctrine based on its
factual findings regarding the circumstantial
prerequisites.
(607 P.2d 834)
The Anderton court in a footnote made comments that are
especially relevant to the present case regarding the
application of res ipsa loquitor and the principles of
comparative negligence:
This is not to say that any contributory
negligence on plaintiff's part prevents the
application of the doctrine, such that it may
not be used in those cases where plaintiff is
seeking partial recovery under Utah's
comparative negligence statute (U.C.A., 1953,
78-27-37). The requirement here is that
plaintiff's use of the agency or
instrumentality not be primarily responsible
for the injury, not that his actions be free
from negligence of any kind. (Note that the
comparative negligence provision bars partial
recovery under any type of proof where
plaintiff's negligence equals or exceeds that
of the defendant.) See 58 Am.Jur.2d
Negligence § 481. p. 58.
- 17 -

(underlining added)(607 P.2d 833)(See Anderton in its entirety
in Attachment 5.)
Another recent Utah Supreme Court decision discussing res
ipsa loquitor is Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah Sup. Crt.
1980).

In Nixdorf, a patient brought a medical malpractice

action against a doctor and hospital because a surgical needle
was left in her body after surgery.

At the trial in this

matter, petitioner did not introduce expert testimony to show
that the defendants care was below the standard of care but,
relied instead on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.

The trial

court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict
because of petitioner's failure to present expert testimony.
The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter for a
new trial.

The Court reaffirmed the proposition that in a

medical malpractice action expert testimony is not always
necessary if the standard of care owed petitioner is within the
common knowledge and experience of a layman.

Then, the Court

surmised the petitioner met her burden through the application
of res ipsa loquitor.

The Court stated:

When the appropriate evidentiary basis is
presented a plaintiff may employ the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitor to carry this burden.
This doctrine establishes an inference of
negligence from the circumstances incident to
the operation. It is a procedural rather than
substantive rule of law which carries the
plaintiff past a motion for nonsuit where the
circumstantial evidence introduced by the
plaintiff is sufficient to support the
application of the doctrine and its inference
of negligence.
- 18 -

(612 P.2d 352)(See case in its entirety in Attachment 6.)
A key case is Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d
1232 (ut. Sup. Crt. 1984).

The petitioner suffered personal

injuries when the pallet on which he was standing broke causing
him to fall.
defendant.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
Petitioner appealed on several grounds including the

refusal to give petitioner's proffered instruction regarding res
ipsa loquitor.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter
instructing the trial court to decide whether petitioner made a
prima facie showing of the res ipsa loquitor elements and, if
so, the jury should receive petitioner's proffered instruction.
The Court in Kusy reaffirmed Anderton. in its description of
the elements of res ipsa loquitor.

It noted in reference to the

third element that "The control necessary for a res ipsa
instruction is control exercised at the time of the negligent
act."

(681 P.2d 1235)

The Utah Supreme Court also held in Kusy

that a petitioner could sustain and be allowed instructions on
theories of res ipsa loquitor and negligence in the same lawsuit
as long as the exact cause of the accident was not known. The
jury based on the circumstances could infer negligence.

(See a

copy of Kusy in its entirety in Attachment 7.)
In the case under consideration, petitioners are entitled to
present their claims under the theories of negligence and res
ipsa loquitor.

Petitioners can establish all the elements

- 19 -

necessary for res ipsa loquitor:

1) the Cal Gas tanker truck

rollover is the kind of accident that does not happen if due
care has been observed, 2) the petitioners had no use or hadn't
operated the Cal Gas tanker and, therefore, could not be said to
be primarily responsible for their injuries and 3) the Cal Gas
tanker was under the exclusive control of defendant.
Since the petitioners can make a prima facie showing of the
above elements, the jury could infer defendant Cal Gas1
negligence.

The application of the res ipsa loquitor doctrine

is a question of fact so is within the exclusive province of the
jury.

Thus, it was improper to grant defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, petitioners respectfully request the
Utah Supreme Court to grant their petition for writ of
certiorari.
Dated this 21st day of January, 1992.

es R. Black

MAJW^\L&?A,,
1L
Susan Black
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ber of years of the husband's employment.
The wife is entitled to one-half of that
portion pursuant to the award of the trial
judge in this case, which our modification is
intended to sustain.
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in
part and remand to the trial court so that
the order may be amended to conform with
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and
HOWE, JJ., concur.
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Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowen,
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, her
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corporation, Sterling R. Draper and Enoch
Smith Sons Company, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 17732.
Supreme Court of Utah.1

1. Appeal and Error <s=>430(l)
Since failure to file timely notice of
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal if notice
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules
42(a), 73(a).
2. Appeal and Error <s=>344, 428(2)
Trial court's April 13 order, entered
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both
consolidated actions, was final judgment in
each case for purpose of calculating timeliness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely
filed appeal from trial court's grant of summary judment on January 26 for city.
3. Judgment «=> 181(2, 3)
Summary judgment is proper only if
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law.
4. Judgment $=> 185(2)
If there is any doubt or uncertainty
concerning questions of fact, doubt should
be resolved in favor of opposing party, on
motion for summary judgment and thus
court must evaluate all evidence and?all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from evidence in light most favorable to party opposing summary judgment.

Nov. 4, 1982.
In a personal injury action, the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S.
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment for
city and subsequently, pursuant to motions
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dismissed all claims, counterclaims and cross
claims with prejudice except for claim
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1)
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether
city fulfilled its duty to maintain city
streets in safe condition was question of
fact for jury, precluding summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded for trial.

5. Judgment <s=»180
Summary judgment is appropriate only
in the most clear-cut negligence cases.
6. Municipal Corporations <$=> 757(1)
City has nondelegable duty to exercise
due care in maintaining streets withinVits1
corporate boundaries in reasonably '^afe,
condition for travel and may be held liable
for injuries proximately resulting fromnts
failure to do so.
7. Municipal Corporations <*=>798
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty-utp
maintain streets, it is necessary for cities, to
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe,
visible and working condition.
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8. Judgment <•» 181(33)
Whether city, which was arguably negligent in not conducting immediate inspections of signs where road maintenance work
was done, and which after receiving notice
that stop sign was down sent individual to
repair sign rather than calling police to
regulate traffic until sign could be raised,
fulfilled its duty to maintain city streets in
safe condition was question of fact to be
determined by jury, precluding summary
judgment in action arising from automobile
collision at intersection.
9. Municipal Corporations <s=>798
Municipality has duty to respond in
reasonable fashion once it is on notice of
defective sign or signal.
John G. Mulliner, Orem, Gary B. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Raymond Berry, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.

Prior to the accident, a passing motorist
noticed the sign was down and notified
Riverton City at 12:50 p.m., approximately
eighteen minutes before the accident A
Riverton City employee responded to the
notice of the fallen sign, but arrived after
the accident.
On November 29, 1978, the Bowens filed
suit (Bowen suit) against Sterling Draper,
Riverton City, and Enoch Smith Sons Company, a construction company that had
worked on the intersection the day prior to
the accident On January 25, 1979, Draper
filed suit (Draper suit) against Kristine
Bowen, Riverton City, and Enoch Smith
Sons Company. The Bowen suit alleged
that Riverton City was negligent in maintaining the stop sign and in responding
negligently when it received notice of the
downed stop sign. Crossclaims and counterclaims were subsequently filed by the
defendants. On motion of Riverton City,
the trial court ordered the Bowen and
Draper cases consolidated pursuant to Utah
RCiv.P. 42(a).

STEWART, Justice:
On January 26, 1981, the trial court
In this personal injury action, plaintiffs granted summary judgments for Riverton
appeal an adverse summary judgment on City in both the Draper and the Bowen
the ground that there are issues of material actions. On January 27, 1981, summary
fact which should be tried by a jury. Riv- judgment was granted in favor of Enoch
erton City, the defendant, seeks affirmance Smith Sons Company, a defendant in the
of the summary judgment and, in the alter- ^Draper action,' and against all other parties.
native, argues that plaintiffs failed to file a On February 2, 1981, the Bowens, as plaintimely notice of appeal and that the appeal tiffs in the Bowen action and as crossdefenshould therefore be dismissed. We reverse dants in the Draper action, filed a "notice
the summary judgment and remand for a of intent to appeal" the summary judgment
trial on the merits.
entered in favor of Riverton City. On
At approximately 1:08 p.m. on Saturday, March 25, 1981, pursuant to stipulation, the
April 9,1978, two cars collided at the inter- trial court awarded Bowens a money judgsection of 12600 South and 2700 West in ment against Sterling Draper in the Bowen
Riverton, Utah. The vehicle driven by action. On April 13,1981, counsel for Sterplaintiff Kristine Bowen was westbound on ling Draper, Florence Draper, Kristine
12600 South. The other vehicle, driven by Bowen, and Cynthia Bowen stipulated and
Sterling Draper, was travelling north on agreed that all claims, counterclaims and
2700 West. Traffic on 2700 West is re- crossclaims set forth in the Bowen and
quired to stop and yield the right of way to Draper actions could be dismissed with prejtraffic on 12600 South. However, on the udice, except for claims against Riverton
day of the accident, the stop sign regulating City, since such claims, counterclaims and
northbound traffic on 2700 West was lying crossclaims had been fully compromised and
on the ground and the Draper and Bowen settled. On the same day the parties remaining in the Bowen and Draper actions
automobiles collided in the intersection.
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moved for an order dismissing the actionss
since all matters but for the claims againstt
Riverton City had been compromised and1
settled. On April 13, 1981, pursuant to the*
motions and stipulations filed by the parties*
in both actions for dismissal with prejudice~
and in an order bearing the heading and
numbers of both the Bowen and Draper
actions, the court ordered that all claims,*'
counterclaims and crossclaims, except for
the claim of Kristine Bowen against Riverton City, be dismissed with prejudice. Oni
May 12, 1981, Bowens filed a notice off
appeal in the Bowen suit.
Riverton City claims that the final judgi
ment in the Bowen suit was rendered
t
March 25, 1981, and since the notice of
appeal was not filed within the jurisdictional one-month period from that time, this
Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain thisr
appeal.1 The Bowens, on the other hand,
argue that the final judgment in these[
cases was not entered until the order dated[
April 13,1981. Since the Bowens filed their.
notice of appeal within one month from{
that date, they contend the appeal is properly before this Court.

counterclaims, and crossclaims in both actions, we hold the Bowens timely filed this
appeal.
The next issue is whether summary judgment was appropriately awarded to Riverton City in this action. The Bowens assert
that Riverton City was not only negligent
in maintaining the stop sign but also responded negligently upon receiving notice
that the sign was down.

[3-5] Summary judgment is proper only
if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and
admissions show that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. In re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d
83, 348 P.2d 683 (1960). If there is any
doubt or uncertainty concerning questions
of fact, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the opposing party. Thus, the
court must evaluate all the evidence and all
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the
evidence in a light most favorable to the
party opposing summary judgment. Durham v. Margetts, Utah, 571 P.2d 1332
(1977); Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16
Utah 2d 30, 395 P.2d 62 (1964). Although
[1] Since failure to file a timely notice1 summary judgment may on occasion be apof appeal is jurisdictional, this Court lacks1 propriate in negligence cases, it is approprijurisdiction to hear an appeal if notice wasJ ate only in the most clear-cut case. FMA
not timely filed. In re Ratliff, 19 Utah 2d Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co.,
346, 431 P.2d 571 (1967); Anderson v. An-' Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979). See Preston v.derson, 3 Utah,2d 277, 282 P.2d 845 (1955).' Lamb, 20 Utah 2d 260, 436 P.2d 1021 (1968):
[2] Without deciding-whether consoli-* In Singleton.v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292,
dated actions should, be. treated as a* single
\ 294, 431 P.2dl26,.128 (1967), this Court
action for purposes of appeal,2 we shall dealI stated:
with the actions in this case^as separate andI
Summary judgments are more fredistinct for determining ;jttie~timeliness off
quently given in contract. cases . . . .
appeal. Nevertheless, we hold the April 13*
However, when it comes to determining
order, entered pursuant to the stipulation of
negligence, contributory negligence,' and
counsel in both actions, is the final judgcausation, courts are not in such a good
ment in each case for the purpose of calcuposition to make a total determination for.
lating the timeliness of the appeal. .Calcuhere enters a prerogative of the jury to
lating the timeliness of the appeal as of the
make a determination of its own, and
entry of that order dismissing all claims,
that is:. Did the conduct of a party meas^
I. Utah R.Civ.P. 73(a) provides in part: 4,[T]he 2. See generally State ex rel. Pacific Intermoun" time within" which an appeal may be taken
tain Express Inc. v. Dist. Court of Second Judi:
shall be one month from the entry of the judgcial 'Dist, Wyo.; 387 P.2d 550 (1963);- 9 C:
ment or order appealed from
A party
Wright & A. MUler, Federal Practice and Proce-,
may appeal from a judgment by filing with the
dure § 2386 (1971).
" district court a notice of appeal .
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ure up to that of the reasonably prudent
man, and, if not, was it a proximate cause
of the harm done?
[6-8] In evaluating the facts of this case
in a light most favorable to the Bowens, we
hold that summary judgment in favor of
Riverton City was improperly awarded.
The city has a nondelegable duty to exercise
due care in maintaining streets within its
corporate boundaries in a reasonably safe
condition for travel, Murray v. Ogden City,
Utah, 548 P.2d 896 (1976); Sweet v. Salt
Lake City, 43 Utah 306, 134 P. 1167 (1913);
Bills v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 507, 109 P.
745 (1910), and the city may be held liable
for injuries proximately resulting from its
failure to do so. Nyman v. Cedar City, 12
Utah 2d 45, 361 P.2d 1114 (1961). See also
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 41-6-22 and 63-30-8. In
fulfilling this duty, it is necessary for cities
to maintain traffic signals in a reasonably
safe, visible, and working condition. Smith
v. City of Preston, 97 Idaho 295, 543 P.2d
848 (1975). Whether the city fulfilled its
duty to maintain the city streets in a safe
condition in the instant case is a question of
fact to be determined by the jury. See
Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 Utah 320,159
P. 530 (1916).
In Riverton City's answers to the Bowens' interrogatories, it stated that visual
inspections were made by city personnel of
all traffic signs within Riverton City on an
annual basis to insure that thejsignsjwere in
place. It is arguable that Riverton City
was negligent in not conducting immediate
inspections of signs where road maintenance work was done. Reasonable persons
might differ as to whether the annual inspections conducted by Riverton City were
sufficient under the circumstances. Enoch
Smith workers present at the intersection
the day before the accident stated that the
sign was loose and blowing in the wind.
[9] Riverton City argues that the eighteen minutes between its receipt of notice
and the accident was insufficient time to
take corrective action. Of course, a jury
might so find. But clearly, a municipality
has a duty to respond in a reasonable fashion once it is on notice of a defective sign or

signal. Gaspard v. Stutes, La.App., 380
So.2d 201 (1980); Bergen v. Koppenal, 97
NJ.Super. 265, 235 A.2d 30 (1967), app'd 52
N.J. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968). In Lochbaum
v. Bowman, La.App., 353 So.2d 379, 381
(1978), the court stated:
[T]here was no attempt [by the highway
department] to notify law enforcement
personnel to direct traffic until repairs
could be accomplished. The Department's radio operator simply notified the
service man on call, who got dressed,
went to the office to pick up tools, and
finally arrived on the scene after the
accident had occurred.
We conclude that the Department was
negligent both in failing to properly
maintain the traffic signal at the intersection and m failing to take steps when
notified of the malfunction to alert the
proper authorities so that traffic at the
intersection could be directed manually
until repairs could be accomplished.
After notice was received in the instant
case, Riverton City responded by sending an
individual to repair the sign rather than
calling the police to regulate traffic until
the sign could be raised. Whether it
should, and if so could, have responded
more effectively and quickly is a matter for
trial.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
costs.
HALL, C.J., and OAK!
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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HORSLEY v. ROBINSON et af.
No. 6940.

which bus could be stopped at various
speeds and under various circumstances.*
PRATT, J., dissenting.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Xov. 6, 1947. *

Appeal from District Court, Third Judicial District: Salt Lake County; C. E.
The reviewing court is not concerned Henderson, Judge..
with preponderance of evidence, but only
Action by Erma D. Horsley against B.
with question of whether there is substan- H. Robinson and others, doing business as
tial evidence to support verdict. Const, the Utah Transportation Company, and
art. 8, § 9.
another to recover for injuries sustained in
a collision between the company's bus and
2. Carriers €=297
an automobile. Judgment for the plaintiff
The driver of passenger vehicle owes against the company and the company appassengers duty to operate vehicle within peals.
such rate of speed as a reasonable prudent
Judgment affirmed.
person would operate under the existing
Moyle, McKay, Burton & White and R.
circumstances. 1
A. Burns, all of Salt Lake City, for appel3. Carriers <§=295(l)
lants.
The operator of bus must exercise a
Hanson & Hanson, for defendant.
proportionate increase in care to avoid inJudd, Ray, Qumney, & Nebeker, all of
jury to his passengers where road and Salt Lake City, for respondent
weather conditions make driving hazardous.
WADE, Juscice.
The defendant, Utah Transportation
4. Carriers <3=>320(I7, 2f)
Company, appeals from a $5,175 verdict in
In action for injuries received by bus
favor of plaintiff Erma Horsley for dampassenger when bus collided with oncoming
ages suffered in an accident while riding as
automobile which skidded into path of bus
a passenger for hire in a bus operated by
on icy highway, evidence relating to speed
the transportation company between Hill
of bus and distance between bus and autoField and Salt Lake City. The same jury
mobile when automobile went out of conreturned a verdict of no cause for action
trol was sufficient for jury on question of
in favor of-the defendant Reinhardt.
v
negligence in operation of bus. Utah Code
2
There
was
an
aisle
down
the
center
of
1943, 57—7—113(a).
the bus with seven double seats on each
5. Carriers <§=>3I6(4)
side and one long seat for five persons
In action for injuries sustained by bus across the "rear end, thus seating 33 persons
passenger when bus collided with oncoming besides the driver. In the accident plainautomobile which skidded into path of bus tiff was thrown forward causing her throat
on icy highway, where there was evidence to strike against the back of the seat in
from which jury could infer that bus was front of her and thereby causing injuries
traveling at excessive speed under the cir- which affected her voice.
cumstances, it .was unnecessary that plainThe accident occurred about 5:25 p. m.
tiff introduce evidence of distances iin r on January 23, 1944, in Davis County a.
1. Appeal and error C=>989

iPaul v. Salt Lake City Ry. Co., 30
Utah 41, 83 P. 563.
2Cederloff v. Wluted, Utah, 169 P.2d
777; Hart v. Kerr, Utah, 175 P.2d 475;
Nikeropoulos v. Ramsey, ^61 Utah 465,
214 P. 304; Dalley v. Mid-Western
Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.'

2d 30ft; jaaarstrich v. Oregon Short
Line R. Co., 70 Utah 552, 262 P. 100;
O'Brien 7., Alston, Gl Utah 368, 213 P.
791; Green v. Higbee, 66 Utah 539,
244 P. 906; Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah
151/140 P.2d 772.
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short distance north of the Salt LakeDavis County Line on highway 91, the
main highway between Ogden and Salt
Lake Otv
The paved portion thereof
consists of four 10 foot traffic lanes with a
13 foot shoulder on each side At the time
of the accident the shoulders were lined
with snow banks which substantially reduced their width, the highway was covered with ice, and slush and a sleet of snow
and ram was falling, thus rendering driving conditions very hazardous While the
bus was proceeding southward at a speed
between 20 and 50 miles per hour in the
outside west traffic lane on the driver's extreme right-hand side of the highway in
the proximity of a long and Aery gradual
curve and on a slightly down hill slope, the
defendant Reinhardt was approaching driving his car from the opposite direction at
from 20 to 30 miles per hour in the east
traffic lane next to the center of the highway when suddenly Remhardt's car went
out of control and swung around so that it
was facing to the south m the outside west
traffic lane and directly in the course of
the oncoming bus While the car was moving slowly toward the south the left front
side of the bus ran into the rear right side
of the car thereby shoving it down the
highway a distance of from 30 to 50 feet
where it was stopped by colliding with another car on the highway By the impact
with the Reinhardt car the bus was turned
slightly to the west where it ran into another automobile which was parked on the
west shoulder*which deflected its_course toward the east and it finally came to a stop
in the snow bank on the east side of the
highway about 75 feet from the parked car
The terms "between distance" and "distance between" used throughout this opinion to indicate the distance between the bus
and the Reinhardt car when it first became
discernible that the latter was out of control, and the 4erm "due care speed" used to
indicate a reasonable speed in view of the
surrounding circumstances, were suggested
by Mr Justice Wolfe
The word ' control" is used herein in its ordinary sense to
mean the abihtv of the driver to stop or
reduce the speed of his vehicle within a
reasonable distance and to guide the same
m the desired course
IS* V 2 i- °^

From the evidence it is clear that when
the Reinhardt car commenced to turn it
was within full view of the driver of the
bus but that he did not slacken his speed
prior to the collision nor appl> rrs brakes
until within 5 or 10 feet of the Reinhardt
car From these facts one of three things
or a combination thereof must have caused
the accident (1) the Reinhardt car went
out of control and into the course of the
bus when it was so near thereto that there
was no time for the bus driver to do anything to avoid the accident, (2) the driver of the bus, although he had sufficient
time and had the bus under sufficient control to avoid the accident failed to see that
the Reinhardt car was turning into his
course in time to avoid the accident, or
seeing it in time failed to exercise the necessary control to avoid the accident, or
(3) the bus driver, although he had sufficient time after the Reinhardt car com
menced to turn into his course to avoid the
accident had he had the bus under control
did not have the bus under sufficient control to avoid the accident
If the Reinhardt car went out of control
and into the course of the bus when it was
so near thereto that the driver did not have
time to avoid the accident then defendants
were not negligent and plaintiff cannot recover Cederloff v Whited, Utah, 169 P2d
777, Hart v Kerr, Utah, 175 P2d 475
If the second proposition above stated was
the cause of the accident then clearly the
defendants were negligent and such negligence proximatel) caused the accident because clearly the driver owes a duty to
keep a proper lookout and see substantial
objects on the road in front of him and to
take the necessar> steps to avoid colliding
therewith and if he failed to do so he is
liable for the darr c:es resulting therefrom
However, I am not sure that the evidence
would justify the jury in finding that such
was the cause of the accident If the accident was caused by the third set of facts
above set out then the jury could from the
evidence find facts sufficient to sustain a
finding that the driver negligently operated
the bus at such a speed that he was unable
to maintain sufficient control thereof to
avoid the accident
So it is necessary to
anahze the evidence and determine what
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facts the jury could reasonably find therefrom
The controlling facts for the jury to determine are (1) At what rate of speed
was the bus travelling at the time of the
accident ? (2) How far was the between
distance ? (3) Did the driver have sufficient control over the bus to stop it within
the between distance ? And from those
facts the jury would have to determine
whether the defendants were guilty of negligence which proximately caused the accident and injuries The jury had before
it e\idence that the bus was traveling as
slow as 20 and as fast as 50 miles per hour

City street (100 feet) Apparently she did
not recognize that this testimony was jn
conflict with her previous statement From
the position the Reinhardt car was struck
and the testimony of all the witnesses it
had turned completely in the opposite direction and was traveling slowly toward
the south, the same direction that the bus
was going This would require some time.,
From all of the evidence we conclude that,
the jury could have reasonably found that
the between distance was as far as 330 feeY
It is argued that since there is no evip
dence of the distance required to stop the
bus under the then existing conditions at

From all the evidence how fast could the
jury reasonably find the bus was traveling ?
The testimony adduced by the defendants
fixed its speed at from as slow as 20 to
slightly faster than 25 miles per hour, and
plaintiff fixed it at 50 miles per hour The
fact that the bus struck the Reinhardt car
and shoved it from 30 to 50 feet where it
was stopped when it hit a parked car, and
the fact that after striking the Reinhardt
car the bus swerved to the right into another parked car and was deflected to the
left across the highway where it was stopped by a snow bank about 75 feet from the
parked car indicates that it was traveling
with considerable speed
The evidence
would sustain a finding by the jury that
the bus was traveling as fast as 40 miles
per hour

any given rate of speed the evidence ^isH
not sufficient from which the jury could
find the defendants guilty of negligence
Which proximately caused the accident If
plaintiff must, in order to make a case,
show that the driver could have stopped
the bus within the between distance then
her evidence is clearly insufficient to justjfy a finding in her favor, because the eviQence does not justify such a finding
On the contrary the evidence points defi,-4
Hitely to the fact that the driver did not
have the bus under sufficient control so that
he could either bring it to a stop, reduce
its speed or steer it to one side sufficiently!
to avoid the accident within the in between
distance
And this is true even though,
that distance was as far as. 330 feet **&

What is the maximum which the jury,
from the evidence, could find the between
distance w a s ? Plaintiff testified that-that
distance Avas a Salt Lake~City block (660
feet), Reinhardt estimated it at less than
300 feet and the bus driver estimated it at
75 to 100 feet These were all interested
witnesses but six passengers on the bus at
the time of the accident were called by the
defendants who testified at various distances ranging from 30 feet to 330 feet All
of them except one fixed it at 150 feet or
less. The sixth witness was a Mrs Sessions who when on direct examination 'by
defendants' counsel without leading was
asked what that distance was answered
twice that it was about a half a Salt Lake
City block (330 feet)
Later defendants'
counsel led her into estimating that distance at about the width of a Salt Lake

The following facts" quite definitely point
to that conclusion The icy highway coV^
ered with snow and slush with a sleetf-6f^
snow and rain falling, the fact that'Wdj
Reinhardt car went completely out of'con-^
trol while traveling from 20 to 30 milesj
per hour, one witness testified that as^hej
approached the scene of the accident fromi
the north he slowed his car down and put
it in intermediate gear in order to insure,
that he could sufficiently control it so th§U
he could safely stop and pick up passen^
gers, the rate of speed at which thejausj
was traveling which the jury could-jreasonfj
ably find to be as fast as 40 miles per hour:
the slightly down hill slope of the highway;
the fact that the driver, according to ^his!
Own testimony saw the Reinhardt car whenj
it commenced to turn and that thereafter,11
a.s the jury could reasonably find, he traveled as far as 330 feet without applying

m) *
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his brakes until within 5 or 10 feet of that
car and without appreciably decreasing
his speed prior to the impact therewith,
point almost conclusively to the fact that
the driver did not have the bus under sufficient control to bring it to a stop or to
turn it to one side sufficiently to avoid the
collision The jury would be amply justified in so finding
Here the jury was only required to return a general verdict and we do not know
how the jury determined the controlling
questions of fact Had the jury been required to answer special interrogatories
covering these questions, and had they answered them in the manner we have above
indicated they reasonably could find from
the evidence no one would contend that the
evidence was not sufficient to sustain such
a finding Since the trial court is not required to submit special interrogatories and
therefore we do not know how the jury in
tact did determine the controlling issues we
must presume that they found the facts
necessary to support their verdict if the
evidence was sufficient to sustain such a
finding Thus we must view the evidence
in its most favorable aspect to support the
\erdict which the jury has rendered and if
from the evidence the jury could reasonably find facts necessary to sustain their
verdict it must be sustained This is true,
even though had we been the triers of the
facts we would have found them differentl), or even though we may not believe
that the jury did in fact so find or, even
though we believe that such a finding would
be against the great preponderanc-e-of the
evidence
[1] Under a general verdict we cannot
be assured what facts the jury found or
that they found the facts necessary to sustain their verdict So it is universally held
under the common law system, as it must be
in order to give stability to jury verdicts,
that the appellate court must sustain the
verdict where the evidence is sufficient to
support a finding of the necessary facts
to do so
herwise, the appellate court
would be required to reverse every verdict
where in its opinion the great preponderance of the evidence is against a finding of
the necessary facts to support it, even
though the evidence JS such that reasonable
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minds might conclude from the evidence
that such necessary facts happened
To
do so would be to review the evidence no
matter what we call it The question of
what were the facts and where is the preponderance of the evidence is for the jury
and not for the court to determine Our
problem is only to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict.
In doing so our standard is Could a reasonable mind be convinced by the evidence
of the necessary facts to support the verdict'* If so, it must be sustained
That this court is not authorized to review the facts found by the jury is expressly provided by our Constitution, Article 8,
Section 9, where it is provided "In cases at
law the appeal shall be on questions of law
alone " Since we cannot review the facts,
whatever we think of where the preponderance of the evidence is, is immaterial If
we were to review the evidence and reverse
this case because we think the preponderance of the evidence on a material issue is
against the plaintiff, we do so in violation
of that constitutional provision We cannot avoid violation of this constitutional
provision by holding that since we have no
assurance that the jury did find that the
between distance was 330 feet, we may assume that they found it to be much less
and reverse the judgment on that ground;
because this requires us first to find that
the preponderance of the evidence is
against the plaintiff on this question, and
thus requires us to review the evidence
for that purpose, _ which the Constitution
forbids us to c do
If the jury found the between distance
was as far as 330 feet, that the bus was
traveling as fast as 40 miles per hour and
that the driver did not have sufficient control thereof so that he could stop or turn
sufficiently to one side so that he could
avoid the accident within that distance,
then under the existing circumstances the
jury could reasonably find that he was guilty of negligence which proximately caused
the accident
The contention that the defendants were
not negligent if the bus could not be stopped within the between distance is based on
the assumption that the rate of speed at
which the bus was traveling was reasonable
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regardless of whether the driver was able
to control it under the existing conditions
when traveling at such rate, and that the
question of how much control the driver
could maintain over the bus at such rate
of speed is immaterial in determining
whether such rate of speed is reasonable
under the existing road conditions What
is a reasonable rate of speed under existing conditions must always be determined
very largely on how much control the driver can maintain while driving at such rate

ditions Where the road and weather^
ditions are bad he must m order to^avoj
being negligent, reduce his speed to a raj
at which he can operate it with reasonabj
safety

fixed which will be reasonable under all
conditions and circumstances On a clear
dry road burdened with little traffic a person could with reasonable prudence operate
a vehicle much faster than he could when
traveling over a highway covered with
slick ice on top of which was slush while
a sleet of snow and rain was falling, and
where the highway was burdened with
heavy traffic. The duty of the operator is
to drive his vehicle at such a rate of speed
that he can sufficiently control the same so
that he does not foreseeably jeopardize the
r
safety of his passengers H e is runder this
duty regardless of the size and weight of
-his vehicle and the road and weather con-

It is argued that on an icy high way-Stflft
impossible to drive so as to avoid the pojsiS
bility of all collisions, that the road anjy
weather conditions might be such that eyejfl
at 5 miles per hour a bus of the size/^ndj
weight of this one might slide 100 feetfpfj
more regardless of anything the d n y j n
could do about it. Of course, if this»jbcuy
had been traveling at the rate of 5 mil$a
per hour the collision with the ReinharjdB
Scar-would not have injured the plaintiff be?
•cause/ at that rate the bus t being drivew
against a small car moving in the samet-diS
rection would not create sufficient jackt<3
injure the passengers On the other handjj
r
if the conditions were such that the dnve^j

Here we are only concerned with t h e ' d S
fendants' duty to their passengers not witS
their duty to the public generally nor wit?
their last clear chance duty to Reinhardi
The rules above stated apply to the publi
generally and especially to a passenger
for hire, since a carrier owes to its passe7
gers
for hire a duty to exe r cise great
[2] The driver of a vehicle carrying
passengers for hire, owes them a duty to care for their satetv than it owes to
Paul v Salt Lake GtjJ
operate his vehicle within such rate of public generally
Ry
Co,
30
Utah
41,
83 P 563
speed as a reasonably prudent person would
operate under the existing conditions UnThe mere happening of the accidentBol
der those conditions an increase in speed course does not prove that the defendant;
would proportionately decrease the control were negligent Nor does the fact that>tnS
of the operator over his vehicle, and in- rate of speed at which they traveled,
crease the danger to his passengers Rea- brought them at the scene of the accident
sonable prudence requires that the driver at the time that the Reinhardt car went
shall not foreseeably expose his passen- out of control and into the course of travel
gers to danger of serious bodily harm If of the bus, because that is something that
the operator drove the bus at such a fast they could not anticipate and guard against
rate of speed that he should realize that That seems to be the point which is cleared
he could not have sufficient control there- up by the cases of Whalen v Dunbar,i744
of to avoid serious danger to his passen- R I 136, 115 A 718, and OMalley <£
gers under the existing road and weather Eagan, 43 Wyo 233, 2 P 2d 1063 77 A L R :
conditions then he was negligent regardless 582
But negligence may be inferred
of how slowly he must operate his vehicle from facts and circumstances uhich zc4
in order to assure reasonable safety to his cording to human experience tend to showj
passengers
and from which reasonable minds might <bg
[3] Where the road and weather condi- convinced that in operating the bus as the^
tions make driving hazardous, reasonable did under the surrounding facts andlciH
prudence requires a proportionate increase cumstances the defendants should havejafiS
in the care of the driver to avoid injury to ticipated that they were endangenngjcthg
his passengers No" rate of speed can be safety of their passengers
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could anticipate that if he drove at the
rate of 5 miles per hour he would not be
able to stop his bus within 100 feet and
that he would thereby seriously jeopardize
the safety of his passengers then it would
be negligence for him to proceed at such
rate of speed
Suppose conditions were
such that the driver could anticipate that if
he moved at the rate of 5 miles per hour he
would slide 100 feet before he could stop
and that in so doing he would be apt to
slide over the side of the highway and his
bus would overturn or slide onto a railroad
track where he would be struck by an approaching tram, Would anyone contend that
he could proceed even at that rate of speed
without being guilty of negligence ?

Remhardt car if it came into his course
of travel 330 feet away. The evidence was
sufficient from which the jury could find
the defendants were negligent
To this effect, the law is well established
in this state: Section 57—7—113, U.C.A.
1943, provides:

"(a) No person shall drive a vehicle on
a highway at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions
and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event
speed shall be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid colliding with any person,
vehicle, or other conveyance on or enteimg the highway in compliance with legal
requirements and the duty of all persons to
[4] If the bus under normal road and use due care
*
*
*
•
*
weather conditions were operated on a
highway burdened with heavy traffic, at
"(c) The driver of every vehicle shall,
•such an excessive rate of speed that it
* * * drive at an appropriate reduced
could not be stopped or turned to one side
speed * * * when special hazard exsufficiently to avoid crashing into another
ists with respect to pedestrians or other
-car which came into its course of travel
traffic or by reason of weather or highway
when the bus was 330 feet away and conconditions "
tinued slowly in the same direction the bus
This statute requires that a driver shall
was traveling, the driver of the bus would
•clearly be guilty of negligence in driving not drive at a speed greater than is reasontoo fast
The defendants would also be able and prudent in view of the existing
negligent if they operated the bus under conditions and hazards on the highway,
normal conditions with such defective that his speed shall be controlled so as to
steering and braking equipment, on a high- avoid colliding with other vehicles enterway burdened with heavy traffic, so that it ing or upon the highway in a lawful man•could not be stopped or steered to one side ner, and that the speed shall be approprisufficiently to avoid a collision with a ve- ately reduced when special hazards exist
hicle which came into its course 330 ieet with respect to other traffic or by reason of
.away m the manner that the Remhardt car weather conditions In other woids, since
-did in this case Here the driver had driv- the greater the speed the less control the
en more than 20 miles under similar road driver has over his vehicle and a longer
and weather conditions which he encoun- distance is required within which to stop,
tered at the time of the accident He had and his ability to guide his vehicle is deample time to fully realize the amount of creased, and since his control will also be
control or lack thereof which he could decreased when traveling on icy roads covexert over the bus in case of an emergency ered with slush when a sleet of snow and
The driver must know that this highway rain is falling, he must under such condiWould be burdened with much traffic, he as tions according to this statute decrease his
-a reasonable prudent man must anticipate speed so that he can drive with reasonable
that vehicles would be constantly crossing safety to others using the highway and, acand coming into his course of travel. - lin- cording to our cases, he even owes greater
,
g e r such conditions he must anticipate that care to his passengers.
H would be highly dangerous for him to
In Nikoleropoulos^v. Ramsey, 61 Utah
* operate the bus at such a rate of, speed 465, 214 P 304, the defendant was driving
that he could not stop or turn to one side his car at night during a heavy rain storm
'Sufficiently to avoid a collision with the at about 12 miles per hour, in the distance
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the -lights''of oncoming cars reflected on the
wet pavement into his eyes so that at the
time of the accident he was unable to see
the plaintiff walking on the pavement in
front of him until he was within 6 feet and
then it was too late to avoid running him
down. We held that defendant was negligent as a matter of law, no matter how
dark and stormy the night or how bad the
visibility, if he drove at such a rate of
speed that he was unable to avoid running
plaintiff down within the distance plaintiff
could be seen walking ahead of defendant's
car on the highway. To the same effect
see: Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co., 80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d 309; Haarstrich v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 70
Utah 552, 262 P. 100; O'Brien v. Alston,
61 Utah 368, 213 P. 791.
The Nikoleropoulos v. Ramsey case is in
substance a holding that it is negligence to
operate a vehicle on the highway at any
time without having it under sufficient control so that others using the highway will
not be unreasonably endangered thereby,
regardless of how slow it is required to
travel to accomplish that end. If that is
the rule where visability is involved, it
follows that the same rule applies where
the lack of control which endangers others
is the result of slippery roads and stormy
conditions. This would be especially true
where a passenger for hire is involved.
As above pointed out, if the lack of control
which caused the danger'to the passengers
was the result of excessive speed, or defective steering~appiratus and faulty brakes,
then he would clearly be.negligent. Under
the above case the fact that the lack of control was the result of bad' weather and
road conditions, would, not exonerate him
from negligence.
Here the situation is slightly different
than it .was in the cases cited in that the
Reinhardt car was out of control and moving from one side to the other in "an uncertain manner. Under such circumstances a
driver might try to pass to one side only to
have the skiding'car swerve'into his path
which he expected to be free. However,
here as in-the cases'cited, the" driver could
be certain to avoid the collision by stopping
the bus before it reached the skidding car.

Since the car was traveling away frorn]tii_
bus had the bus been stopped, no collision
could have occurred. There is also *tlj
difference that in the cases cited, the driyj
was traveling at nighttime, when the :driv§
er's ability to see objects on the highway
was limited by darkness, and here there wasL
no such limitation on the driver's 'abiliKl
to see. ' Since his ability to see was-not'Sra
limited, his .duty to keep his car under 'cbnjS
trol on that account was not so great.'r.fclafl
view of these circumstances the driverAvSgj
not, as a matter of law, guilty of' neglijS
gence, which proximately caused the accin
dent. But in view of the fact that.the^jurfS
might have concluded that the car-con™
menced to turn into the path of the^WaB
when it was 330 feet away, and t h a t r t h «
weather conditions were such that at.thej
rate of speed the bus was traveling it couldj
not be stopped, slowed down, or broughtS
under control in time to avoid the accide'n^
the jury could reasonably conclude .fromj
their own experience and practical judg^j
ment, of what an ordinary prudent person!
would do, that the driver was negligenVjnj
driving at such a rate of speed, and thatj
such negligence was the proximate causejj
of the accident.
If the jury found that when the Reinhardt car commenced to turn into the patfij
of the bus, it was as much as 330 feet awawl
it .being clear from the evidence that/this
visibility • was such and the highwayL/wa»
free from obstructions so that the d r i v e l
could clearly see the car when it coma
menced to turn; that the slippery conditioia
of the highway had.been the same'all tHw
way from Hill Field to the place of the ac3
cident a distance of more than 20 mile's]!
thus giving the driver ample opportunitytol
know how fast he could safely drive-andl
still keep it under proper control; that*th3
accident occurred on a • main highway
where the driver must anticipate heavSj
traffic conditions; and in view of-the^faXw
that the transportation company owed-to^ua
passengers a special degree of caxeifog
their safety, the jury might reasonably cdn3
elude that the driver-was operating the bu3
at such a fast rate of speed that he coulS
not control it sufficiently to avoid the accig
dent. If the jury so found they could r e a j
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isonably conclude therefrom that he was establish one of the necessary;elements of
'guilty of .negligence which .proximately this type of negligence, .but, as previously
ccaused the ^accident and .plaintiff's injury. pointed out/that element was amply shown
This is a rinding of negligence' from the by the evidence which was introduced. , No
-surrounding' facts and circumstances and complaint,is made that such fact was not
^not'merely from the happening of the acci- sufficiently: established.. T h e . complaint
dent- alone. It is universally recognized seems to.be that such.fact was established
'that negligence may be inferred from the and that the defendants were thereby exonerated from neglignce. happening of the accident and the surA comparison with other distances will
rounding facts and circumstances where
.the facts are such as to reasonably justify help us.to visualize how far 330 feet is. It
such inference even though there is no .di- is 110 yards, one-half of a Salt Lake City
rect testimony to establish the exact block, one-sixteenth of a mile, nearly four
grounds of negligence which caused,the times the'.distance between the poles of an
Occident.'1 Green v. Higbee, '66 Utah'539, ordinary utility pole line. -These distances
244 P. 906; Morrison v. Perry| : i04;Utah are familiar to every one who has lived a
h51,' 140 P.2d772,* which is the 1'ast :6piiuori long time, in this state. It is .a long and
in thaKcase which supercedes the one cited dangerous distance for a bus to travel on
a highway burdened with traffic without the
"in appellant's brief.
ability to stop or reduce its speed sufficient'.' [5] The defendants' negligence is based,
ly to avoid a collision such as this.
jiot on the premise that the driver'could
The distance within which the bus could
liave stopped within the between distance,
l»ut on the opposite premise that by reason be stopped at a given rate of speed is an
<of excessive speed under the existing con- evidentiary fact and not an ultimate one.
ditions he could not stop within that dis- The value of evidence thereon would be
tance, and has thereby foreseeably endan- that the ultimate facts which are controlgered his passengers.^ Evidence of the dis- ling in this case might be inferred theretance required to stop the bus at various from. • That fact would have some bearing
•rates of speed would be necessary only on the : question of what was a due care
Tvhere it supplies, proof of some essential rate of speed but it certainly is not controlelement : pf negligence which would other- ling on that question. - y ;
-wise be backing. Here the essential eleHere, *as above pointed out, there are
ments necessary to establish negligence on three sets of facts which were very,largely
^.account of lack of a'due care rate of speed .•determinative of what was not a due care
^requires a snowing that the bus was being .speed:under the: existing conditions. They
Operated a t / s u c r r a ^ a s t - r a t e of speed that ;are";r;(l) How -far- was .the between disIhe driver should : have r e a l i z e d l h a r i t was 'tance?j»;(2) How»fast was the bus travel~^out of control to such an extent as to en- i n g ? ; (3) :Did .the. driver, have sufficient
danger the safety of his" passengers. >:jEvi- control over, the bus so .that his speed was
Y
dence of the distance required t o s t o p the a due. care speed ?..; Both of • the first two
Hxis' at various rates of speed would tend questions were answered by direct - evi^to show either that the driver did or that dence, and the question of the distance re'he did not have the ability to stop the bus quired to stop the bus when traveling at
"within- t h e : in ; between distance. If it various^speeds .would have no bearing on
^showed -that-the 'driver could stop the bus -either-of them.: That evidence would only
^vithin the' between distance then:it would tend'to show-whether or mot the bus was
"-defeat-a'claim of negligence, on this theory, out of control.;;Herethejevidence is ample
-but would conclusively establish negligence • to show that the bus was out of control, so
'on the~grounds*that had he. used due care that at, could not be.stopped or its speed
r
he would have stopped the bus within that reduced ? sufficiently ito avoid the accident.
-distance and thereby avoided the .accident. Such-: evidence was not necessary in order
^ f it showed .that the driver could not stop r for plaintiff to .make a prima facie case,
<the bus within that distance then it would and this court-.is not. authorized to require
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the plaintiff to produce it Especially is
this true where as here the missing evidence has no tendency to establish the disputed questions of fact in the case

and the driver who was then operatmg}£gl
bus at the time of this accident wastinH
better position to know these facts^klwrl
any one else

Although the smoother the road surface
the greater the distance required to stop the
bus at a given speed it does not follow that
a driver can, without being negligent, drive
at such a rate of speed over a smooth road
that the safetv of his passengers will be
thereby jeopardized What is due care under the existing conditions is determined
b> the driver's duty to his passengers, and
that duty is that he must not foreseeably
jeopardize their safety, he has that duty
whether driving over a smooth icy road or
over a normal dry pavement To this effect
the statute and cases cited are positive
The evidence here was sufficient since the
jury could reasonably find that the bus was
traveling at 40 miles per hour, that the
between distance was 330 feet, and that the
bus was out of control so that it could not
be stopped or its speed reduced sufficiently
to avoid this accident within that distance

We have carefully considered the -L otKS|
assignments of error and find no m e n t ^ S
them The judgment of the trial courtjy|
affirmed with costs to the respondent 0

It must be kept m mind that here our
problem is whether the evidence is sufficient
to sustain the verdict, not whether the evidence in question is admissible Had defendants offered to prove the distance
which would be required to stop the bus
under the surrounding circumstances at a
given rate of speed and such offer had been
rejected we would have had a different
problem Since the evidence was sufficient
to make a prima facie case for plaintiff it
is sufficient to sustain -a verdict in her-favor
and that is all we can require her to do
She is not required to produce evidence
which will tend to defeat her claim. If
there are other material facts which defendants wanted to prove they were at
liberty to introduce evidence thereof but
they certainly cannot defeat plaintiff's
claim merely on the ground that she has
failed to produce all the material evidence
This is especially true where as here the
defndants are in a better position to supply
the missing evidence than is - plaintiff.
They, no doubt, have as their employees
many experienced drivers of buses similar
to this one whom they could Tcall to give
evidence on the distance required to stop
the bus under the then existing conditions

McDONOUGH, C J , concurs m^tfiH
opinion of Mr Justice W A D E as eluadattj
ed by the opinion of Mr Justice WOIiRRl
. W O L F E , Justice (concurring)
I concur
While there is much in the reasoning)©
the main opinion with which I am injai
cord, there are a number of statements yt\\
which I do not agree Rather than entl
ci ^
into a critical analysis of those statement
pointing out wherein I think they are^u^
correct, I believe a more constructive'co
tnbution can be made b> an elucidation ofl
some of the concepts applicable to sl?eTeal
cases and in pointing out the pecuhar 4 na3
ture of the bus drner's iesponsibilities r 1cj|
his passengers m VIQW oi the si tuaticSJj
which confronted him—that is, the su^ei
and unexpected sliding of the Reinhaft|i
car athwart the right of way of the bus
as compared to the duty of the dnver r geii
erally to drive at a due care speed when no
emergency confronted him
I shall preface the main part of niyjOgmj
ion by a brief consideration of the pty r a §J
"control of a car", or its equi\ alent J^agl
under control", and its counterpart tj'odl
of control". I am convinced after . s o m a
years in the practice and on the bench thaflj
these phrases are often used without suflwj
cient thought as to their conceptional^conjl
tent in view of the facts of the particular
situations claimed to involve negligence$H
Ordinarily the word "control" apphe&lOT
the operation of a moving mechanical* o | 9
ject such as a car when used in the pkrajjl
"under control" as distinguished from ^ AgJ
of. control", means that the operator "haS
the power to make the car respond to 4 8 3
^vill which in the case of an automobilj|
means that it will respond to his steenng|
and to his action to accelerate or decelerate
by manipulating the throttle or brakeg
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''Out of control" usually means that the car
can no longer be depended upon to respond
to the driver's efforts to guide or slow it.
I go to some pains to describe these terms
because I think that they are often used in
a different and perhaps inexact sense
"Out of control" is the opposite of "under
control" but excess speed is not the counterpart of "under control"
Cars "going at
high speed may be under control in the
sense that they are not out of control We
have an excellent example of a car "out of
control" m the movements of the Reinhardt
car In many cases a pleader will use the
phrase "failed to have proper control of
the car" as meaning that the driver was going so fast as not to be able to slow down
for eventualities although there was no inability of the driver to steer the car, apply
brakes or decelerate the car
The only
reason he could not do so in time to a\oid
an accident was that he was going too fast
Such allegation is synonymous with "excess
speed" which in turn may be included in the
still more inclusive phrase "driving without
due care under the circumstances" or
equivalent phrases The pleader tends to
multiply stigmata of delict in order to make
defendant's conduct seem as reprehensible
as possible For the purpose of framing issues it is well to particularize as to the nature of the failure to exercise due care In
this case also we must fasten on what we
mean when we use the phrases "under control" and "out of control".
In his opinion Mr. Justice Wade states
definitely that he uses the^word "control"
to "mean the ability of the driver to stop
or reduce the speed of his vehicle within a
reasonable distance and to guide the same
in the desired course". I take this to be
somewhat equivalent to what I shall call
"due care speed", which I define as the
speed which a driver should not exceed, in
view of the likelihood of eventualities—not
to avoid all collisions which no driver could
do—but to enhance the possibility and
probability of avoiding collisions
"Due
care speed" is that speed at which a prudent and careful driver should drive in
^iew of the prevailing weather and road
conditions, and m view of the condition and
responsiveness of the braking apparatus
186 P 2d—38 M>
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on his machine and h?5 duty to passengers,
and to other traffic on the highway.
It should be said at the outset that I do
not wish to be understood as saying that
the jury must necessarily fix upon a speed
that would be a maximum due care speed
under a given set of circumstances
The
speed at which a person "was going might
be considered as "too fast"—to use the popular vernacular—without the jury having
to consult and agree or even have in mind
a process or definite figure as being the upper limit of due care speed. <
Therefore, in order not to confuse speed
with "control" used in the sense of ability
to manipulate the car, I shall use instead*
of the word "control", the phrase "due care
speed" and shall use the term "excess
speed", to mean speed in excess of due care
speed Speed seems, even under Mr Justice Wade's interpretation of the word
"control", to be the essence of "keeping
control" or of "control" although at one
place in his opinion he seems to confuse
the meaning with "out of control".
[5] In this case both sides introduced
testimony as to the rate of speed at which
the bus was travelling at the time the Reinhardt car went out of control and skidded
into its path
Both sides also presented
testimony as to the distance between the
bus and the Reinhardt car at the time the
Reinhardt car went out of control
This
distance is hereinafter referred to as the
r

"between distance". In addition to this,
there was some evidence of circumstances
surrounding the collision from which inferences of speed might have been made
Neither side offered evidence of the distances which would be required to stop
the bus, travelling at various speeds, under
the road and weather conditions prevailing at the time of the collision
I shall
hereafter refer to such distances as "stopping distances". Appellant contends that
the failure of plaintiff to introduce such
evidence amounts to a-failure of proof
Appellant's position is that without such
evidence the jury could * ot determine what
was a reasonable speed, and therefore could
not say whether or not the bus was travelling at an excessive speed. This question is fraught with considerable difficulty.
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As background, and for better understanding of the problem involved, I believe it would be helpful first to consider
the duty of the bus driver to Reinhardt
His duty in this respect would be purely
one of last clear chance Even if he were
travelling too rapidly in view oi the skidding hazards his speed would not have been
the proximate cause of the accident His
duty would arise only when he perceived
or should have perceived the Reinhardt
car spinning toward his path and then it
would have been his duty to avoid the collision if, and only if, under all the circumstances, taking into account the speed a t
which he was going, he had had ample opportunity to stop or slow up sufficiently to
go around the Reinhardt car if there was
room for doing that without endangering
his passengers A driver is not ordinarily
required to anticipate that another will
ha\e gotten out of his proper path of travel and that he, the driver, must drive so as
to create for some other a last clear chance
opportunity A driver of a car does not
carry with him an anticipatory last clear
chance obligation
Such obligation arises
only after the operator of the vehicle is
or should be aware of the position of the
other, who, being in a position of danger, is
unaware of his peril, or, if aware, unable
timely to extricate himself from it Grah a m s Johnson, Utah, 166 P 2d 230, on rehearing, 172 P 2 d 665 Nor would he be
compelled to apply his brakes suddenly on
an icy pavement if there were danger of
his skidding off the road by so doing The
high care with which "he was charged as
operator of a public transport vehicle at
the moment of discovery might require
that he release the throttle and let the momentum of the car in part deplete itself
before he applied the brakes That might
also have been the best thing to have done
for^the safety of his passengers even in
this case. Or conditions may have been
such that a -due care speed would be one
in which he had not gathered momentum
and therefore could apply his^ brakes instantaneously Due care speed may revolve
around the time it takes to run out momentum before brakes can be applied with safety The difference between the case of the
"IUS driver's duty toward Reinhardt and the

passengers lies then in this That as to,
Reinhardt, whose car suddenly spun in t u s ^
path, the bus driver's speed cannot be the%J
proximate cause of the accident (la>ingj]
aside the case where the oncoming driver^
was going in excess of the legal speed, a *\
case which I desire to reserve until it comes***
before us properly for consideration), b u £ :
only failure to take ad\antage of the oppor-A
tunity to avoid the collision if it reasonably>l
presented itself, taking into account the bus^
driver's speed, whilst as to passengers the^j
bus driver has the duty to drive with the a
care that a reasonably prudent person would^ i
have exercised under like circumstances^
and that means a due-care speed in view of J
slippery pavements and eventualities whichJi
may arise therefrom
As to passengers, lif |
the driver exceeds a due-care speed he car^• $
ries such negligence with him although \tA
may or may not have proximately caused i
an accident In many instances, negligence, j
does not result in accidents As to R e m ^
hardt, the duty arose only after the bus,
driver did or could have seen Reinhardt's
predicament Reinhardt could not contend ^
that had the bus driver been going slower *
there would have been more distance with *
in which to stop, for by the same token
/*
had the driver been going faster he mighty
have passed the point where Reinhardt^
spun onto his pathway before the spin b~e-<3
gan . No person who gets himself into a*j
dangerous position whether by negligence^
or without fault can contend that, had tneS
on coming party been going slower, ""hej
would have had a greater last clear cha"hcel[
to stop The last clear chance duty is one 1 !
which arises out of the scene as t h e ' d e * !
fendant finds it, it does not take lnto^ao^
count antecedent conditions If it did 'tneljl
plaintiff might argue that had the defend**!
ant been proceeding at a due-care speed, *he8
would even have arrived at the scene *-of/j
danger before he, the plaintiff, extncatedij
himself from such danger and thus argueji
that in such wise the excessive speed was^
the proximate cause
[2,3] r But as to a passenger in the JbujjS
the last ,clear chance doctrine is not ap^ligj
cable as a last clear chance concept. ThereJ
would be the same obligation as in the J?$3J
clear chance doctrine to do everything 2 tol
avoid the accident consistent with safety!
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toward his passengers but that would be in pable failure to follow the court's instruc•addition to the continuing duty to drive tions. I "think it ,unnecessary to bring
•at.a due care speed in view of possible those matters into this case.
t eventualities and before they arose, .and
Returning now to the real problem of the
Jvwould therefore be a part of the bus driv- case, I think it may be analyzed by breake r ' s duty toward his passengers. The duty ing it into two parts. I shall first consider
:
upward _such passengers is to exercise con- the sufficiency of the evidence of between
tinuous high care that they be not injured distances to prove excess of due care speed.
.by the driving. And that means that-the I shall then consider the direct testimony
driver must drive as a prudent person of speed, and whether or not it is sufficient
\would drive in view of his duty toward to justify an inference of excess speed.
passengers, which I have designated for ' There must be some minimum between
.shortness "due care driving", or "due care distance, which is so great that all reason^speed". "This means that the speed must able minds would conclude that if a ve'be adapted to the hazards such as ice, snow, hicle were proceeding along the'highway
traffic and the like and, to an extent, to at so great a speed that it could not be
the likelihood of eventualities. Of course, stopped within such distance, then such veno one can drive on an icy day so as to hicle was travelling at an excess of due
avoid all possible collisions. The Rein- care speed. I shall call this distance x.
hardt car might have skidded directly in Let us assume that the between distance is
front of or even into the side of the bus no one mile. All reasonable minds would conmatter how slowly it was going, or even if clude that a bus that could not be stopped
it were stopped. Consequently, the colli- within one mile was being driven at an exsion itself does not prove excess speed. cess of due care speed. One mile is either
Such conclusion must come from the evi- x distance or x plus.
dence or from inferences from other facts,
There must also be some maximum bealthough by taking into consideration
tween distance so short that all reasonable
'such other facts the fact of the collision,
minds must conclude that a vehicle travel'or the force of it, may themselves be facts
ling at a due care speed would not be able
from which, in view of the total picture,
to stop within such distance. I shall call
inferences could be made.
this distance y. Let us assume that the beWhen a car, through loss _of control or tween distance is 10 feet. All reasonable
other reason, suddenly and" unexpectedly minds would say that a bus travelling at
spins away from its side of the highway in.
.
,
,. ,
.
maximum due care speed could not stop
to the pathway of another vehicle coming
.,
, ,. ^ ^
~
.
.
...
•r
•
J•
t
within
such distance. Ten feet is either v
t
from the opposite direction, we must_ be_ ,
stance or y minus.
careful not to load onto the driver of the
Perhaps these concepts can be -better''exother vehicle, even as to a passenger, the
plained
by a simple illustration.
duty to avoid the danger of the spinning
car unless there is some negligence on the
A Y
P
X
part of the driver of the vehicle remaining
on its own right of way, which negligence M
IN
proximately caused the injury to the passenger.
Let the line M N represent the highway.
[1] It is conceded that it is the duty of The bus is travelling from M toward N.
*he appellate court to sustain a verdict From point A to point Y is y distance.
where there is substantial evidence to sup- From point A to point X is x distance. P
port it. I shall not enter into the matter represents any point between Y and X and
of the appellate court's duty when the evi- p is the distance from A to P. Thus P
dence is claimed to preponderate so plain- represents every point between Y and X,
b against the verdict as to show an abuse and p represents every distance greater
of discretion 'in the trial court m refusing than y and less than x. When the bus arto set the verdict aside as arrived at arbi- rives at point A, the Reinhardt car skids
trarily or through bias or prejudice or pal- .onto the west side of the highway into the
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path of the bus If when the bus is at
point A, the Reinhardt car is at point X
or at any point beyond X, the bus, if travelling at a due care speed, can be stopped in
time to avoid collision If the bus cannot
be stopped in time to avoid the collision all
reasonable minds will agree that it is travelling at excess of due care speed

introduces no direct evidence o f b s g S
but leaves speed to be inferred by thejrfffl
from the evidence of betweenrdistaSI
alone

(a) Where the evidence is concTusi?
that the between distance was x or^greafl
than x, evidence of stopping disfanc
would be immaterial The defendant *w|
If when the bus is at point A, the Rein- travelling at an excess speed as a mat?
hardt car is at point P, reasonable minds of law
may differ as to whether or not a bus trav(b) Where the evidence is concltisTj
elling at due care speed would be able to that the between distance was y
stop in time to avoid the collision
In than y, defendant is entitled to a direcp
other words, reasonaable minds may dif- verdict, since he would not be able to^av?
fer as to whether or not a bus travel- the accident even though travelling^afl
ling at a due care speed would be able to due care speed
From the between* <hs
stop within distance p, or stated conversely, tance alone, no reasonable mind could
whether or not a bus unable to stop with- excess of due care speed, and therefo
in the distance p was travelling at a due there would be no evidence of excess speel
care speed The closer P is to X, or the to go to the jury
more closely p approximates x, the greater
(c) Where the evidence adduced ^tf
the number of reasonable minds which
plaintiff tends to show that the betwe
would conclude that a bus not able to stop
distance was x or greater, and the e V
< o tf
within p was travelling at an excess speed,
dence adduced by defendant tends to sho
and conversely the nearer P is to Y, or the
that the between distance was p, A.w
more closely that p approximates y, the
burden is on defendant to show ^th
fewer the reasonable minds that would constopping distances
The reason for thij
clude that because a bus was not able to
rule is
Plaintiff, having produced^,ey:
stop within p it was tra\ elling at an exdence that the between distance was},
cess of due care speed
or greater has put in proof, which if urbS
If when the bus is at point A, the Rein- contradicted, entitles him to a directed v,eg|
hardt car is at point Y or any point be- diet (absent contributory negligence)
Da
tween A and Y, if the bus is travelling at fendant, by adducing evidence that theiKr*
the maximum due care speed, all reason- tween distance was p has not completely in
able minds will agree that the bus could butted^ plaintiff's proof/ since reasonah
not stop in time to avoid the collision A minds might conclude that even within tchsj
bus ^travelling at less than the maximum tance p a bus travelling at due care spee^
due care speed might be able to stop with- could be stopped In other^ words, in o r f § 3
in y distance, and of course, it would be to completely, rebut plaintiff's evidence^ <$g
the_duty_o£ the_ driver to_stop if possible fendant must "not only sTiow that the*D<
A failure to stop under such circumstances tween distance was less than x (1 e hVL
would make the operator of the bus liable but also that a bus travelling at a due* c a r s
—not because he was negligent in travel- speed could not be stopped -within distan<9
ling in excess of due care speed—but be- p This does not mean that if defenciarH
cause he failed to utilize the last clear fails to offer evidence of stopping distancey
chance to^avoid the collision
that plaintiff is entitled to>a directed -vera
With" these concepts in mind, I think diet a What I do mean is that defendant $ s 3
certain general rules can be laid down as sumes the risk of failure to produce sucjn
regards the necessity of introducing'-evi- evidence, and if the jury finds for plair||
dence of the various distances required to tiff, defendant cannot complain that^ftnej
stop a vehicle travelling at different rates proof is insufficient And,' of course, wrTery
of speed under the conditions prevailing at defendant offers proof that the between'disa
the time of the collision These rules are tance was p, but fails to offer proof of thej
intended to apply only where the plaintiff stopping distances, plaintiff may on rebut^
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tal show the stopping distances to prove
that a bus driven at a due care speed would
be able to stop within distance p. In short,
either party may offer evidence of the shopping distances, but neither may complain
•'that the other failed to produce such proof.
1

"' '(d) Where the evidence adduced by both
parties is that the between distance was p,
.either party may introduce evidence of the
stopping distances, but neither is bound to
do so. Plaintiff may offer such evidence
to show that a bus driven at a due care
speed could be stopped within p, or defendant may offerr such evidence to show that
a bus driven at due care speed could not
be stopped within distance p. However, in
the event of an adverse verdict neither can
complain that the other failed to offer the
requisite proof.

(e) Where plaintiff's evidence shows that
the between distance was p, and defendant's evidence shows that the between distance was y, the risk of failure to provide
evidence of stopping distances is on plaintiff, but failure to furnish this evidence is
not failure of proof, and plaintiff is entitled to go to the jury. And, of course,
defendant may offer evidence of stopping
.distances as rebuttal to plaintiff's evidence.
This is the converse of rule (c).
(f) Where plaintiff's evidence is .that
'the between distance was x,'or greater, and
'defendant's evidence is that th'e -between
distance was y, or less, either-party may,
but neither party must, produce evidence
of the stopping distances.
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greater, or at y or less, ypll the .case be
taken from the jury. In all other situations there is sufficient evidence to go to*
the jury. Either party may offer evidence
of stopping distances, either in support of
his case in chief, or in rebuttal to the evidence of the adverse party. .In most cases
it will be advantageous for one side or the
other to offer such evidence. But if both
sides neglect to offer such evidence, neither
can complain that the other failed to do so.
I think we may analyze speed in the same
manner as we have analyzed between distance. Let r represent the minimum rate
of speed which all reasonable 'minds will
agree is in excess of due care speed under
prevailing conditions. Let s represent the
maximum rate of speed which all reasonable minds will agree is a due care speed
under prevailing conditions. And let k
represent all speeds between s and r. Reasonable minds would differ as to whether a
bus travelling at k speed was at due care
or excess speed. We may now parallel
rules (a) to (f) announced above. Where
the evidence is undisputed that the bus was
travelling at r speed or greater, or at s
speed or less, evidence of stopping distances would be of no value since excess
of due care speed, or due care k speed would
be proved as a matter of law by direct evidence of speed. But where the evidence
.shows -that the bus was travelling ( at k
speed, or where there is a conflict in evidence as to whether the bus was travelling at r speed, k speed, or s speed, evidence of stopping distances may t be introduced by either party, either in support of
his case in chief or in rebuttal of the evidence produced by the*other side. But neit h e r party has the duty to offer such evidence, and neither can complain, in the
event of an adverse verdict, that the other
party failed to prove his case.

Other situations may be conceived where
some of plaintiff's'witnesses put the between distance at x or greater, while others
put it at p, and where some, of defendants'
witnesses put the between distance at y
or less, and others put it at p. Without
segregating all of the possible combinations
~of evidence* I think it may be said that in
As heretofore noted, in this case, as in
^these cases either'party may offer evidence most .cases, there was evidence both of beof the stopping distances, - but neither is tween distances and speed. The evidence
'bound to do so.
of speed varied from 25 to 50 miles per
Summarizing briefly, there is no situation hour. The "evidence of between distance
m which the failure of either party to varied from 30 to 330 feet.
"prove stopping distances will be so fatal
Most, if not all, of the between distances
"to his case as to take it from the jury. testified to would ' fall within-the p "disOnly where the evidence conclusively es- -tance range. Whether the extreme establishes the between distance as x or mates would fall within 1 the x or y dis-
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tances is a question which I think we need
not now determine There was substantial
e\idence that the between distance was p,
and from this the jury could infer that the
bus was travelling at an excess speed If
a bus travelling at an extremely or moderately slow rate of speed could not be stopped within the between distances testified
to then defendants ought to have come forward with proof to that effect Not having
done so, they cannot now complain that
there was not sufficient evidence of excess
of due care speed
As to the evidence of speed, I think that
the jury might have concluded that even
the minimum speed testified to—25 miles
per hour—was an excess of due care speed,
considering the weight of the bus and the
stored energy such a heavy \ehicle would
have going at a speed of 25 miles an hour
and the adverse road and weather conditions prevailing at the time of the collision Here again, defendant cannot complain that plaintiff did not produce evidence
of stopping distances
Defendant could
have come forward with evidence that a
bus travelling at 25 miles per hour could
be stopped in a relatively short distance
under the conditions then prevailing, if
such were the fact Having failed to do
so, he cannot now complain that plaintiff
as failed to -prove his case
[4] I conclude that there was both direct evidence of speed and evidence of between distance from which a jury could
infer that the bus was t r a v e l l i n g ^ excess
speed In addition-to this, there was the
further evidence that after the bus struck
the Rcinhardt car li. struck a parked automobile and then careened across the road,
and finally came to rest at a point about 75
feet from the parked automobile This was
an additional circumstance from which a
jury might infer that the bus was travelling
at an excessive speed.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur.
P R A T T , Justice (dissenting).
In dissenting I'm going to write the case
as I view it in its details
The pertinent facts are these: The
plaintiff was a passenger for hire on a bus
operated by the defendant, Utah Transpor-

tation Company
On the day of the acS
cident plaintiff boarded the defendant's busj
at Hill Field, Utah, her place of employ^
ment, for the purpose of being transported^
to Salt Lake City She took a seat on thej
left side of the defendant's bus about three)
rows behind the driver The bus left Hill;
Field at approximately 4 20 p m It was^
snowing and raining at the time and ttie«
highway along which the bus proceeded
was covered with slush and ice It was*a
four lane highway each lane being 10 feet
wide, and it was paved The road shoul-^
ders were about 13 feet wide but cut down
considerable by snow banks
The bus;
while proceeding south in the outside trat"
fie lane on the west side of the highway*;
about 1,800 feet north of the Salt Lake*)
County line ran into the right rear of tffLj
defendant Remhardt's automobile
Just']
prior to the collision defendant, Reinhardt,
had been driving his automobile north"
about 20 or 30 miles per hour on the high-*1
way in the lane of traffic next to the cen-"
ter line on the east side of the highway"*
For some unexplained reason his car wentl
into a spin and spun from the east side of'
the highway into the outside lane on the*
west side and directly into the path of the*
defendant, Utah Transportation Company's^
oncoming bus Remhardt's car was facing'
in a southeasterly direction and still mov-"
ing at the moment of impact
It was*
knocked down the highway some 30 to SJ)
feet before it came to rest After the first?
impact with Remhardt's car the bus ran*
into another automobile which was parked*
on the west shoulder of the highway be^i
fore being brought to a full stop at a pom 13
about 75 feet from where it hit the parked^
automobile The bus weighed 7,000 pounds,"!
had a 186 inch wheel base, and was 6 fe'et*
10 inches wide Its capacity was 33 per-'*
sons
It was in the first impact with the dg-1,
fendant Remhardt's car that the plaintiff*
received her injury.
There is considerable variance in theevidence presented as to how far the company's bus was from Remhardt's car when
the latter was spinning toward the west
side of the road and into the path of the^
bus, and also as to the speed of the bus at^
that time The defendant Reinhardt, who_
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was called as a witness for the plaintiff estimated the distance to be about 300 feet.
The bus driver estimated the distance to be
between 75 and 100 feet. Five passengers
testified that they saw the Reinhardt car
prior to the impact and their estimates
ranged from 150 to 90 feet. One witness
fixed the distance from the curve where the
accident could first be seen as 200 feet.
Mrs. Horsley the plaintiff, hesitatingly testified to a much greater distance, i. e. about
660 feet, one city block, but only after her
counsel suggested she estimate by comparison with a city block. Her testimony on
this point stands by itself.
1
Mrs. Horsley estimated that the bus was
going 40 to 50 miles per hour. The bus
had a maximum speed governor of 38 miles
per hour which was locked at that speed.
Several other passengers estimated the
speed to be about 25 to 26 miles per hour
approximately the speed the bus driver
said he was driving immediately prior to
the accident. It is undisputed that the bus
driver did not apply the brakes on-the bus
until he was within 5 to 10 feet of the
Reinhardt car. The bus did not slow up
any appreciable amount from the time
Reinhardt's car could have been seen until the collision. The bus was proceeding
down a slight incline at the time of the accident. It had taken the bus about an hour
and 10 minutes to travel approximately
22 miles.
• The real controversy in this case is one
of speed, and also as to whether or not the
speed of the bus was the proximate cause
of the injury to plaintiff. Failure to keep a
proper lookout- is unsupported by the evidence. The alleged failure to slacken speed
and the alleged failure to apply the brakes
are bound up- in the question of speed and
the question of proximate cause between
speed and injury.
The question is: Did the evidence link
speed acid injury together by a chain of
proximate cause? I believe not. Plaintiff has failed to establish the speed as a
proximate cause of the collision. The case
of O'Mally v. Eagan, 43 Wyo. 233, 2 P.2d
1063, 77 A.L.R. 582, at page 588, discusses
the necessity of proof of proximate cause
y
ery clearly. That court says in effect that
one should be able to point out from the
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evidence just how the defendant could have
avoided the accident by the use of proper
care—proper speed in this case. If plaintiff can point that out in the evidence in
the present case she has established a foundation for the jury's verdict. I cannot
overemphasize the fact that the jury's verdict must have support in the evidence and
such support is not found merely in the
fact that the jury may have chosen to conclude that any one of the speeds testified to
was unreasonable, simply because they believed it so, or by the fact that they chose
to believe that such speed proximately
caused the" collision. There must be evidence to support their conclusions whatever those conclusions may be. We quote
from Whalen v. Dunbar, 44 R.I. 136, 115
A. 718, at page 720, a quotation quoted and
approved in O'Mally v. Eagan, (cited
above): "If it should be conceded that the
defendant's automobile at the time the
emergency was created was proceeding at
a rate of speed in excess of the statutory
limit, there was no testimony of probative
value showing or tending to show that the
accident would not have happened if the
defendant's automobile had been proceeding at the rate of 25 miles per hour, or
even at a much less rate of speed, or that
the speed of the defendant's automobile in
any way entered into the cause of the collision."
To arrive at the verdict it did in the
present case the jury must have found that
the defendant bus company's driver could
have stopped this bus upon the road as it
then was within the space and time available to him after Reinhardt's car first became visible in its spin, had he been going
at a reasonable rate of speed. But what
was that reasonable speed; how was it to
be determined so that it would show how
the bus could have been stopped in time?
There is no testimony as to the distance
required to stop that bus at any given
speed. Bus driving is not so common to all
of us that each of us is qualified to express
an opinion as to such a required distance.
Three hundred feet distance or 75 feet distance on an inclined icy road at 50 miles
per hour or at 25 miles per hour with a bus
weighing 7,000 pounds and an automobile
spinning toward the bus are not a set of
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iacts which on their face indicates that
the bus could or could not have been stopped in any particular distance—or, for that
matter, that the collision could or could
not have been avoided by the bus driver
Such circumstances leave nothing but speculation as to what could have been done
with the bus at such speed or at other
speeds In the absence of evidence of the
average human reaction time, the approximate coefficient of friction on the road under the conditions existing on the day of
the accident, and the braking distances of
vehicles, or in the absence of testimony of
expert drivers as to what can be done with
a motor vehicle of that size and weight,
the jury cannot through the application of
logic and reason determine whether or not
a bus proceeding at a reasonable speed
could have stopped in time to a\oid a collision Unless the jury can say from the
evidence (not just say) that the collision
would not have occurred, but for that
speed, they are not justified in returning a
verdict for plaintiff
The jury concluded
that the transportation company's negligence was the only negligence that was the
proximate cause of the collision
E\ en
though it be considered that Remhardt s
skidding was an unavoidable accident so
far as his responsibility is concerned, it
does not follow that such a skidding may
not have been an independent intervening
cause between the alleged negligence of the
transportation company and the collision
To take it out of that classification there
must be evidence connecting the alleged
negligence of the transportation company
as a proximate~cause, to the collision

To hand the jury various speeds andsy^j
nous distances and ask them to selelfl
which is reasonable and which is unreal
sonable without giving them an e v i d e n t i a l
standard upon which to base their select
tion, is to ask them to speculate
Incfti?
majority of cases it will result in theifj
reasoning backward from the resultanttacji
cident that the speed at which theyiconH
elude the driver was going must have beenl
unreasonable or else the accident wouk?
not have happened Such reasoning byatsj
very nature assumes the proximate cauiS
element and the question of what was thej
proper method under the circumstancesfofi
operating the bus upon an icy road ls-gusfrj
skipped over
What is there in the record upon whichy
a comparison can be made to enable thel
jurors to arrive at the conclusion of ex?'
cess or of non excess speed ? I say again,:
bus driving is not a thing of common^
knowledge It must be founded on expert'
testimon)—of which there is none in the'
record It can t be assumed that any spee9 :
is excessive and the burden placed on de"'
fendant to defeat that assumption TKe^
plaintiff's prima facie case calls for proof
of negligence and proof of proximate'
cause neither of which must be assume'd^
Proof of facts which cannot be measured^
for lack of a unit to measure them, accom31
plish nothing
I am of the opinion that the motion tors
a directed verdict in favor of the defendantTransportation Company should have been]
granted
LATIMER, Justice, not participating.^
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George G. KELLY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Lawrence MONTOYA, John S. Ward, Darvel D. Richins, Richins Bros., Inc., and
Norbert E. O'Connor, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 429.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
May 8, 1970.

Truck passenger brought an action
against various defendants for injuries sustained in multiple-vehicle accident. The
District Court of Sandoval County, Waldo
Spiess, J., entered a summary judgment in
favor of the defendant vehicle drivers and
the passenger appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wood, J., held that depositions in action by truck passenger for personal injuries sustained when truck crashed into
vehicles of two defendants who had stopped
their vehicles at scene of prior collision between vehicles driven by two other defendants on highway during sandstorm presented issues of fact as to negligence because of violation of statute prohibiting the
leaving of vehicles on highway, foreseeability and proximate cause precluding summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded for trial.
Dman, J., dissented and filed opinion.

1. Judgment <£=>I85(2)

In deciding motion for summary judgment, trial court must view matters
presented and considered by it in most favorable aspect they will bear in support of
right to trial on issues.
2. Trial <£=>I39(I)

Conflict in testimony of a single witness is to be resolved by trier of fact.
3

- Judgment @=I86

It is not function of trial court to
eigh evidence in considering motion for
summary judgment as such motion should
b
e granted only when facts are undisputed,

w

4. Judgment <£=I85.3(2!)

Depositions in action by truck passenger for personal injuries sustained when
truck crashed into vehicles of two defendants who had stopped their vehicles at scene
of prior collision between vehicles driven
by two other defendants on highway during
sandstorm presented issues of fact as to
negligence because of violation ot statute
prohibiting the leaving of vehicles on highway, foreseeabihty and proximate cause
precluding summary judgment. 1953 Comp.
§ 64-l&-49(a).
5. Negligence <3=>I0

Foreseeabihty is an element of negligence.
6. Automobiles <§=>I73(2)

Statute prohibiting leaving of vehicles
upon highway is for benefit of persons using highway, and since it is foreseeable
that blocking highway may cause other persons to have accident a violation of statute
is negligence per se. 1953 Comp. § 6418-49(a).
7. Negligence <§=56(l.7, 1.12)

"Proximate cause" is that which produces the injury and without which the injury would not have occurred.
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
8. Negligence <§=62(l)

For an intervening act to be an "independent cause" the intervening act must be
sufficient in and of itself to break natural
sequence of first negligence.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
9. Negligence <3=>56(I.I0), 61(1)

"Proximate cause" of injury need not
be last act, or nearest act to injury, but
may be one which actually aided in producing the injury, and proximate cause need
not be the sole cause but it must be a concurring cause.
10. Judgment @=>I85(2)

Party moving for summary judgment
has burden of establishing that there is no
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material issue of fact to be determined by
factfinder and is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law, and burden is not on opposing party to prove prima facie case.

highway behind Ward's vehicle. Next to]
stop was Richins (defendants Richins and?
Richins Bros., Inc.). O'Connor stopped
behind Richins. Kenosha (Kenosha Auto.
Transport Corporation and Woodburnf^
stopped behind O'Connor.

Avelino V. Gutierrez, Albuquerque, for
appellant.

The second accident occurred when
Baumer (Baumer Foods, Inc. and Logan)
ran into the rear of Kenosha. Kenosha in
turn, collided with O'Connor and Richins,
and O'Connor collided with Richins.

Jackson O. Akin, Rodey, Dickason,
Sloan, Akin & Robb, Albuquerque, for appellee Montoya.
J. J. Monroe, Iden & Johnson, Albuquerque, for appellee Ward.
Frank H. Allen, Jr., Modrall, Seymour,
Sperling, Roehl & Harris, Albuquerque,
for appellee Richins.
Eugene E. Klecan, Albuquerque, for appellee O'Connor.
OPINION

Plaintiff, a passenger in the Baumer
truck, sued for personal injuries.
His
claim against Kenosha and Baumer has
been settled. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Montoya,'
Ward, Richins and O'Connor.
Plaintiff
appeals.
When we refer to "testimony" or "evidence," we refer to that which appears in
the depositions.

WOOD, Judge.
[1] Plaintiff was injured in a multi-vehicle accident. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is not proper where
there is the slightest issue as to a material
fact. In deciding a motion for summary
judgment, the trial court must view the
matters presented and considered by it in
the most favorable aspect they will bear in
support of the right to a trial on the issues.
Perry v. Color Title of New Mexico, 81
N.M. 143, 464 P.2d 562 JCt.App.1970).
We reverse the summary judgment discussing: (1) statutory violation; (2) foreseeability; (3) proximate cause and independent intervening cause; and (4) the
burden of the party opposing summary
judgment.
The accident occurred on a highway east
of Deming, during daylight, but also during a sand storm. The wind was strong
and gusting. Because of the sand and
wind gusts, visibility varied from zero to
two hundred feet.
The first accident occurred when Montoya and Ward, both across the center line
of the highway, collided. There is evidence that a vehicle, or two, stopped on the

Statutory

violation.

Plaintiff says there are several issues of.
negligence. We need consider only one of,
them. Section 64-18-49(a), N.M.S.A.1953
(Repl.Vol. 9, pt, 2) provides in part:
"* * *
[N]o person shall stop,
park, or leave standing any vehicle,whether attended or unattended, upon
the paved or main-traveled part of the
highway when it is practicable to stop,
park, or so leave such vehicle off such
part of said highway, * * *."
There is testimony that the highway at
the accident scene had good eight foot
shoulders, that the descent from the shoulders to the bar ditch was not steep, that
vehicles drove onto the shoulder and into
the bar ditch area and beyond. There is
testimony that both the Montoya and Ward
vehicles were driveable after their accident, and that some ten minutes elapsed between the two accidents.
Richins and O'Connor do not dispute
that a factual issue existed as to their violation of § 64-18-49(a), supra; Montoya
and Ward do. These two defendants, relying on selected testimony, assert their cars
were off the highway at the time of the
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second collision. They assert the only testimony to the contrary is that of the investigating State Police officer; they claim
this officer's testimony raised no factual
issue because he admitted to uncertainty as
to the location of the Montoya and Ward
cars when he arrived on the scene.
Contradictory inferences may be drawn
from the officer's testimony. At one place
he said the vehicles were still on the road.
At another place it is indicated the officer
had made a sworn statement that the two
vehicles were on the road. Other parts of
his testimony seem to contradict this.
[2,3] The fact that contradictory inferences exist shows that the evidence is not
undisputed. The conflict in the testimony
of a single witness is to be resolved by the
trier of fact. Hughes v. Walker, 78 N.M.
63, 428 P.2d 37 (1967). The trial court
could not properly resolve such conflict on
a motion for summary judgment for by
doing so, it would be weighing the evidence. It is not the function of the trial
court to weigh the evidence in considering
a motion for summary judgment; such a
motion may be granted only where the
facts are undisputed. Johnson v. J. S. &:
H. Construction Co., 81 N.M. 42, 462 P.2d
627 (Ct.App.1969).
[4] There being factual issues as to the
violation of § 64-18-49(a),~supra, there are
factual issues as to the negligence of each
of the four defendants. Gould v. Brown
Construction Company, 75 N.M. 113, 401
P.2d 100 (1965); Horrocks v. Rounds, 70
N.M. 73t 370 P.2d 799 (1962); Williams v.
Neff, 64 N.M. 182, 326 P.2d 1073 (1958).
Foreseeability.
Defendants assert that even if they violated a statute, they could not be held negligent because of a lack of foreseeability.
They rely on Anderson v. Jones, 66 111.
App.2d 407, 213 N.E.2d 627 (1966). In
that case Jones was in the same position as
Montoya and Ward in this case. There, as
here, cars had stopped on the highway after
the first accident and before the second
accident occurred. Anderson was in the

last car which had stopped when Zehr's
car rear-ended Anderson's car. In ruling
the second accident was not foreseeable,
the Illinois court states:
"It is quite clear that the immediate
cause of plaintiffs' injuries and damages
was the force set in motion through the
negligent act of Zehr. The force set in
motion by Jones had spent itself. It was
in repose. It was quiescent. The incident was at an end. Plaintiffs were
home free save for the wrongful act of
Zehr. Jones, too, is home free from responsibility unless it can be said that he
should have reasonably anticipated or
reasonably foreseen these or like results
or that these or like results were reasonably probable. If they were, the causal
connection is not broken. If they were
not, Jones is effectively insulated from
responsibility and the new force of Zehr
is the sole and proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries."
Defendants state that if Jones could not
have foreseen the consequences of his negligence in Anderson v. Jones, supra, then
they, and particularly Montoya and Ward,
could not have foreseen the consequences
of their asserted statutory violation in
blocking the highway.
We agree that Anderson v. Jones, supra,
is factually similar to our case. Is the legal result from those facts in Illinois the
law of New Mexico?
[5] In TsTew Mexico, 'foreseeability is
an element of negligence. Martin v. Board
of Education of City of Albuquerque, 79
N.M. 636, 447 P.2d 516 (1968); see Tapia
v. Panhandle Steel Erectors Company, 78
N.M. 86, 428 P.2d 625 (1967). U.J.I. 12.1
defines negligence in terms of foreseeability. The committee comment to U.J.I. 11.1, citing New Mexico authority, states:
"The violation of a statute • which is
enacted for the benefit or protection of
the party claiming injury from the violator or for the benefit or protection of a
class of the public to which such person
is a member is negligence per se.
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[6] It seems obvious to us that a traffic statute such as § 64-18-49(a), supra,
was enacted for the benefit of persons using our highways. Plaintiff, a person using the highway, had the benefit of such
statute. W h y ? Because, in our opinion, it
is foreseeable that violations of a traffic
rule may cause accidents. "Foreseeabihty
does not mean that the precise hazard or
the exact consequences which were encountered should have been foreseen. * * *"
Harless v. Ewing, 80 N.M. 149, 452 P.2d
483 (Ct.App.1969).
Since it is foreseeable that blocking the
highway may cause other persons to have
accidents, a violation of the statute which
prohibits such blocking is negligence per
se. The rule, that violation of the statute
is negligence per se, includes the element
of foreseeabihty where, as here, plaintiff is
a beneficiary of the statute violated. The
holding as to foreseeabihty in Anderson v.
Jones, supra, does not state New Mexico
law, and is not applicable.
Even without the foregoing, there is a
factual issue as to foreseeabihty in this
case. The State Police officer testified:
<<* * * there's a lot of them stops on
the roadway, and we have a lot of accidents the same way." This is evidence of
the foreseeabihty of an accident from stopping on the highway.
There being factual issues as to a statutory violation, there were "factual issues as
to the negligence of each of the four defendants. The factual issue of negligence
includes the factual issue of foreseeabihty.
Martin v. Board of Education of City of
Albuquerque, supra.
Proximate
ing cause.

cause—independent

interven-

Defendants contend the act of Baumer,
in running into the stopped vehicles, intervened between any negligence on their part
and plaintiff's injuries. The result of this
intervening act, according to defendants, is
to reduce their asserted negligence to a remote cause, or to a condition which did no
more than make the second accident possi-

ble. Since, according to defendants, their
negligence is either a remote cause, or a
condition, it is not the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries
A corollary of this
premise is that Baumer's negligence is an
independent intervening cause.
The Oklahoma law, on which defendants
rely, supports these contentions. Haworth
v. Mosher, 395 F.2d 566 (10th d r . 1968);
Beesley v. United States, 364 F.2d 194
(10th Cir. 1966); Evans v. Caldwell, 429
P.2d 962 (Okl.1967), Transport Indemnity Company v. Page, 406 P.2d 980 (Okl.
1965); Porter v. Norton-Stuart PontiacCadillac of Enid, 405 P.2d 109 (Okl.
1965). As stated in Beesley v. United
States, supra:
"The Oklahoma Supreme Court has
developed a clear expression of the law
of proximate cause in Oklahoma. The
proximate cause of any injur> must be
the efficient cause which sets in motion
the chain of circumstances leading to the
injury
* * * Where the negligence
complained of oni> creates a condition
which thereafter reacts with a subsequent, independent, unforeseeable, distinct agency and produces an injury, the
original negligence is the remote rather
than the proximate cause thereof. This
is held to be true though injury would
not have occurred except for the original
act * * * Thus the proximate cause
of an event must be that which in the
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken b> any independent cause, produces
that event and without which that event
would not have occurred * * * "
*
Is the Oklahoma view the law of New
Mexico ?
The Oklahoma rule, according to the
above quotation, includes the view that the,
second accident was unforeseeable. We r
have held that foreseeabihty is an issue in^
eluded within the factual issue of negligence.
Also, according to the above quotation,
the second accident was independent of the
asserted negligence of defendants even^
though plaintiff's injury "* * * would
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not- have occurred except for the original
act * * V
[7,8] A partial definition of proximate
cause is " * * * that which * * *
produces the injury, and without which the
injury would not have occurred. * * *"
Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 285
P.2d 507 (1955). For an intervening act
to be an independent cause, Thompson v.
Anderman, supra, states: "* * * Such
intervening cause must be sufficient in and
of itself to break the natural sequence of
the first negligence * * *."
If plaintiff's injuries would not have occurred except for the alleged negligence of
the defendants, their negligence is a proximate cause of the injuries. If, however,
the second accident broke the natural sequence of defendants' asserted negligence,
if the second accident is the one without
which the injuries would not have occurred, the second accident was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. If the
second accident did break the natural sequence of events resulting from the asserted negligence of defendants, the second
accident would be an independent intervening cause. If, however, plaintiff's injuries
"would not have occurred except for the
original act" of the defendants, the second
accident was not an independent intervening'cause. New Mexico law on independent intervening cause is not the same as
the quoted statement of Oklahoma law.
[9] Nor is the Oklahoma view of remote cause the New Mexico law. The
proximate cause of an injury, in New
Mexico, need not be the last act, or the
nearest act to the injury, but may be one
which actually aided in producing the injury. Proximate cause need not be the sole
cause, but it must be a concurring- cause.
Ortega v. Texas-New Mexico Railway
Company, 70 N.M. 58, 370 P.2d 201 (1962).
Thompson v. Anderman, supra, states:
"* * * Where a person by his own
negligence produces a dangerous condition of things, which does not become
^ active for mischief until another person
has operated upon it by the commission
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of another negligent act, which might
not unreasonably be foreseen to occur,
the original act of negligence is then regarded as the proximate cause oi the injury which finally results."
Thus, if defendants' asserted negligence
became active by the negligence of another, their negligence has greater legal effect
than a "condition which made the second
accident possible." Their negligence may
be regarded as the proximate cause of the
injury which finally results.
Being contrary to New Mexico law,
Oklahoma law is not authority for the
summary judgment.
Defendants rely on two other cases.
Bell v. Fore, 419 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.Civ.
App.1967) applies the "remote cause" or
"condition" concept which is contrary to
New Mexico law. In Copple v. Warner,
260 N.C. 727, 133 S.E.2d 641 (1963), the
first collision between cars A and B, was
caused by car B. This collision blocked
the eastbound lane of the highway. Car C
was proceeding west in the unblocked
westbound lane. The second collision occurred when car C drove across the center
line and collided with cars A and B. It was
held that these facts were insufficient to
show any negligence on the part of car B
that was a proximate or concurring proximate cause of the second collision. The
factual situation here is different, there
being testimony that each of the defendants here, to some extent, was blocking the
lane of travel in which the second collision
in this case occurred. Neither case is authority for the summary judgment.
Was the asserted negligence of any, or
each, of the four defendants a proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries? Was the second accident an independent intervening
cause? Did the alleged negligence of any
of the defendants concur with the alleged
negligence of anyone else (Kenosha or
Baumer) in causing plaintiff's injuries? If
reasonable minds might differ on these issues, the matter is for the jury. Rivera v.
Ancient City Oil Corporation, 61 N.M. 473,
302P.2d953 (1956).
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Reasonable minds could differ on these
issues because there are disputed facts and
because the reasonable inferences frorn
those facts are contradictory
Harless v
Ewmg, supra
For example If it were
practicable for each of the defendants to
have parked their vehicles off the road between the time of the first and second collisions, and they did not do so, did the second accident result because their vehicles
were on the pavement, or did it result
from the speed of the Baumer truck, or the
driver's failure to keep a proper lookout or
his failure to properly control his truck under the existing conditions of visibility ?
If the Kenosha truck, with which the Baumer truck initially collided, was negligent
in blocking the highway, did the alleged
negligence of these defendants concur with
Kenosha ? There are factual issues of
causation as to each of the four defendants

would have us hold that plaintiff has failed
to meet his burden without allowing him a
trial
[10] The issues here were decided on a
motion for summary judgment "A party
moving for summary judgment has the
burden of establishing that there is no matenal issue of fact to be determined bv the
fact finder and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law * * * The
burden is not on the opposing party to
prove a prima facie case * * *" Barber's Super Markets, Inc v Stryker, 81
N M 227, 465 P2d 284 (1970)
Plaintiff
did not have the burden in the summary
judgment proceeding O'Connor, and the
other three defendants, did Thev failed to
meet it
"Reversed and remanded ior trial
It is so ordered
HENDLEY, J , concurs

Burden of the party opposing summary
judgment
O'Connor reviews the testimony to show
that the presence of his \ehicle had no
bearing on the accident He asserts that
since our Supreme Court agreed with the
trial court in Gould v Brown Construction
Companv, supra, that the issue of causation
in that dust storm case was for the jur>,
that here we should agree with the trial
court that the issue is one of law He reminds us, relying on Seele v Purcell, 45
N M 176, 113 P2d 320 (1941), the plaintiffs have the burden of proof and that
where defendants have acted in an emergency the burden on plaintiff 'becomes
more burdensome " He asserts this case is
a similar situation and that plaintiff failed
to meet that burden
O'Connor's claims are without merit In
Gould v Brown Construction Company, supra, the issues were decided b> the jury
after trial Here, the trial judge decided
them as a matter of law Since reasonable
minds might differ on these issues the)
are to be tried In Seele v Purcell supra,
plaintiff was held to have failed in the
burden of proof after a trial
O'Connor

OMAN, Judge (dissenting)
I agree with the majontv concerning the
law applicable in ruling on a motion for
summarv judgment
I also agree that in
the light of this law there are factual issues as to whether the defendants here involved violated § 64-18-49(a), N M S A
1953 (Repl 9, pt 2) The essential portion
of this section of our statutes is quoted in
the majontv opinion
-, b
I also agree "foreseeabihty" is one of
the tests ordinanlv to be considered and
applied in determining the factual question
of negligence, and that the violation of a
statutorv rule of the road constitutes negh
gence per se However, I disagree with
the majority's disposition of the "foreseeabihty" issue in this case, insofar as it relates to the questions of "proximate cause"
and "independent intervening cause," and I
disagree with the majority holding that
there is a question of fact as to whether
the negligence of these defendants was a
proximate cause of the second accident and
plaintiffs resulting injuries
I agree with the following statements of
the majont) concerning the law of ' proxi-
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mate cause" and l independent intervening
cause".
"A partial definition of proximate
cause is '* * * that which * * *
produces the injury, and without which
the injury would not have occurred
* * *' Thompson v Anderman, 59
N.M 400, 285 P2d 507 (1955) For an
intervening act to be an independent
cause, Thompson v Anderman, supra,
states
'* * *
Such intervening
cause must be sufficient in and of itself
to break the natural sequence of the first
negligence * * *'
"If plaintiff's injuries would not have
occurred except for the alleged negligence of the defendants, their negligence
is a proximate cause of the injuries If,
however, the second accident broke the
natural sequence of defendants' asserted
negligence, if the second accident is the
one without which the injuries would not
have occurred, the second accident was
the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. If the second accident did break
the natural sequence of events resulting
from the asserted negligence of defendants, the second accident would be an independent intervening cause If, however, plaintiff's injuries 'would not have
occurred except for the original act' of
the defendants, the second accident was
not an independent intervening cause
* * *»
I disagree with the majority statement
that the opinion of the Illinois Court in
Anderson v. Jones, 66 IllApp2d 407, 213
N.E.2d 627 (1966) " * * * does not state
New Mexico law, and is not applicable,"
and with the majority conclusion that under New Mexico law, as above quoted
from the majority opinion, reasonable
minds could differ on the question of
whether the negligence of defendants could
have proximately concurred in causing the
second accident.
I have already stated I agree the evidence here is sufficient on the issue of the
defendants* negligence to avoid summary
judgment. As I understand the opinion of
470 P 2d—36Va
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the Illinois court in Anderson v Jones, supra, the negligence of Jones was conceded.
The concern of the Illinois court with
"foreseeabihty" was whether the second
accident, precipitated by the "intervening
cause"—the conduct of Zehr in running
into the rear of plaintiff's vehicle—could
have been reasonably foreseen as a result
of the original act of negligence—the
conduct of Jones in causing the first collision If it could have been so reasonably
foreseen, then the negligence of Zehr was
not an "independent intervening cause,"
which could have broken the chain of causation between the negligence of Jones and
the injur) to plaintiff This is consistent
with the law of New Mexico U J I 1315, Thompson v Anderman, supra, cited
in the above quotation from the majority
opinion See also, Annot, 58 A L R 2d 270
(1958), and particularly § 2 [b] and cases
cited therein as showing that "foreseeabilit)" is a test to be applied in determining
whether another's negligence constitutes an
"intervening cause" or merely a "concurring cause "
The majority "* * * agree that Anderson v Jones, supra, is factually similar
to our case" However, they distinguish
the result reached therein from their result
in the present case on the basis that
"* * * the holding as to foreseeabihty
* * *" by the Illinois court * * *
does not state New Mexico law, and is not
applicable" As above stated, I disagree
with this and can see no reason to arrive
at a result directly opposite that reached by
the Illinois court in a concededly similar
factual situation now before us
The majority, however, also seek to support their result by asserting that a factual
issue as to foreseeabihty is presented by
the statement of the State Police Officer
that "* * * there's a lot of them stops
on the roadway, and we have a lot of accidents the same way."
In my opinion this statement by the
State Police Officer cannot reasonably be
said to raise a question on the issue of
proximate causation under the undisputed
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facts before us. It may possibly, as the
majority suggest, raise a question as to the
negligence of defendants in stopping on
the highway, but this is not the issue in the
case as I see it and as I have above stated.
An examination of the evidence, in the
light of the above quoted law from the majority opinion as to "proximate cause" and
"independent intervening cause," demonstrates clearly to me that the negligence of
the defendants -in stopping or parking on
the main travelled portion of the highway
could not constitute a proximate cause of
the second collision from which plaintiff's
injuries resulted.
• Here the evidence is that Kenosha (Kenosha Auto Transport Corporation and its
driver Woodburn) brought its tractor and
trailer to rest on the highway behind the
O'Connor automobile.
Woodburn remained in the vehicle about 30 seconds,
and then got out, where he remained for
about another 30 seconds. He heard a vehicle approaching and started to get back
inside the cab of his vehicle when the
Baumer vehicle collided with the rear of
the Kenosha vehicle.
The Kenosha vehicle consisted of a tractor and a transport trailer on which were
loaded six automobiles. Across the rear of
this trailer there were a cluster of three
red lights in about the. center thereof and
about four feet above the ground or road
surface, a red clearance light on each side
about 3'6" above the road surface, and two
red flashing'lights which were about 6"
from the top of the trailer. All of these
lights were burning and visible from the
rear, except as their visibility may have
been obscured by the dust.
Woodburn's visibility was about 200 feet
ahead as he approached the O'Connor
automobile, and during the time he remained stopped on the highway prior to
the accident. He saw the O'Connor automobile and the Richins truck ahead. He
admitted he could probably have driven off
the highway.
The Baumer vehicle (driven by Logan),
which collided with the rear of the Keno-

sha vehicle, had a gross weight of between
60,000 and 65,000 lbs. Logan was familiar
with the highway and was driving at about
55 miles per hour. He saw the dust ahead,
but made no effort to slow down, other
than to take his foot off the accelerator,
until he was inside the dust and through
which he could not see. He then applied
his brakes and the collision with the rear
of the Kenosha vehicle occurred almost immediately.
He has no recollection of
seeing the Kenosha vehicle prior to the
collision. He alone failed to react as had
all those who preceded him, in that he did
not bring his vehicle to a stop before colliding with another vehicle.
Woodburn, driver of the Kenosha vehicle, admittedly had sufficient visibility and
sufficient time in which to remove his vehicle from the highway.
In my opinion, the negligence of these
two drivers was not only sufficient to
break the natural sequences of the negligence of the other defendants in stopping
on the highway, but in fact did so, and was
the proximate cause of the second collision.
If the negligence of the remaining defendants could be said to have proximately
caused Woodburn to stop on the highway,
their negligence was at rest once Woodburn had stopped and had sufficient time
to remove his vehicle from the highway.
So long as he remained stopped or parked
on the highway, when he could admittedly
have gotten off the highway, the presence
of his vehicle prevented a direct collision
by an approaching vehicle with the vehicles ahead, and his negligence in so remaining on the highway interrupted the
natural sequence of events which might
have followed from the negligence of those
stopped ahead of him. His negligence and
the negligence of Logan, which, as already
stated, consisted of conduct unlike that followed by all the other drivers in approaching the dust, produced a result different
than that which could reasonably have
been foreseen by the other defendants.
The negligence of Woodburn and Logan
was not only the. immediate cause of the'
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second collision, but was the efficient producing cause thereof, and without which
the plaintiff would not have been injured
As already stated, I believe the New
Mexico law compels the same result
reached by the Illinois court in the factually similar case of Anderson v Jones, supra I agree with the majority that the
Oklahoma rule, as quoted from Beesley v
United States, 364 F2d 194 (10th Or
1966), appears to be somewhat different
from the New Mexico rule, in that it is
stated the original act is not a proximate
cause of the injury even though the injury
would not have occurred except for the
original act However, the New Mexico
and Oklahoma definitions of proximate
cause are almost identical in their wording
See U J I 12 10, Haworth v Mosher, 395
F2d 566 (10th Cir 1968), Beesley v
United States, supra Proximate cause is
defined in U J I 12 10 as follows
'The proximate cause of an injury is
that which in a natural and continuous
sequence [unbroken b> any independent
intervening cause] produces the injury,
and without which the'mjury would not
have occurred [It need not be the only
cause, nor the last nor nearest cause It
is sufficient if it occurs with some other
cause acting at the same time, which in
combination with it, causes the injury] "

Regardless of whether negligently stopping on a highway be called "negligence"
or a "condition," the stopping must be a
proximate cause of the resulting injuries
before there can be liability for the stopping Here we are concerned only with
the issue of negligence in stopping on the
highway, when it was practicable to stop
off the highway There are factual issues
as to whether the different defendants now
before us were on or off the highway, and,
if on the highway, whether it was practicable tor them to have gotten off the high
way However, the negligence of Woodburn in not removing the Kenosha vehicle
from the highway, when it was practicable
for him to do so, and the negligence of Logan, in his operation of the Baumer vehicle, were the concurring proximate causes
of this second accident This second acci
dent would not otherwise have occurred
The negligence of each of the defendants
in this appeal in stopping on the highway
was at most a remote cause which in no
way proximately contributed to the second
accident and plaintiff's resulting injuries
In addition to the foregoing cited cases,
compare § 4, and cases therein cited, of
Annot, 58 A L R 2d 270 at 284
For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent

HARRIS v. UTAH TRANSIT AllTHOHm

Utah 217

Ote as 671 P^d 217 (Ut*h 1983)

exception to the hearsay rule The statement was not an admission which could be
used against the defendant, but a self-serving statement made by the defendant long
after the crime was committed and of questionable reliability.
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The UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY and
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[3] Defendant also urges that the trial
court erred in failing to give a requested
No. 17042.
instruction on criminal trespass as a lesser
Supreme Court of Utah.
included offense of burglary. _The Court
has recently fully explored the lesser includOct. 7, 1983.
ed offense doctrine in State v. Baker, Utah,
671 P.2d 152 (1983). Since all the evidence in this case is consistent only with
Action was brought against bus driver
the burglary charge and there is no evi- and bus company for personal injuries susdence consistent with criminal trespass, we tained in collision between bus and another
affirm on the basis of State v. Baker, vehicle. The Second District Court, Weber
supra.
County, Ronald 0. Hyde, J., entered judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appealAffirmed.
ed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held
that: (1) instruction tc jury that driver of
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissent- other vehicle was negligent as a matter of
ing):
law and that if jury found that he saw bus
I agree with the Per Curiam opinion as to stopped on highway or if he negligently
the exclusion of defendant's statement. I failed to see bus, then his negligence was
cannot agree however that "all the evidence sole proximate cause of collision, was erroin this case is consistent only with the bur- neous; (2) exclusion of bus company mainglary charge and there is no evidence con- tenance records, made subsequent to accisistent with criminal trespass." The only dent, introduced to show that taillights
evidence which the majority opinion relies were defective at time of accident was erroon is that a security box had been moved neous; and (3) combined errors warranted
from the head of a bed to the center and reversal.
the lock on the box was exposed. Nothing
Reversed and remanded.
was taken. I do not think that evidence
necessarily shows an attempt to commit
theft and excludes trespass. The instruc- 1. Negligence <s=>62(3)
tion on the lesser included offense of crimiA person's negligence is not superseded
nal trespass should have been given.
by the negligence of another if the subsequent negligence of another is foreseeable.
2. Automobiles <s=>245(15, 50)
In action for injuries sustained by jeep
passenger in collision between jeep and rear
end of bus, issue of whether jeep driver was
negligent and issue of proximate cause of
the accident were for the jury.
3. Trial <s=>142, 143
Where evidence is in dispute, including
inferences from evidence, issue should be
submitted to jury.
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4. Negligence • » 136(25)
Whether the negligence of an actor
who observes, or negligently fails to observe, a dangerous condition created by a
prior actor's negligence and who negligently fails to avoid the dangerous condition
supersedes the negligence of the prior actor
is a question for the jury; overruling Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d
143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953); McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346 P.2d 711
(1959); Valesquez v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
12 Utah 2d 379,366 P.2d 989 (1961); Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24
Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970).
5. Negligence <&=>131
Evidence of repairs made after an accident is inadmissible to prove negligence;
however, evidence of subsequent repairs is
admissible for other purposes, such as proving physical conditions that existed at time
of accident, if defendant disputes the earlier condition, and if only way of establishing
the earlier condition is by evidence of subsequent repairs.
6. Evidence <s=>351
Bus maintenance records made subsequent to collision between another vehicle
and rear end of bus were admissible to
show that bus taillights were defective prior to accident.
7. Appeal and Error <s»1027
An error is reversible if there is reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result
would have been obtained by complaining
party in the absence of the error
8. Appeal and Error «=> 1056.1(3), 1064.1(3)
In action for injuries resulting from
collision with bus based on theory that bus
driver negligently drove bus and that bus
company negligently maintained taillights,
erroneous instruction to jury that driver of
jeep that collided with bus was negligent as
a matter of law and that, if jeep driver saw
bus or should have seen bus, his negligence
was superseding cause of accident, together
with erroneous exclusion of bus maintenance record introduced to show defect in
lights prior to accident, were sufficiently
prejudicial to warrant reversal.

»<l SERIFS

Merlin R. Lybbert, Paul C. Droz, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Timothy R. Hanson, Salt Lake City, for
defendants and respondents.
STEWART, Justice:
Plaintiff Matthew Harris brought this action for personal injuries sustained in a
collision between a bus owned and operated
by defendant Utah Transit Authority
(UTA) and a jeep in which the plaintiff was
a passenger. The driver of the bus, Lester
Loosemore, is also a defendant. The trial
court ruled as a matter of law that Rodney
Talbot, the driver of the jeep, was negligent, and the jury found that UTA and
Loosemore were not negligent and that Talbot was the sole proximate cause of the
accident. Judgment was entered for the
defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.
The accident occurred on the morning of
March 7, 1977. Talbot, Harris, and Kevin
Lucia, another passenger of Talbot, were on
an errand for their high school teacher
The collision occurred at the "T"-intersection of 1700 North and Washington Boulevard in North Ogden, Utah. At the point
of the collision, Washington Boulevard has
four traffic lanes, two north bound and two
south bound. The impact occurred m the
outside south-bound lane. A bus of defendant UTA stopped to pick up a passenger,
and was positioned with its right rear outer
wheel four inches off the pavement and
was obstructing a portion of the outside
travel lane. The day was dry and clear,
and the driving conditions were good The
jeep was in good mechanical condition and
traveling within the speed limit and with
the flow of traffic at between 40 and 50
miles per hour.
Talbot did not recall seeing the bus ahead
of him until just before the collision occurred. Upon seeing the bus, he glanced in
his rear-view mirror, swerved left and
braked to avoid the bus. In the course .of
this maneuver, the right side of the jeep
struck the left rear corner of the bus and
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stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 447 (1965):
The fact that an intervening act of a
third person is negligent in itself or is
I. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
done in a negligent manner does not
make it a superseding cause of harm to
A. Proximate Cause and Superseding
another which the actor's negligent conCause
duct is a substantial factor in bringing
Plaintiffs urge that the trial court erred
about, if
in directing the jury to find as a matter of
(a) the actor at the time of his neglilaw that Talbot, the driver of the jeep, was
gent conduct should have realized that a
negligent and that if because of his neglithird person might so act, or
gence he failed to observe the bus, then he
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situwas the sole proximate cause of the acciation existing when the act of the third
dent. Instruction no. 14 stated in part:
person was done would not regard it as
[Y]ou are instructed that the driver of
highly extraordinary that the third perthe Jeep, Rodney Talbot, was negligent
son had so acted, or
as a matter of law, and if you find that
(c) the intervening act is a normal conhe observed the bus stopped upon the
sequence of a situation created by the
highway, or, under the circumstances
actor's conduct and the manner in which
should have observed the bus, but beit is done is not extraordinarily negligent
cause of his negligence failed to do so in
time to avoid the accident, then you are The same general rule is stated by Profesinstructed that the negligence on his part sor Prosser as follows:
The risk created by the defendant may
was the sole proximate cause of the colliinclude
the intervention of the foreseeasion.
ble negligence of others.... [T]he stanThe instruction directed a verdict on two
dard of reasonable conduct may require
crucial contested issues of fact and in addithe defendant to protect the plaintiff
tion was confusing. First, the instruction
against 'that occasioned negligence which
directed the jury that Talbot was negligent
is one of the ordinary incidents of human
as a matter of law. In addition, even
life and therefore to be anticipated.'
though the instruction did not specify in
Prosser, The Law of Torts § 44 at 274 (4th
what manner Talbot was negligent as a
ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
matter of law, it nevertheless stated that
This Court has applied that rule on severif Talbot: (1) knew the bus had stopped or
al
occasions. E.g., Jensen v. Mountain
(2) should have observed that the bus was
States
Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra;
stopped and failed to do so in time to avoid
Watters
v. Querry, Utah, 588 P.2d 702
the accident, then Talbot's negligence was
(1978),
appeal
from proceedings after rethe "sole proximate cause of the collision."
mand,
626
P.2d
455 (1981). See SkollingsSecond, the instruction in effect directed a
berg
v.
Brookover,
26 Utah 2d 45, 484 P.2d
verdict on proximate cause, apparently on
1177
(1971).
Cf.
Collier
v. Frerichs, Utah,
the theory that Talbot's negligence was a
626
P.2d
476
(1981).
Accord
Hennigan v.
superseding cause.
Atlantic Refining Co., 282 F.Supp. 667 (E.D.
LI j The law of superseding causation is, Pa.1967); Grainy v. Campbell, 493 Pa. 88,
as a general proposition, more easily stated 425 A.2d 379 (1981); Strobel v. Chicago,
than applied. A person's negligence is not Rock Island & Pacific RR. Co., 255 Minn.
superseded by the negligence of another if 201, 96 N.W.2d 195 (1959). See also Annot,
the subs* ent negligence of another is Negligence Causing Automobile Accident,
foreseeab
This Court in Jensen v. Moun- or Negligence of Driver Subsequently Aptain States Telephone and Telegraph, Co.,proaching Scene of Accident, As Proximate
Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980), adopted the rule Cause of Injury by or to the Approaching
pinched Harris' right arm between the bus
and the jeep, effectively severing the arm
between the shoulder and the elbow.
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Car or to Its Occupants, 58 A.L.R.2d 270,
§ 2[b] (1958).
In Watters v. Querry, supra, the defendant Hemingway slowed abruptly on the
freeway while changing lanes. Plaintiff
Watters slowed to avoid hitting Hemingway, and was in turn rear-ended by defendant Querry. On appeal, this Court held
that an instruction, essentially similar to
instruction 14 in the instant case, constituted reversible error. The instruction stated
that if the driver of a cr should have observed and avoided a dangerous condition
created by another car in front of him and
did not, that driver's negligence was an
" 'independent intervening cause, and,
therefore the first driver cannot be a proximate cause of the collision.' " 588 P.2d at
703 (emphasis in original). This Court held:
The more fundamental test is whether
under the particular circumstances he
should have foreseen that his conduct
would have exposed others to an unreasonable risk of harm; and this includes
situations where negligent or other
wrongful conduct of others should reasonably be anticipated.... The difficulty with the instruction about which plaintiff complains is that, as applied to the
instant situation, it would seem to exculpate defendant Hemingway (who created
a dangerous situation) if it is found that
the defendant Querry (the latter actor)
was negligent, whether o r n o t the latter's
conduct was foreseeable. If the principle
of law just discussed is properly applied
to the evidence in this case, it appears to
us that there is a legitimate question as
to whether a jury could reasonably find
that defendant Hemingway, in making
the alleged abrupt stop, should have foreseen that, in traffic such as there was on
that highway, some momentarily inattentive driver following her would not have
been able to react and brake quick
enough to avoid collision with her car or
the car behind hers.
588 P.2d at 704.
Later, when Watters was again appealed
from an order entered after the remand in
the first case, we reaffirmed the rule. Cit-

ing Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone
and Telegraph Co., supra, this Court stated:
[T]he first actor cannot excuse himself
from liability arising from his negligent
acts merely because the later negligence
of another concurs to cause injury, if the
later act were a foreseeable event.
626 P.2d at 458.
[2] In the present case, the disputed instruction was erroneous because it failed to
submit the proximate cause issue to the
jury for determination. Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
supra. In other words, the jury should
have decided whether Loosemore stopped
the bus in such a way that it was foreseeable that "some momentarily inattentive
driver following [him] would not be able to
react and brake quick enough to avoid collision." Watters v. Querry, supra, 588 P.2d
at 704.
[3] Where the evidence is in dispute,
including the inferences from the evidence,
the issue should be submitted to the jury.
Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, Utah,
641 P.2d 112 (1982); FMA Acceptance Co.
v. Leatherby Insurance Co., Utah, 594J>.2d
1332 (1979). See also Bowen v. Riverton
City, Utah, 656 P.2d 434 (1982); Jensen v.
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph
Co., Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980).
We do not mean to imply that rulings by
the trial court which decide a factual contention as a matter of law are never appropriate.
But the right to trial by jury is a basic
principle of our system that cannot be allowed to be eroded by improper intrusions
on the jury's prerogative. In the instant
case, the issue of Talbot's negligence and
proximate cause should have gone to the
jury. If, as plaintiff contends, Loosemore
stopped the bus too rapidly, or failed to
drive out of the lane of traffic, or had
faulty brake lights, he may have contributed to a rear-end collision by a momentarily
inattentive driver, which would not have
been so "extraordinary" as to be unforeseeable.
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B. The Rule in Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co.

becomes confronted with an emergency
situation.

U Kline v Moyer, 325 Pa 357, 191 A 43, 111
[4] Instruction no. 14 appears to have
A L R 406 (1937)
been based on the rule stated in Hillyard v.
Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 151, 18 Ibid
263 P.2d 287, 292 (1953); and restated in 1 Utah 2d at 151, 263 P.2d at 292 (emphasis
in original) In other words, the test in
McMurdie v. Underwood, 9 Utah 2d 400, 346
P.2d 711 (1959); Valesquez v. GreyhoundHillyard is two-pronged. (1) where a moLines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989 torist sees a stationary object m the road
and negligently fails to avoid it, his negli(1961); Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Pavgence
is, as a matter of law, a superseding
ing Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467 P.2d 45 (1970).
cause,
but (2) if the motorist negligently
Hillyard, supra, stated the rule as follows:
fails
to
see the stationary object in time to
In applying the test of foreseeability to
avoid
it,
the issue of whether the motorist's
situations where a negligently created
negligence
is a superseding cause is for the
pre-existing condition combines with a
jury.
later act of negligence causing an injury,
The case most heavily relied on in Hillthe courts have drawn a clear-cut distincyard
to support the first prong of the rule
tion between two classes of cases. The
there
stated has been overruled Kline v.
first situation is where one has negligentMoyer,
325 Pa 357, 191 A 43 (1937), was
ly created a dangerous condition [such as
expressly
overruled by Grainy v. Campbell,
parking the truck] and a later actor ob493
Pa.
88,
425 A.2d 379 (1981), which reserved, or circumstances are such that he
jected
the
rule of superseding cause in
could not fail to observe, but negligently
Kline
and
adopted
the rule stated in § 447
failed to avoid it. The second situation
of
the
Restatement
(Second) of Torts See
involves conduct of a later intervening
also
Hennigan
v.
Atlantic
Refining Co., 282
actor who negligently failed to observe
F.Supp.
667,
678-79
(E.D.Pa.1967)
(explainthe dangerous condition until it is too late
ing
Pennsylvania's
modifications
to
Kline v.
to avoid it. In regard to the first situaMoyer).
tion it is held as a matter of law that the
later intervening act does interrupt the
The strong drift away from deciding the
natural sequence of events and cut off issue of superseding causation in automothe legal effect of the negligence of the bile accidents as a matter of law is evident
initial actor. This is based uponjthe r e a . in Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and
soning that it is not reasonably to be Telegraph Co., Utah, 611 P.2d 363 (1980),
foreseen nor expected that one who actu- and Watters v Querry, Utah, 588 P.2d 702
ally becomes cognizant of a dangerous (1978) Indeed, Jensen all but overruled the
condition in ample time to avert injury first prong of Hillyard sub silento The
will fail to do so.17 On the other hand, approach taken in Jensen and Watters is
with respect to the second situation, also consistent with a number of other Utah
where the second actor fails to see the cases in which this Court has held that a
danger in time to avoid it, it is held that a motorist who collides with a stationary vejury question exists, based on the ration- hicle on the highway is not guilty of negliale that it can reasonably be anticipated gence as a matter of law without respect to
that circumstances may arise wherein the totality of the circumstances. See Colothers may not observe the dangerous lier v. Frerichs, Utah, 626 P.2d 476 (1981);
condition until too late to escape it.18 Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P.2d
The distinction is basically one between a 642 (1956); Nielsen v. Watanabe, 90 Utah
situation in which the second actor has 401, 62 P.2d 117 (1936).
sufficient time, after being charged with
Finally, the first prong of Hillyard cannot
knowledge of the hazard, to avoid it, and stand analysis from a theoretical point of
one in which the second actor negligently view. There is no valid distinction between
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one who negligently fails to keep a proper
lookout and rear-ends another car and one
who keeps a proper lookout but negligently
fails to avoid a collision. The two situations
are similar to the doctrines of assumptions
of risk and contributory negligence—which
are now treated for the most part simply in
terms of whether a defendant failed to act
as a reasonably prudent person under the
circumstances. Moore v. Burton Lumber &
Hardware Co., Utah, 631 P.2d 865 (1981);
Jacobsen Construction Co. Inc. v. StructoLite Engineering, Inc., Utah, 619 P.2d 306
(1980). Although Moore and Jacobsen did
not deal with proximate cause, that is not
significant. What is significant is that the
distinction between the first and second
prongs of Hilly surd is artificial and unjustifiable basically for the reasons stated in
Moore. In addition, whether a defendant's
conduct fits under the first or second prong
in Hillyard, conduct under either prong is
generally foreseeable from the point of
view of the person who first creates the
hazard.
Finally, the unsound distinction made in
Hillyard serves to frustrate the purpose of
the Comparative Negligence Statute by
precluding the kind of comparison of fault
that a jury ought to make. The allocation,
of liability should be made on the basis of
the relative culpability of both parties. To
do that the jury must assess the reasonableness or uhreasonableness of the second driver's actions in light of all the circumstances,
including whatever action it takes to avoid
a collision, his initial speed, the initial speed
of the first car, road conditions, traffic conditions, and the like.
To avoid further confusion in the doctrine
of superseding causation in cases such as
this, we hereby overrule the first prong of
the Hillyard test as stated in Hillyard,
McMurdie, Valesquez, and Anderson.
II. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
Plaintiffs also urge that the court erred
in excluding the bus maintenance records
made subsequent to the accident. The records were offered for the purpose of demonstrating that the tail lights of the bus

were not functioning at the time of the
accident and that UTA was therefore negligent.
[5] The law is well settled that evidence
of repairs made after an accident is inadmissible to prove negligence. Rule 51, Utah
R.Evid.; Potter v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latterday Saints Hospital, 99 Utah 71, 103 P.2d
280 (1940). However, evidence of subsequent repairs is admissible for other purposes, such as proving the physical conditions that existed at the time of an accident, if the defendant disputes the earlier
condition, and if the only way of-establishing the earlier condition is by evidence of
subsequent repairs. Lawlor v. County of
Flathead, 111 Mont. 508, 582 P.2d 751
(1978); Heldman v. Uniroyal, Inc., 53 Ohio
App.2d 21, 371 N.E.2d 557 (1977); Leeth v.
Roberts, 295 Ala. 27, 322 So.2d 679 (1975)
(dictum); McCormick on Evidence § 295 at
668 & n. 23 (2d ed. 1972); Annot., Admissibility of Evidence of Repairs, Change of
Conditions, or Precautions Taken After Accident, 64 A.L.R2d 1296, § 6[d] (1959). See
also 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 283 (Chadbourn rev. 1979).
[6] Although the alleged malfunctioning
of the brake lights of the bus might have
been caused by the accident itself, the
plaintiff's theory was that the lights were
defective prior to the accident and that that
defect was a causative factor. Under the
circumstances, whether the lights were malfunctioning and whether they contributed
to the accident were questions of fact for
the jury. In short, it was error to exclude
the proffered evidence.
III. REVERSIBLE ERROR
[7,8] Since instruction no. 14 and the
exclusion of UTA's maintenance records
were erroneous, the issue must be addressed
whether those errors were sufficiently prejudicial to constitute grounds for reversal.
An error is reversible if there is a reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result
would have been obtained by the complaining party in the absence of the error.
Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co.,
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Utah, 631 R2d 865 (1981); Shurtleff v. Jay which Loosemore stopped the bus and
Tuft & Co., Utah, 622 P.2d 1168 (1980); where he stopped.
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 26 Utah Plaintiff adduced evidence which made
2d 448,491 P.2d 1209 (1971). See also Rivas the reasonableness of Talbot's conduct and
v. Pacific Finance Co., 16 Utah 2d 183, 397that of defendants turn to a significant
P.2d 990 (1964); Hales v. Peterson, 11 Utah degree upon whether the rear bus lights
2d 411, 360 P.2d 822 (1961).
were malfunctioning as well as upon whethPlaintiffs tried the case on the theory er Loosemore stopped too swiftly and failed
that Loosemore was negligent in five dif- to pull completely out of the traffic lane
ferent respects in the manner in which .he when he stopped.
drove the bus. Plaintiff also contended
Although there was much disputed testithat UTA was negligent in its maintenance mony concerning the operation of the rear
of the bus* electrical system. The error in signal and tail lights, no witness saw the
instruction no. 14 in directing a verdict on brake lights at the time of the accident or
proximate cause combined with the exclu- immediately thereafter. The evidence resion of evidence was clearly prejudicial on vealed that the bus had experienced several
the theory based on improper maintenance electrical failures in the lighting and relatof the bus.
ed systems prior to the accident, and the
Furthermore, we cannot conclude that proffered evidence indicated that there had
the errors in instruction no. 14 relating to been numerous and continued problems
Talbot's negligence and to proximate cause with the electrical system after the acciand the error in the exclusion of evidence dent.
were harmless in assessing whether there
One of Harris' witnesses, an expert in the
was negligence in the operation of the bus, field of accident reconstruction, testified
even though the jury found Loosemore not that without functioning brake lights a
negligent Absent those errors it is reason- slowing or stopping maneuver is very diffiably possible that the jury would have cult to perceive in the rear driver's "cone of
found Loosemore's operation of the bus perception" until he is relatively close to the
negligent in view of instruction no. 11, stopping vehicle. The expert testified that
which is set out in the margin, and a proxi- from the point Talbot perceived the bus and
mate cause of the accident.1 Whether the reacted, he made the best possible effort to
brake and turn lights were working clearly avoid the accident. A driver of a vehicle
bore on the reasonableness of-the mannerln behind Talbot testified that she was not
1. Instruction no. 11 stated:
It was the duty of the defendant, Lester
Lorenzo Loosemore, to use reasonable care,
under the circumstances, in driving the bus,
to avoid danger to himself and others, and to
observe and be aware of the condition of the
highway, including its width and shoulders,
the traffic thereon, and other existing conditions; in that regard, he was obligated to use
reasonable care in respect to:
(a) To use reasonable care to keep a lookout for persons, other vehicles and other conditions reasonably to be seen or anticipated;
(b) To keep the bus under reasonably safe
and proper control;
(c) Not to stop the bus upon the paved or
main traveled part of the highway when it is
practical to stop the bus off such paved or
main traveled part of the highway,
(d) Not to suddenly stop or decrease his
speed without first ascertaining that he could
do so with reasonable safety, and, if other

vehicles are to be affected by such movement, not without first giving an appropriate
signal to the driver to the rear that such
movement is to be made; either by the extension of the hand and arm downward or by
appropriate signal lamps, either such signal
to be given continuously;
(e) Not to turn from a direct course or
from one lane to another without first ascertaining that such movement can be made
with reasonable safety, and, if other vehicles
are to be affected by such movement, not
without giving an appropriate signal continuously for at least the last three seconds preceding the beginning of the turn or change,
either by the appropriate extension of arm
and hand or by appropriate signal lamps.
Failure of the defendant, Loosemore, to operate the bus in accordance with any of the
foregoing requirements of law would constitute negligence on his part. [Emphasis added]
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aware that the bus had stopped until "suddenly the space between the jeep and the
bus, and myself and the jeep was getting
narrow." Another driver of a vehicle behind Talbot stated, "I didn't realize the bus
was slowing down or stopping. We didn't
have any indication it was stopping."
In sum, the exclusion of the maintenance
records bore directly on whether the turn
and brake lights were properly functioning
and may have been of critical importance
with respect to plaintiffs theories of negligence, both as to maintenance and manner
of operation of the bus, and with respect to
proximate cause. The errors were not
harmless because there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury's verdicts would have
been different in the absence of error.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Costs to appellants.
HALL, C.J, and OAKS, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

Calvin N. HALL and Rita M. Hall,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Perry C. FITZGERALD, et aL,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 18371.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct 7, 1983.
Vendors brought action against purchasers to foreclose real estate contract
The Fourth District Court, Utah County,
Allen B. Sorensen, J., granted summary
judgment in favor of vendors, and purchasers appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J.,
held that: (1) vendors fulfilled their contractual responsibility to convey "title" to
purchasers by delivering warranty deed to

subject property, even though vendors were
themselves purchasing property under real
estate contract and therefore never possessed legal title; (2) denial of purchasers'
motion to set aside judgment on ground of
newly discovered evidence was not abuse of
discretion; and (3) questions as to whether
remand was required because, prior to foreclosure sale, trial court entered personal
judgment against purchasers for any deficiency owing after sale and whether vendors would be unjustly enriched if there
was deficiency judgment were moot and
would not be adjudicated.
Affirmed.

1. Judgment <s=>181(ll)
Allegations or denials in pleadings are
not sufficient basis for opposing summary
judgment.
2. Vendor and Purchaser *=>128
Although, in real estate transaction,
"title" most often refers to estate in fee
simple, clear of all encumbrances or interests of any other person, contract by its
terms, or circumstances leading up to and
surrounding transaction, may show that
parties intended another meaning; under
such circumstances, "title" can refer to
wide array of estates or interests,-including
legal title, equitable title, or mere right of
possession.
3. Vendor and Purchaser <s=»128
Where, under uniform real estate contract, equitable title would have been
passed to purchasers when contract was
signed, "title" required to be passed to purchasers by paragraph of contract was not
usual unencumbered fee simple estate with
participation by no other person, inasmuch
as vendors would have no such title to give,
but would, at most, refer to legal title retained by vendor.
4. Vendor and Purchaser <*» 129(1)
Although vendors, who were themselves purchasing property under real estate contract, never possessed legal title to
property sold to purchasers, vendors ful-
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panion were apprehended. The -juvenile
was then taken to the Provo Police Station,
and his mother notified at 12:05 a. m. The
mother had no transportation and asked the
juvenile's aunt to go to the Police Station.
A Detective Baum investigated the circumstances at the school, and then interrogated the juvenile at the Police Station,
having arrived there at approximately 1:00
a. m. He there read the juvenile his "Miranda"2 rights, and wrote down the juvenile's statement The juvenile signed the
statement at 2:45 a. m., January 6, 1979,
and was released.
At the hearing in Juvenile Court, defense
counsel objected to the admission of the
written statement and to Detective Baum's
testimony concerning the juvenile's statement on the ground that a juvenile is incapable of voluntarily waiving his constitutional rights. The Court overruled this objection, saying:
Pending a ruling by the Appellate
Courts on this question in Utah, there has
been a fairly uniform position of the trial
courts of the juvenile system, so if the
evidence appears to show a knowledgeable understanding of the rights being
given and that there's no evidence showing involuntariness, that the simple fact
of minority, at least at the age of this
respondent, does not automatically incapacitate him from-the legal waiver or a
separate waiver. So I will overrule your
objection, but note it for the record.
On appeal, the juvenile cites this ruling
as error, and urges this Court to adopt a
rule which would exclude a juvenile's admissions or confessions made without the
counsel of his attorney or his parents. In
addition, the juvenile contends that the police interrogation was in violation of Section 78-3a-29, and that such violation renders the juvenile's statements inadmissible.
- [1] We have dealt with both of these
questions at length in State v. Hunt, 607
P.2d 297 (1980). We there held that the
purpose of Section 78-3a-29 was not to
govern police interrogation of juveniles, and

that the admissibility of the juvenile's confessions or admissions depends upon whether the juvenile made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights in
light of the total circumstances of his case.
[2] Here, the Judge determined that
this confession was voluntary, and that the
juvenile had waived his rights. The evidence supports this determination. The juvenile testified in his own behalf, but the
only evidence he gave of any "coercive"
tactics on the part of the police was that
the officer told him to sign the confession
because he (the officer) wanted to go home
and go to bed. The juvenile admitted, however, that he knew the statement would be
used against him in court. We do not believe any coercion existed here which would
render this confession involuntary. It was
given by a juvenile, 17 years of age, who,
according to the record was not unfamiliar
with the process of the criminal law.
Affirmed.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
HALL and STEWART, JJ.f concur.

Kerby R. ANDERTON, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Terry MONTGOMERY and Tom Mont-'
gomery, dba Vernal Hide & Fur Company, Defendant and Respondents.
No. 15980.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 15, 1980.
Action was brought to recover against
owners and operators of business for injuries sustained when side of device, which

2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436, 86 S Ct 1602, 16 L.Ed 2d 694 (1966)
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was used to exhibit sheet metal samples,
collapsed and caused samples to crash down
on plaintiff. The Fourth District Court,
Uintah County, David Sam, J., dismissed
action, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that: (1) certain
instruction did not contradict fes ipsa loquitur instructions given, but, rather, merely
constituted a clarification thereof; (2) instruction dealing with unavoidable accident
did not contradict the theory of res ipsa
loquitur; (3) unavoidable accident instruction was not superfluous, confusing, or misleading; and (4) fact that attorney-client
relationship existed between defense counsel and corporation, of which a juror had
once been an officer, and that such relationship was not disclosed at voir dire examination did not result in prejudicial error.
Affirmed.
1. Negligence <s=> 121.2(2)
Purpose of res ipsa loquitur is to permit
one suffering injury from something which
was under control of another and which
ordinarily would not cause injury except for
the other's negligence, to present grievance
to a court or jury on basis that an inference
of negligence may reasonably be drawn
from such facts, and cast the burden on the
other to make proof as to what happened.
2. Negligence <*=> 121.2(3)
Circumstances which, under doctrine'of
res ipsa loquitur, would permit trier of fact
to infer that defendant has engaged in negligent conduct to injury of the plaintiff,
are: that the accident was a kind which, in
the ordinary course of events, would not
have happened had due care been observed;
that plaintiff's own use or operation of the
agency or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for the injury; and that the
agency or instrumentality causing the injury was under exclusive management or control of the defendant.
3. Negligence <s=> 136(6)
Weighing of evidence presented to establish the elements which must be established before doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
can be applied is within province of the
jury.

4. Negligence < 136(6), 138(3)
Where trial court determines that the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, could have established prerequisites to the application of doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur, an instruction to that effect is
proper, and it then becomes jury's responsibility to apply or refuse to apply the doctrine, based on its factual findings regarding the circumstantial prerequisites.
5. Negligence «=» 121.2(9)
Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in proof of negligence; it has
no bearing on issue of causation, which
must be separately and independently established.
6. Negligence e=> 121.5
Res ipsa loquitur does not relieve plaintiff of his obligation of establishing causal
link between defendant's act or omission
and plaintiff's injury, but permits plaintiff,
in lieu of linking his injury to specific act on
defendant's part, to causally connect it with
agency or instrumentality, under exclusive
control of defendant, functioning in manner
which, under the circumstances, would produce no injury absent negligence; if agency
or instrumentality is not established to be
cause of plaintiff's injury or if it is not
shown to be under exclusive control of defendant, causal connection is not established, and inference of negligent conduct
giving rise thereto is nullified.
7. Trial e=>243
In action to recover against owners and
operators of business for injuries sustained
when side of device, which was used to
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff,
certain instruction, by informing jury that
"where the precise cause of an accident on
the whole evidence is left to conjecture or
speculation, and may be attributed to causes over one or more of which the defendants have no control, as to a cause for which
the defendant would be responsible," liability should not be found, did not contradict
res ipsa loquitur instructions given by trial
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court, but, rather, merely constituted a clarification thereof.
8. Negligence <s=>63
Where injury arises from a set of circumstances which do not reflect a lack of
due care on anyone's part, the accident has
been "unavoidable" and no recovery may be
had under a theory of negligence.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
9. Negligence <s=»140
In action to recover against owners and
operators of business for injuries sustained
when side of device, which was used to
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff,
instruction dealing with unavoidable accident did not contradict plaintiff's theory of
res ipsa loquitur.
10. Trial *=>244(4)
Though an instruction on unavoidable
accident amounts to a reemphasis of principles implicit in other instructions, giving of
an unavoidable accident instruction is not
error if it clearly and concisely states the
principle involved and does not create an
imbalance in the jury instructions.
11. Negligence <8=>140
Trial <s=»229
In action to recover against owners and
operators of business for injuries sustained
when side of device, which was used to
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff,
giving of "unavoidable accident" instruction
was not superfluous, confusing or misleading under certain circumstances.
12v Appeal and Error *=> 233(2)
Where jury's question in regard to possibility of assessing 60% of injury to unavoidable accident and 40% to negligence
was answered to satisfaction of both parties, plaintiff could not complain on appeal
that the question posed remained as evidence of the inadequacy of trial court's
instruction on unavoidable accident.

13. Constitutional Law <s=*267
Requirements of due process dictate
that jury be impartial and unbiased. U.S.C.
A.Const. Amend. 14; Const, art. 1, §§ 7, 10.
14. New Trial <s=>42(2)
Trial court may order new trial if it
appears that juror bias has crept into the
proceedings notwithstanding voir dire questioning. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Const,
art. 1, §§ 7, 10; Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule 61.
15. Appeal and Error «=> 1170.1
Where, in sound discretion of trial
court, an infraction of a party's rights at
voir dire questioning has no material impact
on party's right to impartial jury trial, no
prejudicial error has occurred. U.S.C.A.
Const. Amend. 14; Const, art. 1, §§ 7, 10;
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 61.
16. Appeal and Error «=»1170.1
In action to recover against owners and
operators of business for injuries sustained
when side of device, which was used to
exhibit sheet metal samples, collapsed and
caused samples to crash down on plaintiff,
fact that attorney-client relationship existed between defendant's counsel and corporation, of which a juror had once been an
officer, and that such relationship was not
disclosed at voir dire examination did not
result in prejudicial error where neither
counsel nor juror were aware of such relationship until after the trial had finished.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 61.

George E. Mangan, Roosevelt, for plaintiff and appellant.
Stephen B. Nebeker and Paul S. Felt, of
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City,
for defendants and respondents.
HALL, Justice:
This appeal is taken from the dismissal .of
a personal injury action pursued by plaintiff Kerby R. Anderton against defendants
Terry and Tom Montgomery, owners and
operators of the Vernal Hide and Fur Company.
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Defendants' business, located in Vernal,
Utah, deals, among other things, in commercial sale of sheet metal. Plaintiff, a
part-time welder, visited defendants' place
of business on September 26, 1975, for the
purpose of purchasing sheet metal for the
construction of a metal box. Plaintiff was
conducted into defendants' business yard by
defendant Terry Montgomery, and shown a
display device used to exhibit sheet metal
samples. The display consisted of a rack,
set on a pipe frame and holding sheet metal
samples vertically, such that they could be
turned from one side to the other, like the
pages of a book. As plaintiff and another
individual who had accompanied him began
turning through the samples, defendant
Terry Montgomery was called away by a
telephone call. While plaintiff, assisted by
his friend and another employee of defendants, continued to examine the samples on
the rack, the right -side of the pipe frame
supporting the display collapsed, causing
the rack bearing the samples to crash down
onto plaintiff, driving the pipe through the
flesh of his right hip and buttock. The
accident resulted in partial, permanent impairment of plaintiff's right hip and leg.
Plaintiff thereupon instituted suit against
defendants. At trial, defendants asserted
that they had used the display device for
some six months without any prior difficulty, but were unable to point to "any specific
factor which could have been responsible
for the frame's collapse. Plaintiff was likewise unable to establish any specific conduct on defendant's part giving rise to the
collapse. Consequently, plaintiff requested
that the court instruct the jury regarding
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which instruction was given, over defendants' objection. Defendants requested an instruction
explaining the nature of an "unavoidable
accident" under the law, which was also
given, over plaintiff's objection. The jury
found neither party negligent and plaintiff
was therefore denied recovery for his injuries.
Sometime subsequent to the entry of
judgment, Mr. Stephen B. Nebeker, counsel
for defendants, while preparing for the defense of a separate action involving a com-

pany by the name of H & S Trucking,
learned that a former owner of that company, one LeRoy Dean Huber, had served on
the jury in the instant case. Neither Mr.
Nebeker nor Mr. Huber had been aware of
their connection in this regard at the time
of the former trial; Mr. Huber had denied,
on voir dire, any connection or acquaintance
with either counsel, and Mr. Nebeker had
never dealt with Mr. Huber pursuant to his
dealings with H & S Trucking, as IJuber
had sold his interest therein in 1973, while
the litigation involving the services of Mr.
Nebeker did not arise until 1974. Mr. Nebeker, however, notified the trial court immediately regarding the relationship thus
discovered, whereupon a hearing was held.
The trial court ruled that plaintiff's interests had not been prejudiced by reason of
the relationship since, at the time of the
trial, neither Mr. Nebeker nor Mr. Huber
was aware that it existed.
On appeal, plaintiff first claims prejudice
by reason of conflict and inconsistency in
the jury instructions given by the trial
court below. As previously mentioned,
plaintiff requested and received instructions relating to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, and to its application in the
present case. The instructions given were
as follows:
Instruction No. 4
Our law recognizes a doctrine known as
res ipsa loquitur which means: The thing
speaks for itself. By reason of it, under
certain circumstances, one who is injured
may hold another responsible without
showing the exact conduct of the other
party that caused or set in motion the act
that caused the injury. The doctrine of
law may be applied only under special
circumstances, they being as follows:
First: That the rack of sheet metal and
the stand pipe that broke and collapsed
upon the plaintiff, Kerby Anderton,
which proximately caused the injury to
him, was in the possession and exclusive
control of the defendants Terry Montgomery and Tom Montgomery at the
time the cause of injury was set in mo-
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tion, and that it appears that the injury
resulted from some act or omission incident to the manner in which the defendants maintained or constructed or exercised due care in the use of the said rack
of sheet metal This does not mean that
defendants had to be present at the time
of the injury or that the plaintiff could
not be engaged in assisting the defendants agents in locating the desired piece
of .sheet metal.
Second: That the incident was one of
such nature as does not or would not have
happened in the ordinary course of
things, if those who have control of or are
responsible for the rack of sheet metal,
use ordinary care.
Third: That the circumstances surrounding the causing of the occurrence
were such that the plaintiff is not in a
position to know what specific conduct or
act or omission or failure to act, was the
cause, whereas the defendants, being
those in charge of their yard and the rack
of sheet metal, may be reasonably expected to know, and thus to be able to explain
their lack of negligence. (See Sanone v.
J. C. Penny [sic] Company, 17 Utah 2d 46,
404 P.2d 248).
If you find all of the above conditions
to exist, they may give rise to an inference by you that the defendants were
negligent, which inference will support a
verdict for the plaintiff, in-the absence of
evidence of non-negligence on the part of
the defendants.
Instruction No. 4a
If you find from a preponderance of
the evidence that the sheet metal which
collapsed on Kerby Anderton when the
stand pipe holding the same broke, was in
the possession and exclusive control of
the defendants, as I have explained the
same to you; and, if you further find
that the incident causing such an injury is
of such a nature as
would [not]
have happened in the ordinary course of
events if the rack of sheet metal had been
properly constructed and or maintained;
and, if you shall further find that the

plaintiff is not in a position to know what
was the specific reason for the breaking
of the stand pipe and the collapse of the
sheet metal, whereas the defendants as
the possessors of said yard, and have the
exclusive right to the control of the same,
may be reasonably expected to know the
reason for the same, and to thus explain
their lack of negligence; then upon your
making such findings, there arises an inference that the proximate cause of the
occurrence was some negligent conduct
on the part of the defendants. The inference is a form of evidence, and if there is
none other tending to overcome it, or if
the inference, to your minds, preponderates over contrary evidence, it would
warrant a verdict for the plaintiff.
Therefore, you shouW consider this inference together with all of the other evidence in the case in determining your
verdict.
Defendants, over plaintiffs objection, secured the submission of an instruction relating to causation, which read as follows:
Instruction No. 17
You are instructed that where the precise cause of an accident on the whole
evidence is left to conjecture or speculation, and may be as reasonably attributed
to causes over one or more of which the
defendants has no control, as to a cause
for which the defendants would be responsible, then, and in that event, there
has been a failure in the required burden
of proof. If you find from the evidence
in this case that it is just as likely that
the accident resulted from causes beyond
the control of defendants as from negligence or fault, then the burden of proof
as against such defendants have not been
met, and such defendants are entitled to
your verdict in their favor, no cause of
action.
Defendants likewise requested and secured (again over plaintiff's objection) the
reading of an instruction relating to the
d(Ktrine of "unavoidable or inevitable accident." The instruction stated that,
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Instruction No. 19
In law we recognize what we, term as
unavoidable or inevitable accidents.
These terms do not mean literally that it
was not possible for such an accident to
be avoided. They simply denote an accident that occurred without having been
proximately caused by negligence. Even
if such an accident could have been avoided by the exercise of exceptional foresight, skill or caution, still no one may be
held liable for injuries resulting from it.
Both negligence and proximate cause, as
defined in these instructions, are requisites for [finding] liability. If you find
from the evidence in this case that the
accident occurred without negligence on
the part of defendants or was not proximately caused by any negligence on the
part of defendants, you should answer
interrogatory No. 3 "No".
It is plaintiff's contention that instructions 17 and 19 conflict with and contradict
instructions 4 and 4a, dealing with res ipsa
loquitur, in that they suggest the incumbency, upon plaintiff, of producing evidence of
specific acts of negligence on the part of
defendants, where res ipsa loquitur specifically obviates the necessity of doing so,
permitting plaintiff to establish negligence
on defendants' part by inference drawn
from circumstantial evidence.
[1-4] Turning first to plaintiff's contention that instruction 17 was inconsistent
with the application of res ipsa loquitur, we
note that he correctly characterizes the underlying function and purpose of that doctrine. As previously stated by this Court,
the purpose of res ipsa loquitur is "to per1. Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d
276, 351 R2d 952 (1960), see also Joseph v. W.
H Groves Latter Day Saint Hospital, 10 Utah
2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960), White v. Pinney, 99
Utah 484, 108 P.2d 249 (1940).
2. This is not to say that any contributory negligence on plaintiffs part prevents the application of the doctrine, such that it may not be
used in those cases where plaintiff is seeking
partial recovery under Utah's comparative negligence statute (U.C A , 1953, 78-27-37) The
requirement here is that plaintiffs use of the
agency or instrumentality not be primarily re-

mit one who suffers injury from something
under the control of another, which ordinarily would not cause injury except for the
other's negligence, to present his grievance
to a court or jury on the basis that an
inference of negligence may reasonably be
drawn from such facts; and cast the burden
upon the other to make proof of what happened." l It is often the case that a plaintiff, while suffering injury which was
caused by a force or agency allegedly instigated by defendant's conduct, is enable to
produce evidence pinpointing a given act or
omission on the part of defendant which
breached a legally imposed standard of
care. Where this is the case, the law permits plaintiff to withdraw from the specific
conduct constituting negligence, and concentrate upon presenting evidence probative of circumstances which would permit
the trier of fact to infer that defendant had
engaged in negligent conduct to the injury
of the plaintiff. Such circumstances, which
have been defined by law, are (1) that the
accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, would not have happened had due care been observed; (2) that
the plaintiff's own use or operation of the
agency or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for the injury;2 and (3) that
the agency or instrumentality causing the
injury was under the exclusive management or control of the defendant.8 It* is to
be noted that the weighing of evidence
presented to establish the above elements,
like all other questions of fact, is within the
province of the jury; where the trial court
determines that the evidence, viewed in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff, could
establish the prerequisites to the application
sponsible for the injury, not that his actions be
free from negligence of any kind. (Note that
the comparative negligence provision bars partial recovery under any type of proof where
plaintiffs negligence equals or exceeds that of
the defendant.) See 58 Am.Jur.2d Negligence,
§481, p 58
3. Wightman v Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 5
Utah 2d 373, 302 P.2d 471 (1956); Moore v.
James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P.2d 221 (1956); Loos
v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 99 Utah 496, 108
P.2d 254 (1940)
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of the doctrine, an instruction to that effect
is proper. It then becomes the jury's responsibility to apply, or refuse to apply, the
doctrine based on its factual findings regarding the circumstantial prerequisites.4
[5-7] With regard to instruction 17 in
the present case, however, we must observe
that res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary doctrine aiding in the proof of negligence; it
has no bearing on the issue of causation,
which must be separately and independently established.5 As in any negligence action, a legally-recognizable causal link must
be established between defendant's act or
omission and plaintiff's injury. Absent
such a causal relationship, defendant's conduct, negligent or otherwise, gives rise to
no liability.6 Res ipsa loquitur does not
relieve plaintiff of this obligation; rather,
it permits him, in lieu of linking his injury
to a specific act on defendant's part, to
causally connect it with an agency or instrumentality, under the exclusive control
of the defendant, functioning in a manner
which, under the circumstances, would produce no injury absent negligence. However, where the agency or instrumentality
is not established to be the cause of plaintiff's injury, or where it is not shown to be
under the exclusive control of the defendant, the causal connection is not established,
and the inference of negligent conduct giving rise thereto is nullified. Instruction 17,
by informing the jury_that_"where the precise cause of an accident on the whole evidence is left to conjecture or speculation,
and may be attributed to causes over one or
more of which the defendants has no control, as to a cause for which the defendant
would be responsible," liability should not
be found, was simply specifying that, under
such circumstances, the prerequisites of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would thereby
be lacking. As such, instruction 17 does not
contradict the res ipsa loquitur instructions

given, but constitutes merely a clarification
thereof.
[8,9] For similar reasons, we are unpersuaded that jury instruction 19, dealing
with unavoidable accident, contradicts the
theory of res ipsa loquitur. Unavoidable
accident, rather than being a separate legal
doctrine, is simply a recognition of the fact
that an incident causing injury to the plaintiff does not necessarily give rise to liability
in the defendant. Where the injury arises
from a set of circumstances which do not
reflect a lack of due care on anyone's part,
no recovery may be had under a theory of
negligence, the accident having been "unavoidable." 7
Instruction 19, therefore,
merely cautioned the jury that, absent persuasive proof presented by the plaintiff (by
use of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or
otherwise) that defendant had engaged in
negligent conduct which resulted in an injury to the plaintiff, no liability was to be
found, the injury arising from an unavoidable accident.
Plaintiff next focuses on the allegedly
improper use of the "unavoidable accident"
instruction under any circumstances. It is
plaintiff's contention that the unavoidable
accident instruction, by expressly restating
what is no more than a legal truism implied
in instructions relating to negligence and
causation, is at best superfluous, jand at
worst confusing and misleading to the jury.
[10] As explained above, a properlydrafted unavoidable accident instruction
punctuates the necessity of finding both
negligence and causation pnor to assigning
liability. It is true that such an instruction
amounts, in essence, to a reemphasis of
principles already implicit in other instructions. Such fact, in and of itself, is not
prejudicial, however, unless it results in the
instructions given being weighted, as a

4. Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra, foot-7. Calahan v. Wood, 24 Utah 2d 8, 465 P.2d 169
note 1.
(1970), Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d
5. See Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability,
§ 12.03[1], p. 284.
6. Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d
664 (1966).

210, 436 P.2d 442 (1968); Porter v.'Price, 11
Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 66 (1960).
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whole, in favor of the defendant.8 As such,
an unavoidable accident instruction is not
error if it clearly and concisely states the
principle involved, and does not create an
imbalance in the jury instructions.9
[11,12] Instruction 19 adequately explains the concept of unavoidable accident.
The final sentence thereof, stating, "If you
find from the evidence in this case that the
accident occurred without negligence on the
part of defendants or was not proximately
caused by any negligence on the part of the
defendants, you should answer interrogatory No. 3 'No,'" sufficiently links the instruction to those other theories presented
to the jury to enable them to perceive its
significance in context.10 It is to be noted,
moreover, that the giving of instruction 19
in no way created an unfair imbalance of
the instructions given to the jury. In light
of the instructions already given regarding
the use of circumstantial evidence under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, we deem it
not only permissible but indeed proper that
the need to find negligence, by one means
or another, be reemphasized prior to the
beginning of deliberations.

tunity to challenge Mr. Huber, either for
cause or peremptorily. As such, plaintiff
was denied the right of full information and
selective processes in jury selection, and
was therefore denied trial by an impartial
jury. We cannot agree with plaintiff's
analysis.
[13-15] Trial by jury in civil cases is
guaranteed under the Utah Constitution.11
Moreover, the requirements of due process
dictate that the jury be impartial and unbiased.12 It is in furtherance of these rights
that voir dire examination of prospective
jurors before the beginning of trial is engaged in. For the same reason, a trial
court may order a new trial should it appear that juror bias crept into the proceedings notwithstanding voir dire questioning.13 This is not to say, however, that it is
incumbent upon a trial court to order a new
trial whenever information is revealed
which was not discovered by voir dire questioning addressed thereto. It is impartial
jury trial, not complete voir dire questioning, that is the ultimate right involved.
Where, in the sound discretion of the trial
court, an infraction of the latter has no
material impact upon the former, no prejudicial error has occurred.14

Plaintiff's final point on appeal deals
with the relationship existing between juror
Huber and defense counsel Nebeker. Plaintiffs theory runs as follows: Mr. Huber's
[16] Given, in the pre'sent case, that an
failure to disclose his relationship with Mr. attorney-client relationship existed between
Nebeker, even though based on total igno- Mr. Nebeker and the corporation of which
ranee of that relationship, denied plaintiff's . Mr. Huber had at one time been an officer,
counsel full opportunity to question regard- and that such relationship was not disclosed
ing the matter during voir dire. As such, upon voir dire examination, we are noneplaintiff's right to voir dire was improperly theless constrained to agree with the trial
curtailed, resulting in an inadequate oppor- court that no prejudicial error resulted
8. Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073
(1955)
9. Caiahan v. Wood, supra, footnote 7
10. Plaintiff, attempting to show that the unavoidable accident instruction was confusing to
the jury, points to a note delivered to the court
inquiring after the possibility of assessing 60
percent of the injury to unavoidable accident
and 40 percent to negligence Such evidence
would be more persuasive had not the tnal
court, in concert with counsel of both parties
and by their express approval, submitted a
clarifying instruction to the jury regarding the
proper use of unavoidable accident The jury's
question having been answered to the satisfac-

tion of both parties, plaintiff may not now be
heard to state that the question posed remains
as evidence of the inadequacy of the instruction.
11. See Article 1, Section 10, Constitution of the
State of Utah.
12. See Article I, Section 7, Constitution of the
State of Utah, Amendment 14, Constitution of
the United States
13. Rule 59(a)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
14. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
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therefrom. The evil to be avoided in any
relationship between juror and counsel is
that of improper bias or prejudice, which
arises, not from the fact of the relationship
itself, but only from an awareness thereof.
Mr. Huber can hardly be suspected of inclining toward the representations of Mr.
Nebeker due to a relationship existing between the two of them of which neither
was aware until after the trial had finished.
For this reason, impartiality of the jury was
undiminished by the relationship, and no
prejudicial error occurred.
The decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs awarded to defendants.
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN,
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur.

( £ | KEYNUMBERSYSTE^

Torvai ALBRECHT, Sherwood Albrecht,
Maurice Albrecht, M. Steve Albrecht
and Carl Albrecht & Sons, Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
v.
URANIUM SERVICES, INC., a Utah
Corporation, Defendant and
Appellant
No. 15996.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 15, 1980.
Summary judgment entered by the
Seventh District Court, Emery County,
Boyd Bunnell, J., quieting title to certain
mining claims in plaintiffs was affirmed on
appeal, 596 P.2d 1025, and petition by defendants for rehearing was granted. The
Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that a
dispute of material facts was presented so
as to preclude entry of summary judgment
in case.
Reversed and remanded.
Maughan, J., dissented.

Judgment $=> 181(15)
A dispute of material facts on issue of
whether mining operations had been conducted on mining claims was presented so
as to preclude entry of summary judgment
in suit to quiet title to certain mining
claims.

Leonard W. Burningham, Salt Lake City,
for defendant and appellant.
Tex R. Olsen, Richfield, for plaintiffs and
respondents.
WILKINS, Justice:
A petition for rehearing was granted by
this Court after its opinion, Utah, 596 P.2d
1025 (1979), was rendered on May 29, 1979.
Petitioner, Uranium Services, Inc. asserts
the same point on rehearing as it asserted
on appeal; to wit: that genuine issues of
material facts have been raised by the
pleadings including affidavits filed by both
parties, and that the District Court erred in
granting summary judgment. Respondents
Albrecht again contend that the appeal was
not timely filed.
This Court is still of the opinion that the
appeal was timely filed, as discussed by Mr.
Justice Maughan in the original opinion.
Upon^ reconsideration, however, this
Court is of the view that a dispute of material facts has been presented and on that
issue we adopt the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Stewart, concurred in by Mr. Chief
Justice Crockett, in the original decision of
this case, Albrecht, ante, 596 P.2d at 102728.
The summary judgment entered by the
District Court of Emery County is therefore
reversed and this case is remanded for trial
on the merits. Costs to defendant, Uranium Services, Inc.
CROCKETT, C. J., and HALL and
STEWART, JJ., concur.
MAUGHAN, J., dissents.

343 Vteh

m

PACIFIC REPORTER,

Elsa H. NIXDORF, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
N. Frederick HICKEN and A. James
McAllister, Defendants and
Respondents.
No. 16151.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 27, 1980.
Patient brought medical malpractiee
action based on allegation that surgeo^
breached his duty when he left a surgic^j
cutting needle in the patient's body an<}
thereafter omitted to inform the patie^
triat trie needfe riacf 6een (eft in rier 6ocf>
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County
James S. Sawaya, J., granted a directe^
verdict in favor of defendants, and th^
patient appealed. The Supreme Cour^
Maughan, J., held that: (1) while the Su_
preme Court would not say that the sui^
geon's initial loss of the needle was negligent
as a matter of law, the patient was not r$_
quired to present expert testimony to estab^
lish that the continued presence of the needl^
in the patient's body more probably than no^
resulted from negligence; (2) under the ci^.
cumstances, the application of the doctrii\e
of res ipsa loquitur created a rebuttab)e
inference of negligence sufficient to carry
the patient's case past the motion for no^_
suit; (3) the evidence presented a question
for the jury as to whether the defendant
were negligent in failing to disclose t\\e
greseace <jf the aeedte; aad (4f the tn\i
court erred in granting a directed verdic^
against the patient.
Reversed and remanded.
Stewart, J., dissented in part and cor\.
curred in part and filed opinion.
1. Physicians and Surgeons $=»14(4)
In malpractice actions generally, a ph>.
sician is held to the standard of skill that } s
employed by his contemporaries in the same
or similar communities.

2d SERIES

2. Physicians and Surgeons «=> 18.60
In order for plaintiff to prevail in -a
medical malpractice action, plaintiff must
establish both the standard of care required
of the defendant as a practicing physician
in the community and that the defendant
did not employ that standard.
3. Physicians and Surgeons *=> 18.80(9)
Although, in the majority of medical^
malpractice cases, the plaintiff must introduce expert testimony to establish the standard of care, such testimony is unnecessary
to establish the standard of care when .the
propriety of the treatment received is within the common knowledge and experience
of the layman; the loss of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia in the operating site exemplifies such treatment.
4. Physicians and Surgeons <s=» 18.80(8]
Where surgeon lost a curved cutting
needle in the operating site while repairing
patient's rectocele, patient was not required
to introduce expert testimony to establish^
the applicable professional standard of caife*
5. Physicians and Surgeons <*=» 15(12]
Where curved cutting needle became"
disengaged from needle holder while'0«j3|
geon was repairing a rectocele, the fact thai
the* surgeon realized that the needle^ waffi
lost and attempted to locate it by palpating
the suspect area did not obviate the'corag
quences of the loss or relieve the surgeomdEj
liability for any breach of duty arisincr fronl
the initial loss of the needle.
6. Physicians and Surgeons $=» 15(14]
Whether or not surgeon acted n<e^
gently in leaving lost surgical needle**i
patient's body after unsuccessfully atteiffia
ing to locate the needle was a sepaSwB
question from the question whether theSia
tial loss of the needle was a breach of^duj^
7. Physicians and Surgeons <•=> 18760 ? * ^ |
When the appropriate evidentiary; j ^ j
is presented, a patient may employ the4J|9
trine of res ipsa loquitur in order • to ^J!a3
his burden to prove that a physi3anffl|
surgeon did not exercise the level °f Jj]a|
required by the applicable community! st3H
dard of care.
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8. Negligence <*=> 12L2(2)
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a
procedural rather than a substantive rule of
law which carries the plaintiff past a motion for nonsuit when the circumstantial
evidence presented by the plaintiff is sufficient to support the application of the doctrine and the inference of negligence.
9. Physicians and Surgeons <*=> 18.60
Generally, utilization of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur in a medical malpractice
case requires introduction of expert medical
testimony to establish that the outcome
more likely resulted from negligence than
from some other cause.
10. Physicians and Surgeons 3=18.80(9)
^ In certain situations, a medical procedure is so common or the outcome to the
patient so affronts notions of medical propriety that expert testimony is not required
to establish what would occur in the ordinary course of events and, in this type of
Situation, the patient can rely on the common knowledge and understanding of laymen to establish that the outcome would
jnot have happened had the physician or
•urgeon utilized due care.

was more probably than not the result of
negligence and, therefore, expert testimony
was not required to establish that element
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
13. Physicians and Surgeons <*=* 18.60
Evidence that cutting needle became
disengaged from needle holder while surgeon was repairing patient's rectocele, that
the needle thereafter remained present in
the patient's body, that the instrumentality
which caused the ultimate bad result was in
the exclusive control of the surgeon and
that the patient was under a general anesthetic and could not participate in or contribute in the act causing the injury provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation for
applying the res ipsa loquitur doctrine and
created a rebuttable inference of negligence
sufficient to carry patient's case against
surgeon past motion for nonsuit.
14. Physicians and Surgeons <*=> 18.60
In a medical malpractice action, the
defendant may introduce evidence to rebut
an inference of negligence arising from the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

§5?. Negligence *=» 121.2(8)
pT<u', When the instrumentality which caused 15. Physicians and Surgeons *=» 18.90
While the defendant may introduce
Bhe. injury was in the exclusive control of
gtefendant and plaintiff did not participate conflicting medical testimony on the cause
Ttfthe acts causing the injury, negligence of the injury after the patient has presentty be inferred from the injury alone if the ed evidence creating a rebuttable inference
J^use of injury is so obviously negligent of negligence, this conflicting medical testi*t negligence may be inferred as a matter mony should not be relied on by the trial
-law or if people would know from com- judge to remove the case from the jury;
mon experience that the result would not rather, such testimony establishes a conflict
*ve happened without negligence or if in the evidence which it is the jury's duty to
ere,.is expert testimony that the injury
resolve.
Kjild not have occurred if proper care had
^ n ' used.
16. Physicians and Surgeons <*=> 18.60
In a medical malpractice action, the
^Physicians and Surgeons <*=> 18.60
plaintiff
has the burden to prove that the
-Though the Supreme Court declined to
negligence
of defendant proximately caused
X that surgeon was negligent as a matter
aw
the
injury.
when he allowed a needle to become
ei
«aged from its needle holder during
^^ry, the ultimate fact that the needle 17. Physicians and Surgeons <*=> 18.80(7)
Proof that the negligence of defendant
| * j R m e d Present in the body of the patient
*uch that laymen could know from proximately caused the patient's injury rem
°n knowledge and experience that it quires some expert testimony.
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18. Physicians and Surgeons <fc=> 18.90
Testimony of defendant surgeon, an acknowledged expert, that needle that was
left in plaintiff's body after surgical procedure was in a position such that it could
produce pain was sufficient to render causation a question of fact for the jury, even
though there was conflicting evidence that
patient's pain was due to other medical
abnormalities.
19. Physicians and Surgeons <s=» 18.90
In a medical malpractice action, it is
not necessary that the proximate cause of
injury sustained through a physician's negligence be proved with exactitude; if the
injury could be attributed to two or more
causes, one of which was the negligence of
a doctor, it is for the jury to determine
which was the proximate cause of the injury.
20. Physicians and Surgeons <s=> 18.90
Evidence in medical malpractice action
presented a jury question whether surgeon
was negligent in failing to disclose to patient that a needle had been left in the
patient's body during a surgical procedure.
21. Physicians and Surgeons <s=>15(8)
Relationship between a doctor and a
patient creates a duty in the physician to
disclose to the patient any material information concerning the patient's physical
condition.
22. Physicians and Surgeons <3=>15(8)
The physician's duty to disclose to his
patient any material information concerning the patient's physical condition stems
from the fiduciary nature of the physicianpatient relationship and from the patient's
right to determine what shall or shall not
be done with his body.
23. Physicians and Surgeons <&=>15(8)
Scope of a physician's duty to inform
the patient is defined by the materiality of
the information in the decisional process of
an ordinary individual; if a reasonable person in the position of the patient would
consider the information important in
choosing a course of treatment, then the
information is material and disclosure is
required.

24. Physicians and Surgeons <*=> 18.90
In a medical malpractice action wherein plaintiff alleges that physician was negligent in failing to disclose certain material
information to the patient, it is for the jury
to determine what a reasonable person
would consider material information in a
decision concerning his well being.
25. Physicians and Surgeons «=» 18.90
Once the duty to disclose certain information to the patient is established, then,
the physician's total breach of that duty
presents a jury question as to what dainages were proximately caused by thte
breach.
26. Physicians and Surgeons $=> 18.80(7)
When a physician fails to disclose to his
patient any information concerning a material fact, there is no question of skill or,
judgment and no question of practice be-,
yond the knowledge of laymen which must^
be established through expert testimony int
order to prove liability.
27. Evidence <s=>574
In determining the existence and ex-o
tent of a physician's duty to disclose in eachparticular situation, the jury need not de-i
pend solely on expert testimony.
28. Physicians and Surgeons s=»15(8).
When a physician has knowledge; of^tf
fact concerning the patient's physical condi-j
tion which is material to that patient^ ajidl
when the physician fails to disclose the fac$
the relationship between the physician'and]
patient may render the physician's silence,
fraudulent.
29. Physicians and Surgeons *» 18.110
Damages which may be shown to Wj
low as a proximate result of physicians
nondisclosure to patient of material ^fadS
concerning patient's condition include reag
sonable charges for discovery and repairfSj
any resultant injury and monetary compcnl
sation for mental anguish.

Edward M. Garrett, Salt Lake City^S!
plaintiff and appellant.
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John H. Snow, Salt Lake City, for de'endants and respondents.
MAUGHAN, Justice:
The plaintiff appeals the district court's
granting of a directed verdict in favor of
the defendants. Following the preservation
)f the plaintiff's case the defendants moved
pursuant to Rule 50 for a directed verdict.
The court granted the motion and entered
its judgment thereon. We reverse and remand the action for a new trial. All statutory references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
For a period of approximately ten years,
the plaintiff, Elsa H. Nixdorf, suffered
from a cystocele and rectocele.1 In June
1964 she contacted the defendant, Dr. N.
Frederick Hicken, concerning the alleviation of these problems.2 Although Dr.
Hicken initially counseled the plaintiff on
the necessity of a hysterectomy, during the
subsequent operation which he performed
on June 5, 1964, he elected instead to merely repair the cystocele and rectocele and
amputate a portion of the plaintiffs cervix.
The repair of the cystocele was completed
without incident. However, during the repair of the rectocele one of the curved
cutting needles used to suture the torn diaphragm became disengaged from the needleholder. Although the doctor realized the
needle remained in the operating site, his
attempts to locate it by palpating the suspect area were unsuccessful and the operation was completed without recovery of the
lost needle.
~ Following the operation, the plaintiff remained under the care of Dr. Hicken until
his retirement on July 1, 1970, when his
partner, Dr. A. James McAllister, assumed
!• These terms refer to the bladder and rectum
respectively and denominate a condition in
w
hich these organs protrude from the abdominal cavity through a rupture in the pelvic diaphragm and into the vaginal area
• The other defendant, Dr James McAllister,
w
*s a partner of Dr Hicken at the time of the
operation and following Dr Hicken's retirement assumed the plaintiff as a patient

the plaintiff as his patient.8 Notwithstanding the plaintiff's repeated complaints of
pain in the pelvic-abdominal area, Dr. Hicken and Dr. McAllister never informed her
of the presence of the needle. In fact, the
plaintiff had no knowledge of the presence
of the needle until 1976 when Dr. Robert
Maddock, who she consulted because of lower abdominal pain, revealed its presence to
her.4
At trial the plaintiff averred the defendant Hicken was negligent in the performance of the 1964 operation and because of
his negligence, she has incurred certain
damages, e. g., pain and suffering and related medical expenses. Plaintiff also averred the defendants acted negligently in not
informing her of the presence of the needle.
At the conclusion of the plaintiffs case,
the defendants moved pursuant to Rule 50,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for a directed verdict on the grounds the evidence
presented by the plaintiff was insufficient
as a matter of law to create a jury question
on the defendants' negligence. The trial
judge granted this motion on the basis of
the plaintiff's failure to introduce expert
testimony to establish the applicable standards of care.
[1,2] In malpractice actions generally
the physician is held to the standard of skill
employed by his contemporaries m the same
or similar communities. Therefore, before
the plaintiff can prevail in a medical malpractice action, he must establish both the
standard of care required of the defendant
as a practicing physician in the community
and the defendant's failure to employ that
standard.
3. Although Dr. McAllister was not present at
the original operation, the plaintiffs files contain the Operation Report which under Xhe
heading "Complications" states "A small
curved cutting needle was broken while repairing the rectocele and is apparently lying in the
levator am or the gluteus muscle or fascia on
the left side
4. Dr Maddock became aware of the needle
from x-rays taken of the area for use in his care
of the plaintiff
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In the majority of medical malpractice
cases the plaintiff must introduce expert
testimony to establish this standard of care.
Expert testimony is required because the
nature of the profession removes the particularities of its practice from the knowledge
and understanding of the average citizen.
[3] However, this Court has recognized
certain exceptions to the general rule requiring expert testimony.5 Specifically, expert testimony is unnecessary to establish
the standard of care owed the plaintiff
where the propriety of the treatment received is within the common knowledge and
experience of the layman. The loss of a
surgical instrument or other paraphernalia,
in the operating site, exemplifies this type
of treatment. We explained in Fredrickson
v. Maw:6
Whether a surgical operation was unskillfully or skillfully performed is a scientific question. If, however, a surgeon
should lose the instrument with which he
operates in the incision
it
would seem as a matter of common sense
that scientific opinion could throw little
light on the subject.
[4-6] The loss of the surgical cutting
needle by Hicken falls squarely within the
perimeters of this exception to the general
5. See Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347
P.2d 1108(1959).
6. Fredrickson v Maw, 119 Utah 385, 388, 227
P.2d 772, 773 (1951); quoting from Wharton v.
Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 P. 235, 237 (1913),
see also Lipman v. Lustig, 346 Mass. 182, 190
N.E.2d 675 (1963); Taylor v Milton, 353 Mich.
421, 92 N.W.2d 57 (1958); Ballance v. Dunnington, 241 Mich. 383, 217 N.W. 329 (1928).
7. The trial court appeared to have overlooked
the initial breach of the defendant's duty, I. e.,
the loss of the needle. The defendant's realization of the absence of the needle and his attempt to retrieve it does not obviate the consequences of its loss. Whether or not the defendant acted negligently in leaving the needle in
the person of the plaintiff represents a separate
issue. The plaintiffs failure to present a prima
facie case on that issue does not eliminate the
defendant's responsibility for the initial loss.
8. See Talbot v. Dr. W. H Groves' Latter-Day
Saints Hospital, 21 Utah 2d 73, 440 P.2d 872
(1968).

rule. The guidance provided by expert tes^*
timony is unnecessary in this situation "and ^
therefore, expert testimony should not have^
been required to establish the professional^
standard of care under the facts ofilhe^
present case.7
Concomitant with the establishment- of\
1
the community standard is the plaintiff^<*
proof that the defendant failed to exeras£
the level of skill this standard requf
7

JL'l

[7,8] When the appropriate evidentii t
basis is presented a plaintiff may^eniplb1
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to^c
this burden.8 This doctrine establishes'ai
inference of negligence from the circuiS
stances incident to the operation.9 It isJS
procedural rather than substantive rule oi
law which carries the plaintiff past a W
tion for nonsuit where the circumstanfii
evidence introduced by the plaintiff is suff"
cient to support the application of the *<<
i
trine and its inference of negligence.10 9-:
We delineated the evidentiary foundatr
which the plaintiff must establish befon|
employing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitr
in Moore v. James n when we stated: *t
The rule . . .
is applicable"when
(1) The accident was of a kind wWck^
the ordinary course of events, would i g
have happened had "the defendant ""*
9. Joseph v. Dr. W. H. Groves' Latter^
Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d|
(1960) In Joseph, this Court set forf^
basis for the application of res ipsa loquitli
malpractice actions when we explained: *!Sj
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur springs rromlj
very practical process of drawing logicalj|
elusions from circumstantial evidence. Itsjjj
pose is to permit one who suffers i n j u r ^
something under the control of another;CW|
ordinarily would not cause the injuiy jjxcepf
the other's negligence, to present his gnf^
to a court or jury on the basis of the reasbn
inferences to be drawn from such factsjQ
though he may be unable to presenty*
evidence of the other's negligence." 348J
at 936.
10. Turner v. Willis, 59 Hawaii 319, 582J
710 (1978).
11. Moore v. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 96,^2§2j
221,224 (1956).
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due care, (2) the instrument or thing
causing the injury was at the time of the
accident under the management and control of the defendant, and (3) the accident
happened irrespective of any participation at the time by the plaintiff.
[9] The establishment of this evidentiary basis presents a peculiar problem to a
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case because of the necessity of showing what the
usual outcome of a medical procedure would
be when the required due care is employed.
Generally, this requires the introduction of
expert medical testimony to establish the
fact the outcome is more likely the result of
negligence than some other cause. This
testimony would be necessary to provide
the evidentiary basis from which the jury
could conclude the result is more probably
than not due to the negligence of the attending physician.12
[101 However, in certain situations, the
medical procedure is so common or the outcome so affronts our notions of medical
propriety that expert testimony is not required to establish what would occur in the
ordinary course of events. In this type of
situation the plaintiff can rely on the common knowledge and understanding of laymen to establish this element,13
[11] Therefore, when the instrumentality causing the injury is in the exclusive
12

See Talbot, supra note 8, 440 P.2d at 873

control of the defendant, and the plaintiff
does not participate in the acts causing the
injury, then negligence may be inferred
from the injury alone if: (1) the cause of
injury is so obviously negligent that negligence may be inferred as a matter of law;
(2) people would know from common experience the result would not have happened
without negligence; or (3) when a physician
testifies bad results would not have occurred if proper care had been used.14
[12] While we will not say the act of the
defendant in losing the needle from the
needleholder was negligent as a matter of
law, the bad result, i. e., the needle present
in the body of the plaintiff, is such that
people would know from common knowledge and experience it is more probably
than not the result of negligence.15 Therefore, in the present case, expert testimony
was not required to establish this element
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
[13-15] The evidence presented at trial
indicates the instrumentality which caused
the bad result was in the exclusive control
of the defendant at the time of the accident. Furthermore, the plaintiff was under
a general anesthetic and could not participate or contribute to the act causing the
injury. These facts when combined with
the nature of the accident provide a sufficient evidentiary foundation for the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in
See Dietze v King, 184 F Supp. 944, 946 (E D
Va 1960)

13. This Court has previously recognized this
exception in Frednckson v Maw, supra note 6,
14. See Tomei v Henning, 67 Cal 2d 319, 62
227 P 2d at 773, where we quoted "So, in this
Cal Rptr 9, 431 P 2d 633 (1967)
case, where a surgeon loses a metallic spring
in the body of his patient, and fails to 15. See Miller v Kennedy, 11 WashApp 272,
discover and remove it, it would seem that a
522 P2d 852 (1974), approved and adapted, 85
jury would have abundant justification for inWash 2d 151, 530 P.2d 334 (1975), This case
ferring negligence without the aid of expert
must be distinguished from the situations in
'testimony" (Quoting from Wharton v Warwhich the needle is broken during the sutunng
ner, supra note 6, 135 P at 237) Some courts
The malfunctioning of the surgical instruments
limit the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
presents an intervening cause for the accident
loquitur exclusively to this type of situation
beyond the control of the physician In that
See Swanson v Hill, 166 F Supp 296 (N D N D
situation the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may
1958) This appears to be a stnet application
still be applicable because the result is more
of the doctrine requiring the result to "speak
probably than not the result of negligence, but
for itself without the aid of any other proof
the intervening cause may be used as a defense
Thus, the application of the doctrine has someagainst the plaintiffs proof of proximate causatimes been explained by courts as eliminating
tion The present situation is more analogous
the necessity of the plaintiffs procurement of
to
the loss of whole instruments and other
e
*pert testimony in the initial stages of proof
paraphernalia in the course of the operation
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this case. The application of the doctrine
provides a rebuttable inference of negligence which will carry the plaintiff's case
past the motion for nonsuit.16
[16-19] Therefore, under the facts of
this case, expert testimony was not required
to establish the negligence of the defendant
and the trial court erred in granting a
directed verdict against the plaintiff because of the lack of that testimony.17
[20-22] The trial court also erred in not
submitting to the jury the plaintiff's second
cause of action, concerning the doctor's failure to disclose the presence of the needle.
The relationship between a doctor and his
patient creates a duty in the physician to
disclose to his patient any material informa16. See Moore v. James, supra note 11, 297 P.2d
at 224; The defendant may introduce evidence
to rebut the inference of negligence established
by the application of the doctrine. While the
defendant may introduce conflicting medical
testimony on the cause of the accident this
should not be relied upon by the trial judge to
remove the case from the jury's consideration.
Rather, this establishes a conflict in the evidence which it is the jury's duty to resolve.

tion concerning the patient's physical condition. This duty to inform stems from the
fiduciary nature of the relationship1* and
the patient's right to determine what shall
or shall not be done with his body.19
[23,24] The scope of the duty is defined \
by the materiality of the information in'the
decisional process of an ordinary individual:;
If a reasonable person in the position of fhe'i
plaintiff would consider the information im-•
portant in choosing a course of treatment
then the information is material and disclc&'i
sure required.20
[25-28] Once the duty to disclose certain^
information is established, then the physi-1
cian's total breach of that duty,21 as found]
best interests it is important that he shduTdl
know." 396 F.2d at 935.)
19. Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospl4
tal, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914); see alsoj
Miller v. Kennedy, supra note 15, 522 P.2d afi
860. In Miller the court explained, "The<pa|jj
tient is entitled to rely upon the physicianJtoJ
tell him what he needs to know about ^tnej
condition of his own body. The patient has thel
right to chart his own destiny, and the dckittfS
must supply the patient with the material fact|j
the patient will need in order to intelligent
chart that destiny with dignity."

17. The plaintiff also has the burden of proving
the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of. the injury. This proof requires
some expert testimony in medical malpractice
cases. Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139
P.2d 216 (1943). In the present case the de- 20. The members of the jury can discern-whatM
reasonable man would consider material infP&B
fendant, an acknowledged expert, testified the
mation in a decision concerning his well ;beL551
position of the needle was such that it could
Although there may be certain situations^osi2ffl
produce pain. Although there is contradictory
as the patient's incompetence or specific fflSjl
evidence that the pain the "plaintiff suffered was
cal reasons for withholding material irifontM
due to other medical abnormalities the testimotion where expert testimony may estabUslyH
ny of the defendant is sufficient to render caudefense for nondisclosure, it is not essehtiaUjjH
sation a question of fact to be determined by
the plaintiffs establishment of a prirnatfjgH
the jury. As we explained in Anderson,
case. See Wilkinson v. VeseyJllO R.I. 606&9
". . . it is not necessary that the proxiA.2d 676 (1972). ("The decision as to . w h n
mate cause of an injury sustained through the
or is not material is a human judgment, igi^B
negligence of a doctor be proved with exactiopinion, which does not necessarily requirfflBB
tude.
.", and 'if the injury sustained
assistance of the medical profession/rfffigH
could be attributed to two or more causes, one
A.2d at 688.) This objective approach jiasjgM
of which was the negligence of the doctor, it
accepted by some courts in the contextj^JH
would be a question for the jury to determine
formed consent malpractice actions. ^SejsSfflB
which was the proximate cause of the injury."
ler v. Kennedy, supra note 15, 522 P.2o!;atffiU
Id. 139 P.2d at 220. See also Forrest v. Eason,
While analogy to the informed consent o^fffflM
123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178 (1953); .13 A.L.
is helpful it is not dispositive. TheiPXaBB
R.2d, Proximate Causation—Malpractice, Acsituation differs from that found in ttMBM
tions, Section 2, page 22.
formed consent context and our approacnfflW
must reflect this difference. See CanterbtfSjU
18. Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary and Casualty
Hospital, 396 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("We Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir.jjfjj^H
find in the fiducial qualities of that relationship
[between physician and patient] the physician's 21. In Wilkinson, supra note 20, 295 <AS«
duty to reveal to the patient that which in his
686, the court explained: "As explicat®
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in the present case, presents to the jury the
question of what damages were proximately caused by the breach. Where the physician fails to disclose to his patient any information concerning a material fact, there
is no question of skill and judgment, no
question of practice beyond the knowledge
of. laymen which must be established
through expert testimony22. To borrow
justice Wiest's much quoted phrase from
Ballance,2* even the "merest tyro" would
know the nondisclosure was improper.24
[29] Damages which may be shown to
follow as a proximate cause of the nondisclosure include reasonable charges for dis/covery and removal of the needle and monetary compensation for the mental anguish
'following the realization of the needle's
presence.25
CROCKETT, WILKINS and HALL, JJ.,
'concur.
r

'_STEWART, Justice (dissenting in part
and concurring in part):
I respectfully dissent.
The majority, in my view, misapplies a
^oommon sense rule, applicable in simple
^malpractice fact situations, and arrives at a
^result which would allow the jury to find
-jegligence in total ignorance of whether

Dr. Hicken's conduct violated the applicable
standard of care. Clearly this case falls
within the scope of the rule that expert
testimony in a medical malpractice case is
necessary to establish proper standards of
medical performance. In particular, the
majority misapplies the rule that "loss of a
surgical instrument or other paraphernalia,
in the operating site, exemplifies [the] type
of treatment" that is "within the common
knowledge and experience of the layman/'
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347
P.2d 1108 (1959). In short, the plaintiff's
failure to produce expert testimony as to
the standard of care will necessarily mean
that a verdict is based on speculation.
It is an unrealistic rule that holds in all
cases abandonment of a surgical instrument
or other paraphernalia in a person during
the course of an operation can be considered
negligence by a lay person without regard
for the nature of the surgical procedures
involved. It need hardly be reiterated that
a physician is not a guarantor of the results
of an operation. Marsh v. Pemberton, supra. Nor does he warrant against all accidents which may occur during surgical procedures. The basis for fastening liability on
a defendant in a malpractice suit is negligence, not the occurrence of an untoward
circumstance. In the instant case, the sur-

Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488
alone. Respect for the patient's right of self
(1967), the Natanson [Natanson v. Kline, 186
determination on particular therapy demands a
Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (I960)] rule provides
standard set by law for physicians rather than
• ','•
that where a physician is silent and"
one which the physicians may or may not immakes no disclosure whatever, he has failed in
pose upon themselves." 464 F.2d at 784.
.the duty owed to the patient and the patient is
^not required to produce expert testimony to 23. Ballance v. Dunnington, supra note 6, 217
s
? how that the doctor's failure was contrary to
N.W. at 330.
accepted medical practice
•• In determining the existence and the extent 24. See Taylor v. Milton, supra note 6; the
present factual situation could also be used to
?f a physician's duty to disclose in each particestablish a cause of action in fraudulent
ular situation, the jury need not depend excluconcealment. Where a physician has knowlsively on expert testimony. In nondisclosure
edge of a fact concerning the patient's physical
ffi*s the jury is not invariably functioning in
jWrarea of such technical complexity that it is
condition which is material to that patient and
wound to medical custom, as established
he fails to 'disclose it the confidence relationUgh ex
D?p
Pert testimony, as an inexorable apship between them creates a duty to disclose
irjjy*1*00 of the community standard of reasonwhich may render his silence fraudulent. See
able care. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
Hudson v. Moore, 239 Ala. 130, 194 So. 147
^
(DC. Cir. 1972). In Canterbury the court
(1940).
~j? b u s s i n g the basis of disclosure required in
rc£* informed consent context explained: "Nor 25. See Jackson v. United States, 182 F.Supp.
«in we ignore the fact that to bind the disclo907 (D.C.Md.1960); Houston Clinic v. Busch,
. r* obligation to medical usage is to abrogate
64 S.W.2d 1103 (Tex.Civ.App.1933).
•U*e d e c i ^ i n o ^ « -.~..~1„*:~~ *.* *u~ _i
:-:~_
ion on revelation to the physician
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gical operation was not perhaps as unusual
and complex as some of the advanced procedures now being used, but it clearly was of
such a nature that application of the Marsh
rule is inappropriate, and there is no evidence in the record which indicates that Dr.
Hicken was negligent at all. There is even
evidence that Dr. Hicken's conduct may not
have been the actual cause of the loss of the
cutting instrument in the plaintiff. He testified that in operations of the type he
performed on the plaintiff the surgical instrument sometimes breaks just below the
eye through which the catgut thread is
passed and that, given the nature of the
operation, sound medical judgment often
dictates leaving the instrument in the body
if it cannot be readily located.
The inappropriateness of the legal rule
applied by the majority is demonstrated by
the testimony of Dr. Hicken. Operating
inside a body cavity, he could not see what
he was doing and had to orient his actions
primarily by touch. He described the problems relating to the loss of the needle as
follows:
A. Well, you are working down there,
[inside the vagina], you have the retractors in and you have—you're bringing
this [i. e., the needle] around on one side
of the tissue and trying to bring it around
and all at once you don't have ahold of
the needle and then the thing you do, you
have to bring your forceps back but, then
you poke—use your lights and you look in
there to see if you can see it. You put
your glove finger in and you try to palpate it to see if you can feel it and as a
general rule one can feel and in knowing
the exact area in which you were working, one can generally feel where the
suture is or the needle is. In this case,
we did not find it.
Q. All right. Now, for that needle to
become loose from the holder that ratchet
could be disengaged, did it not?
A. Well, the ratchet could be disengaged but the needle—by far the more
common way of losing a needle in this
operation is, you are working up in there
—see, I told you, you put your finger
here as a guide to exert a little pressure

as you bring it around. You are working
in a zone that has blood. There is '/at?
That means there is oils and its possible
for this to just rotate and slip out of the
needle holder. That's the usual thirier
that happens.
The needle may also break off because :ofj
a defect in the needle itself or because^
the forceps or other holding implement*
Dr. Hicken stated:
For instance, we have no way of kno#$
ing whether the needle was whole or.brog
ken. From experience in handling these]
things, where the thread goes through
the needle it is very thin and frequently^
needle will break at that part but-^-ai^
you have a little—just a splinter of "the]
eye of the needle left and separates froiS
the main shaft of the needle and when]
you pull your hemostat back you:.haJg
nothing. Both the eye of the needle^jSa
the main curved needle still remain^Hra
situ. That means in position in the area!
in which you are working.
Loss of the needle could also occur for othSB
reasons.
You are getting a bite of tissue 1 ^
are coming down and getting a bit
tissue—you see, here's a ratchet^
locks it. I showed you yesterday^
when you are sewing, you do notlfl
your fingers in these openingSvSr
ratchet. You take your hand put ana
it against the palm here using thisjfil
to give you a little force and a directro
mechanism for the point of the Ineg
and you come around like this.^^T
sometimes you hit heavy mtisc}as,;Jm
times you have thinner muscles,V
times you have scar tissue. If;the
der and things have been outjt
that tissue has been irritated and.|p
a lot of scar tissue, until you gej^j
resistance in bringing the neediest
and it's very easy for the—pt
the needle, being in oil and. blooi
fatty tissue down there, too, tha
needle could rotate and slip plitjJ
we bring the needle—when we,j>J!
the needle holder out it was still^Jg
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-and the needle wasn't in it so that's why
.you assume that the needle was broken or
lost.
The doctor was well aware of the relative
hazards of searching further for the lost
needle as opposed to leaving it within the
body cavity. He consciously made a medical judgment as to which course of action
would result in the least risks to the patient. He testified:
Well, because this woman was elderly.
She was not in the best physical condition. We had had her on the operating
table for one hour and to get X-ray machines at that time—we are talking about
fourteen years ago—at that time we had
to get X-ray machines from the basement
up into the operating room and it would
take too much time to complete that sort
of a procedure and the second thing is
that from my experience in such cases
and from being very conversant with literature on this subject, as I was a Professor and teacher in medical schools, I knew
•that a needle left in this particular area
was not particularly harmful to the patient. It is common knowledge that we
leave metal in the pelvic area very frequently. Now, for example, in some of
our operations instead of using sutures
and ties to tie around bleeding blood vessels, we have an instrument that we go in
'there and we put a metal clip on that
blood vessel because it's easier to do, it's
quicker to do and it is innocuous.
This testimony, in my view, destroys the
necessary foundation for application of the
rule that loss of a surgical instrument in a
|*>dy establishes, without more, an inference of negligence. Nor do the facts provide a foundation for application of. the
wfctrine of res ipsa loquitur. As this Court
Jrtjted in Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter$& Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348
£2d 935 (I960):
is realized that res ipsa loquitur has
.^eu applied in various fields where an
injury occurs which is not to be expected
."rf Proper standards of care and skill are
-observed. But this is done only with
:Ca
ution, particularly in the medical field

because of the realization that many aspects of the treatment of human ills cannot yet be regarded as exact science and
a bad result may obtain even though recognized standards of care and skill are
employed. [10 Utah 2d at 99, 348 P.2d at
938.] [Emphasis added.]
I recognize that there is a ring of common sense to the proposition that leaving
foreign objects in a person constitutes negligence, see Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah
385, 227 P.2d 772 (1951), but neither justice
nor common sense are enhanced by the mechanistic application of a rule of law to a
fact situation that is only superficially related to the type of situation the rule was
intended to govern. In this case, I cannot
see how a jury could possibly find negligence in light of Dr. Hicken's testimony and
in the absence of any contrary expert testimony. I think the trial judge was right in
directing a verdict on this issue.
I concur, however, with the majority that
the defendants had a duty to inform the
plaintiff of the fact that a foreign object
had been left in her body.
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In the Matter of the GUARDIANSHIP
of Alice KESLER.
No. 15960.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 28, 1980.
Appeal was taken from an order of the
District Court, Millard County, D. Christian
Ronnow, J. pro tern., declaring ward an
incompetent and appointing a guardian for
her estate. The Supreme Court, Maughan,
J., held that trial court should not have
proceeded under repealed guardianship
statutes merely because petition was filed
one day prior to time statutes became a
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nation, (2) has not been emphasized by either counsel or the court, and (3) has not
been elicited by the prosecution.6
Affirmed.
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.

Arthur Dennis KUSY, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
K-MART APPAREL FASHION CORP., a
Delaware corporation, and John Doe,
an individual, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 18360.
Supreme Court of Utah
April 24, 1984.

Action was brought m which plaintiff
sought to recover for personal injuries he
sustained when pallet on which he was
standing allegedly broke and he fell to
ground. The District Court, Salt Lake
County, G. Hal Taylor, J., entered judgment in favor of defendant, and plaintiff
appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks, J.,
held that: (1) admission in answers to interrogatories that pallet board where plaintiff
stepped broke off and plaintiff fell to
ground should have been admitted for impeachment purposes, even though interrogatories were signed by someone other than
testifying witness, and (2) plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence at trial to entitle
him to a res ipsa loquitur instruction.
Reversed and remanded.
6. Id. at 223.

1. Evidence <s=>222(l)
Pretrial Procedure <£=*307
Admission in answers to interrogatories, which were signed by general manager of store, on behalf of corporate defendant, that pallet board where plaintiff
stepped broke and plaintiff fell to ground
should have been admitted for impeachment purposes in personal injury action,
even though answers to interrogatories
were signed by someone other than the
testifying witness who implied that plaintiff had merely fallen off-pallet and that
pallet had not broken. Rules Civ.Proc,
Rule 33(b); Rules of Evid., Rule 63(7).
2. Negligence «=»138(2)
Before being entitled to jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur, plaintiff must
show that accident was of a kind which, in
ordinary course of events, would not have
happened if due care had been observed,
the plaintiffs own use or operation of
agency or instrumentality was not primarily responsible for injury, and that agency
or instrumentality causing injury was under the exclusive management or control of
defendant.
3. Negligence <s=>138(2)
Once plaintiff makes a prima facie
showing of elements, he is entitled to a res
ipsa loquitur instruction.
4. Negligence e=>138(2)
In order to determine appropriateness
of res ipsa loquitur instruction, court must
view evidence in a light most favorable "to
tne plaintiff.
5. Negligence <s=>138(2)
Res ipsa loquitur instruction should
have been given m action in which plaintiff
sought to recover for his personal injuries
sustained when he fell to the ground from
pallet which broke under him, in light of
plaintiffs testimony which would support
an inference that pallet would not have
broken if due care had been observed,*
plaintiffs testimony that he unloaded truck
in usual manner, consistent with directions
of manager of garden department, and fact
that defendant retrieved pallets in its own

KUSY v. K-MART APPAREL FASHION CORP.

Utah

1233

Cite as 681 ?2d 1232 (Utah 1984)

yard and brought them to truck for plaintiffs use.
6. Negligence <s=>121.2(8)
Control necessary for a res ipsa instruction is control exercised at time of
negligent act.
7. Negligence ®=>138(2)
A res ipsa loquitur instruction would
not be appropriate as to theory of negligent
failure to inspect.
8. Negligence e=>138(2)
Res ipsa loquitur instruction may be
appropriate as to theory of negligent maintenance.
9. Negligence <^121.2(11)
Where res ipsa loquitur has been properly brought into a case, it will not be
removed by mere prima facie showing of
specific negligence, but under such circumstances the case should be submitted on
both the theory of specific negligence and
res ipsa loquitur.
10. Negligence <s=>121.2(ll)
Res ipsa loquitur should not be removed by proof of specific negligence unless proof goes so far as to fully explain
the cause of injury by positive evidence
revealing of the facts and circumstances.
11. Negligence @=*140
Unavoidable
accident
instruction
should be given on remand of personal
injury action only if evidence showed that
this was an unusual and unexpected occurrence which resulted in injury and which
happened without anyone failing to exercise reasonable care.

Wilford A. Beesley, Jack Fairclough, Salt
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Alan L. Larson, Salt Lake City, for defendants and respondents.
1. For cases declaring the proprietor's duty to
use reasonable care to maintain premises in
safe condition for business invitees, see Walker
v. Union Oil Mill, Inc., La, 369 So.2d 1043
(1979), Husketh v. Convenient Systems, Inc., 295

OAKS, Justice:
In this personal injury action, the jury
found no negligence on the part of defendant K-Mart. On appeal, plaintiff claims
that the trial court erred by refusing to
admit into evidence defendant's answer to
an interrogatory. He also cites error in the
failure to give his proffered jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur and in the instruction given on avoidable accident. We reverse.
Plaintiff was employed as a truck driver.
In May 1976, he delivered a load of trees
and shrubbery to one of defendant's stores
in Murray. In the unloading process, plaintiff requested assistance from the garden
shop manager, Hunt. Hunt designated his
employee, Coupe, to deliver pallets by forklift to the door of plaintiffs truck. Coupe
selected pallets from a pile on the store's
premises and raised them to the level of
the truck's bed, approximately five feet
from the ground. Plaintiff then placed
from twenty-five to thirty trees on each
pallet.
Plaintiff's injury occurred after he successfully unloaded two pallets of trees. He
contends that he noticed some damaged
boards toward the back of the third pallet
Coupe delivered. Fearing that the boards
might break and spill some of the trees, he
requested a new pallet. Coupe refused.
After plaintiff unloaded six or eight trees
onto this pallet, some of its boards (not
those he had originally noticed) broke under plaintiffs foot, causing him to lose his
balance, fall to the ground, and break his
wrist. Plaintiff alleged that defendant
negligently maintained or negligently
failed to inspect the pallets to insure their
safety.1
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF ANSWERS TO
INTERROGATORIES
Plaintiff was the only eyewitness to testify about the accident. Coupe, the other
N.C. 459, 245 S.E.2d 507 (1978). See also DiMare v. Cresci, 58 Cal.2d 292, 373 P.2d 860, 23
Cal.Rptr. 772 (1962) (duty to inspect for latent
defect).
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eyewitness, was apparently out of the
country. Defendant presented only one
witness, Hunt. He was on the premises
when the accident occurred and approached
the scene immediately thereafter. Hunt
testified that he did not know whether the
pallet broke or whether plaintiff merely fell
from the pallet. He testified that he observed no broken boards or debris on the
ground when he first walked up to the
scene. Thus, Hunt's testimony at least to
some degree refuted plaintiffs version of
the 'accident and implied that plaintiff had
merely slipped from the pallet.
[1] While cross-examining Hunt, plaintiffs attorney sought to read one of defendant's answers to interrogatories. (The
answers were signed by Michael Street,
general manager of the K-Mart store, on
behalf of the corporate defendant.) In that
answer, defendant admitted that "the pallet board where [plaintiff] stepped broke
off and plaintiff fell to the ground." The
trial judge refused to allow counsel to read
this answer, ruling that since the interrogatories were signed by someone other than
the testifying witness, they could not be
used for impeachment. This was reversible error.
Rule 33(b), Utah R.Civ.P.,'allows answers to interrogatories to be used at trial
"to the extent permitted by the rules of
evidence/' Utah Rules of Evidence 63(7),
in effect at the time of trial, provided "that
a statement made by a party would not be
excluded under the hearsay rule when the
statement was offered against him. See
Terry v. Panek, Utah, 631 P.2d 896, 898
(1981).2 An admission of a party, when
offered against him, comes in as substantive evidence of the facts stated. Geldert
v. State, 3 Haw.App. 259, 649 P.2d 1165,
1172 (1982). This is especially appropriate
when the evidence is embodied in answers
to interrogatories, since a declarant has
ample time to consider such a statement
and submits it under oath.

propriately used to impeach Hunt, since
Hunt did not sign it. We disagree. Hunt
was the only witness who testified on behalf of defendant. Through his testimony,
Hunt gave the impression that the boards
on the pallet did not break and that plaintiff had merely fallen off the pallet. Plaintiff was then entitled to introduce whatever
substantive evidence he had to contradict
the witness and support his own version of
the facts. Specifically, "answers to interrogatories can be used by an adverse party
for any purpose, including attacking the
credibility of a party as a witness." Farhas v. Sadler, R.I., 375 A.2d 960, 964
(1977). That rule covers the proposed use
of the answer to the interrogatory to impeach the witness in the circumstances of
this case.
We are unable to say that the error in
excluding the answer to the interrogatory
was harmless in this case. Hunt's testimony implied that plaintiff had merely fallen
off the pallet and that the pallet had not
broken. The only evidence that the pallet
had in fact broken was plaintiffs own testimony, which the jury could have viewed as
self-serving. Plaintiffs credibility would
have been greatly enhanced if the jury had
been informed that defendant, in sworn
answers to interrogatories, had given the
same rendition of the facts. Failure to
allow the evidence was prejudicial to plaintiffs case. We must therefore reverse and
remand the case for a new trial.
For the guidance of the district court on
remand, we proceed to address the issues
regarding jury instructions.
II. RES IPSA LOQUITUR

Defendant argues that the admission in
the answer to the interrogatory was inap-

Plaintiff requested jury instructions on
res ipsa loquitur. For reasons that do not
appear in the record, the trial court refused
to give them. 'On appeal, defendant argues
that plaintiff failed to make out the elements that are necessary before such an
instruction is given.

2. We note that our new evidence rules are to the
same effect: an admission of a party-opponent,

offered against that party, is not hearsay. Utah
Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2).
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[2] Res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary
rule that permits an inference of negligence on the part of a defendant under
well-defined circumstances. Before being
entitled to such a jury instruction, a plaintiff must show:
(1) [T]hat the accident was of a kind
which, in the ordinary course of events,
would not have happened had due care
been observed; (2) that the plaintiffs
own use or operation of the agency or
instrumentality was not primarily responsible for the injury; and (3) that the
agency or instrumentality causing the injury was under the exclusive management or control of the defendant.
Anderton v. Montgomery, Utah, 607 P.2d
828, 833 (1980) (citations omitted). One of
the purposes of the res ipsa instruction is
to "cast the burden upon [the person who
controlled the agency or instrumentality
causing the injury] to make proof of what
happened." Id. at 833, quoting Lund v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 Utah 2d 276,
280, 351 P.2d 952, 954 (1960). It should be
noted, however, that "[ojnce the elements
of res ipsa loquitur have been established,
it merely permits and does not compel the
inference of negligence by the fact finder."
Archibeque v. Homrich, 88 N.M. 527, 532,
543 P.2d 820, 825 (1975). See also Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation District, 97 Idaho 580, 585, 548 P.2d 80, 85
(1976).
[3, 4] Once the plaintiff makes a prima
facie showing of the elements, he is entitled to a res ipsa instruction. The trial
court should not weigh conflicting evidence
of the elements; this is the jury's function.
In order to determine the appropriateness
of a res ipsa instruction, the court must
view the evidence "in a light most favorable to the plaintiff
" i Anderton v.
Montgomery, 607 P.2d at 833.
[5] Under the standard discussed
above, this plaintiff introduced sufficient
evidence at the trial to entitle him to a res
ipsa loquitur instruction. There was a prima facie showing of each of the three
elements. First, plaintiff testified about
his extensive experience utilizing pallets

during the course of his work He testified
that pallets are able to bear far greater
weight than was placed on the pallet that
broke here. This testimony would support
an inference that the pallet would not have
broken if due care had been observed, as
discussed below. E.g., DiMare v. Cresci,
23 Cal.Rptr. at 776, 373 P.2d at 864 ("[ordinarily steps which are part of a common
stairway do not collapse when used by a
tenant in a normal manner unless the landlord who has had the duty to maintain and
inspect them was negligent"). Second,
plaintiff testified that he unloaded the
truck in the usual manner, consistent with
the directions of the manager of the garden
department. Third, defendant retrieved
the pallets from its own yard and brought
them to the truck for plaintiff's use.
Defendant argues that the first element
("kind of accident") was lacking because
the jury found that neither party was negligent. This begs the question. Plaintiffs
evidence entitled him to the res ipsa instruction, and he does not lose that entitlement because of what the jury found without the instruction.
[6] Defendant further argues that the
third element ("exclusive management or
control") was lacking, since there was testimony that some of the pallets were not
owned by defendant and that pallets were
always being delivered and picked up from
defendant's premises. However, the issue
is not ownership but control. The control
necessary for a res ipsa instruction is control exercised at the time of the negligent
act. Town of Reasnor v. Pyland Construction Co., Iowa, 229 N.W.2d 269
(1975); Birmingham v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
Tex., 516 S.W.2d 914, 918 (1974). It is clear
from uncontradicted evidence that defendant had exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the injury as of the time
the alleged negligent act occurred.
In this case, we know from defendant's
admission in its answer to the interrogatory that plaintiffs injury was caused by his
fall and that his fall -was caused by the
breaking of the pallet. We do not know
what caused the pallet to break. Similarly,
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in Kitto v. Gilbert, 39 Colo.App. 374, 570
P.2d 544, 548-49 (1977), it was clear that
plaintiffs injury resulted from inadequate
anesthetization when tubing connecting
him to the anesthesiology apparatus became dislodged, but it was unclear what
caused the tubing to be dislodged. On
those facts, it was held error to refuse a
res ipsa instruction.
In this case, plaintiff alleged and sought
to prove two different theories under which
defendant would be responsible for the defective condition of the pallet that caused
the injury: negligent failure to inspect and
negligent maintenance. In support of the
first theory, plaintiff elicited from Hunt an
admission that the pallets were not inspected before they were provided for use by
plaintiff. In support of the second theory,
Hunt admitted that the pallets were
stacked in an unprotected area where they
were sometimes run over by motor vehicles.
At the second trial, the court must decide
if a res ipsa instruction is appropriate on
the basis of the evidence submitted there.
Assuming plaintiff can prove that the pallet broke and caused his fall, but cannot
point to the specific act that caused the
pallet to break, a res ipsa instruction could
be appropriate. However, if the evidence
goes so far as to explain the precise cause
of the _ break, res ipsa is no longer necessary and therefore would be inappropriate.
Crawford v. Rogers, Alaska, 406 P.2d 189,
193 (1965); Hugo v. Manning, 201 Kan.
391, 395-98, 441 P.2d 145, 149-51 (1968);
Dabroe v. Rhodes Co., 64 Wash. 431, 392
P.2d 317, 322 (1964). See generally Webb
v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 9 Utah
2d-275, 285, 342 P.2d 1094, 1101 (1959).
[7] A res ipsa instruction would not be
appropriate as to the theory of negligent
failure to inspect. ' Defendant admitted at
trial that it failed to inspect the pallets
before providing them for plaintiffs use.
This admission leaves nothing to infer
about the cause of the accident so far as it
pertains to this theory of responsibility.
The only remaining issue is whether failure
to inspect (assuming inspection would have

revealed the defect) constitutes a breach of
defendant's duty to provide a safe working
place for its business invitees. The res
ipsa instruction has no function under this
issue.
[8] A res ipsa instruction may be appropriate as to the theory of negligent maintenance of the pallets. There was evidence
at trial that pallets on defendant's premises
were stacked in an unprotected area where
they were sometimes run over by motor
vehicles. At the same time, plaintiff cannot point to an individual event or practice
of defendant's that produced the defective
condition in the particular pallet that broke
and caused this accident. Thus, under this
theory of responsibility, we have evidence
of spedfk acts of negligent rft&mtenaYioe
by defendant, but no clear demonstration
of the cause of the defect in the pallet that
broke.
[9,10] The rule we choose to follow in
this circumstance is the rule articulated by
the Kansas Supreme Court in Ballhorst v.
Hahner-Foreman-Cale, Inc., 207 Kan. 89,
99, 484 P.2d 38, 46 (1971):
[W]here res ipsa loquitur has been properly brought into a case it will not be
removed by a mere prima facie showing
of specific negligence, but under such
circumstances the case should be submitted on both the theory of specific
negligence and res ipsa loquitur. We
further [hold] that res ipsa loquitur
should not be removed by proof of specific negligence unless the proof goes so far
as to fully explain the cause of the injury
by positive evidence revealing all of the
facts and circumstances.
(Italics in original.) Accord Hugo v. Manning, supra; Fields v. Berry, Mo.App., 549
S.W.2d 122, 124-25 (1977). See also Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 935-36, 523
P.2d 536, 538-39 (1974) (pleading).
In the second trial of this case, plaintiff
may be able (by proof of specific acts or
practices of defendant) to make a prima
facie showing that the defective condition
of the pallet that broke was caused by
defendant's maintenance (or lack of mainte-
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nance). If so, the jury might find defendant negligent on that theory even without a
res ipsa instruction. But under the rule in
Ballhorst, the prima facie showing of specific acts of negligence in respect to maintenance would not preclude an otherwise
appropriate res ipsa instruction, so long as
the specific evidence of negligence does not
"fully explain the cause of the injury by
positive evidence revealing all of the facts
and circumstances." Consequently, a^res
ipsa instruction may be available on this
theory.
On remand, the district court will determine on the evidence at the second trial
whether plaintiff has made a prima facie
showing of the elements necessary for the
res ipsa instruction and, if so, whether the
evidence of specific acts of defendant's
negligence so clearly explain the cause of
the accident that res ipsa loquitur is not
appropriate.
III. UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
The trial court gave defendant's proposed jury instruction on unavoidable accident. Plaintiff argues on this appeal that
the instruction should not have been given.
Courts in other jurisdictions have disapproved such an instruction, see, e.g., Lends
v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., 156 Colo. 46, 61,
396 P.2d 933, 941 (1964), and we have said
that it is only to be used "in _a_ rare
case
" Stringham v. Broderick, Utah,
529 P.2d 425, 426 (1974). Nevertheless, we
have approved unavoidable accident instructions in two recent cases. Anderson
v. Toone, Utah, 671 P.2d 170, 174 (1983);
Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d at 83435 (case involving res ipsa loquitur). "Such
an instruction should be given with caution
and only where the evidence would justify
it." Woodhouse v. Johnson, 20 Utah 2d
210, 213, 436 P.2d 442, 445 (1968) (emphasis
in original).
[11] It will be up to the district court on
remand to determine whether the facts
presented at the second trial warrant an
unavoidable accident instruction. The instruction should only be given if the evidence could be interpreted as showing that

this was an unusual and unexpected occurrence "which result[s] in injury and which
happen[s] without anyone failing to exercise reasonable care
" Id.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new
trial consistent with this opinion. Each
party to bear own costs.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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THORNE AND WILSON, INC., A Utah
Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 18825.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 24, 1984.

Investment broker dealer brought action to obtain declaration that it was not
subject to sales taxes for sale of rare United States coins, foreign coins, and precious
metals. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Philip R. Fishier, J., held sale
of such items subject to state sales tax, and
broker dealer appealed. The Supreme
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) rare United States coins, foreign coins, and precious
metals sold by broker dealer for their extrinsic value, and not for use as currency,
were "tangible personal property" subject
to state sales tax, and (2) sales taxation of
such items did not impinge upon federal
government's exclusive rights with regard
to coinage of money.
Affirmed.

. «, ^uvironment, 234 Kan. 374, 673
P.2d 1126 (1983); In re Initiative Petition No. 272,
State Question No. 409, 388 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1963);
Somer v. Woodhouse, 28 Wash. App. 262, 623 P.2d
1164(1981).
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Joseph KITCHEN and Richard Phillips,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
CAL GAS COMPANY, INC., a California
Corporation,
Defendant and Appellee.
No. 910420-CA
FILED: November 20, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Frank G. Noel
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James R. Black and Susan B. Black, Salt Lake
City, for Appellants
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Fred R. Silvester,
Charles P. Sampson, and Paul M.
Simmons, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Garff.
OPINION
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Plaintiffs Joseph Kitchen and Richard Phillips appeal from a summary judgment in
favor of defendant Cal Gas Company, Inc., in
a negligence action stemming from a truck
accident. Kitchen and Phillips assert there are
disputed issues of material fact and, thus, the
trial court erred in granting Cal Gas's motion
for summary judgment. We affirm.
FACTS
Kitchen and Phillips drove trucks for
A.N.R. Freight Systems, Inc. (ANR). Kitchen
and Phillips drove an ANR truck out of Los
Angeles, California, heading for Salt Lake
City, Utah, on February 5, 1986. They
stopped at the port of entry east of Wendover,
Utah, early in the morning on February 6th.
At the weigh station, a Utah Highway Patrolman warned Kitchen and Phillips of black ice
on Interstate Eighty beginning twelve to fourteen miles ahead, and continuing into Salt
Lake City. As the truckers left the port of
entry, Kitchen drove the ANR truck while
Phillips climbed into the "sleeper* part of the

truck's cab to rest. A Cal Gas true
them five minutes after the ANR true
port of entry. At the time, Kitchen wa
the ANR truck approximately t*
twenty-five miles an hour on the wet,
icy, interstate highway. Kitchen test
Cal Gas truck passed "in a hurry," bi
not attempt to estimate the Cal Gas
speed.
Kitchen first encountered black ice
imately fifteen miles later. Kitchen pr
slowly, continuing to drive approj
twenty to twenty-five miles an hour
icy road. A Toyota pickup truck pas
ANR truck in the left lane of the twe
ound lanes of traffic four miles after
first encountered black ice and approx
forty-five minutes after being passed
Cal Gas truck. The Toyota turned on it
beam headlights as it passed Kitchen,
ding to Kitchen, the Toyota's headligh
minated a "shadow" lying across th<
approximately a quarter mile ahead.
Kitchen saw the "shadow" ahead, he to
foot off the throttle, causing the ANR
to slow. Almost immediately, the ANR
was struck from behind by another large
owned by C.R. England & Sons, Inc
ANR truck overturned on its side, and
Kitchen and Phillips were injured.
Kitchen and Phillips were pulled fron
ANR truck, they recognized the "shadow
the Cal Gas truck that passed them e*
The Cal Gas truck was overturned appr<
ately 200 feet ahead of the ANR truck
was blocking the left lane and part of the
lane of the eastbound traffic.
Kitchen and Phillips subsequently brc
this action against both C.R. England anc
Gas, alleging that their truck drivers' nc
ence caused Kitchen's and Phillip's injn
Prior to trial. Kitchen and Phillips reach
settlement with C.R. England. Thereafter,
Gas filed a motion for summary judgi
claiming that, even if the Cal Gas driver
operated the Cal Gas truck negligently, !
negligence could not have been the proxio
cause of Kitchen's and Phillip's injuries,
trial court denied this motion. Cal Gas si
equently filed a motion for summary judga
claiming there was no evidence that the
Gas driver was negligent. The trial cc
granted Cal Gas summary judgment, cone
ding, as a matter of law, that on the undi
uted facts before the court, Cal Gas was i
negligent.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal, Kitchen and Phillips assert t
trial court erred in granting summary juc
ment on the issue of Cal Gas's negligent
Summary judgment is proper when "the pi
adings, depositions, answers to interrogatorie
and admissions on file, together with the ai
idavits, if any, show that there is no genuh
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ootn parties moved for a directed verdict. The
court ruled the decedent was negligent as a
matter of law for driving on the wrong side of
the road in the path of an approaching automobile. However, the court denied both directed verdict motions and submitted the issue
of the other driver's negligence to the jury,
which returned a verdict for the plaintiffdecedent. Id. at 161. On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court reversed, holding the lower
court should not have submitted the issue of
negligence to the jury. The DeMille court
pointed out that the plaintiff-decedent had
submitted no evidence of the other automobile
driver's conduct. The court explained that,
because of the instinct for self preservation,
the law presumes an automobile driver is
exercising due care and that the presumption
disappears only when the opposing party
produces evidence of negligence. Id. Because
the plaintiff-decedent had produced no evidence as to the other driver's conduct, the
presumption remained intact and thus the trial
court erred in not granting a directed verdict
in favor of the defendant driver.3 Id. at 162.
The DeMille presumption, which disappears
when a prima facie case of negligence is presented, Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d 489, 495
(Utah 1985), is really no more than an incorporation of the evidentiary burden of proof in
a negligence action. The plaintiff bears the
burden of proof and must establish a prima
facie case to survive summary disposal of the
case. Lindsay, 497 P.2d at 30; Dybowski v.
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446
(Utah App. 1989).
In light of this authority, we must now
determine if Kitchen and Phillips offered any
evidence of negligence to rebut the presumption that Cal Gas's driver was exercising due
care at the time the truck overturned. In this
case, Kitchen and Phillips produced no evidence as to the Cal Gas driver's negligence, and
therefore, they cannot survive a motion for
summary judgment. The Cal Gas driver's
being "in a hurry" forty-five minutes prior to
the accident cannot sustain an inference that
the Cal Gas driver was speeding and that such
speeding continued after the roads became icy.
Further, we cannot say the mere fart that the
Cal Gas truck was overturned in the road
establishes that the Cal Gas driver acted negligently. There are numerous possible explanations as to why the truck overturned, many
of which would not involve the negligence of
the driver and, in this case, all of which
require speculation. Submitting the issue of
negligence to the jury would require the jury
to engage in mere speculation as to whether
the Cal Gas driver was negligent. Accordingly,
because Kitchen and Phillips have not produced any evidentiary basis for a jury to find
the Cal Gas driver acted negligently, the trial
court's summary judgment for Cal Gas on the
issue of negligence was proper.4

RES IPSA LOQUITUR
Alternatively, Kitchen and Phillips a:
trial court erred in rejecting their ai
that the Cal Gas driver's negligence
inferred under the doctrine of res ips
itur.
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidenc
allows a party, in certain circumstar
raise an inference that another party hi
negligently notwithstanding a lack of e
concerning the other party's actions.
[T]he purpose of res ipsa loquitur
"to permit one who suffers inji
from something under the cont
of another, which ordinarily wo\
not cause injury except for t
other's negligence, to present 1
grievance to a court or jury on t
basis that an inference of negliger
may reasonably be drawn from su
facts; and cast the burden upon t
other to make proof of what ha
pened."
Anderton v. Montgomery\ 607 P.2d 82
(Utah 1980)(quoting Lund v. Phillips
leum Co., 10 Utah 2d 276, 351 P.2d 91
(I960)). Accordingly, the fact that Kitch
Phillips failed to produce any evidei
negligence does not, by itself, preclud<
res ipsa loquitur claim. However, be
party is entitled to proceed on a res ip?
uitur theory, the party must satisfy a p
nary evidentiary foundation demons
that the facts of the case properly presen
ipsa loquitur question. See Nixdorf v. h
612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). This fc
tion consists of three parts:
(1) ... [T]he accident was of a kir
which in the ordinary course c
events, would not have happenc
had the defendant(s) used due cart
(2) the instrument or thing causin
the injury was at the time of th
accident under the management an
control of the defendant, and (3
the accident happened irrespectiv
of any participation at the time b
the plaintiff.
Daliey v. Utah Valley Regional Medical C
791 P.2d 193,196 (Utah 1990)(quoting Mo
James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 96, 297
221, 224 (1956)). Once a party makes
showing, there arises a "rebuttable infe
of negligence which will carry the [pa
case past the motion for nonsuit." Nix
612 P.2d at 354. Therefore, to determi
Kitchen and Phillips were entitled to pn
under a res ipsa loquitur theory, we
evaluate the evidence in light of the s
three-part test.
Under the first prong of the test, we
determine whether the accident in que

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

_. —O-^WAWW. uwiey,

/Vl P.2d

at 1%. Kitchen and Phillips argue that, normally, a truck does not roll over in the
absence of negligence. Cal Gas, on the other
hand, asserts that because there is no evidence
from which to infer negligence, and because of
the icy road conditions, it is not more likely
than not that the Cal Gas truck overturned
due to its driver's negligence.
The Utah Supreme Court has recently outlined the analytical framework for deciding the
first prong of the res ipsa loquitur test:
Before a plaintiff is entitled to a
jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur,
the plaintiff must have presented
evidence that the occurrence of the
incident is "more probably than not
caused by negligence." The plaintiff
need not eliminate all possible inferences of non-negligence, but the
balance of probabilities must weigh
in favor of negligence, or res ipsa
loquitur does not apply.
Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah
1985)(emphasis added)(citations omitted).
Further, the court recognized that *[w]hen,
however, the probabilities of a situation are
outside the realm of common knowledge,
expert evidence may be used to establish the
necessary foundational probabilities." Id.
Courts from several jurisdictions have held
that the mere fact that a driver has lost
control of a vehicle on icy roads is insufficient
to meet the first prong of the res ipsa loquitur
test. See, e.g., Millonig v. Bakken, 112 Wis.
2d 445, 334 N.W.2d 80, 86-87 (1983)(rearend collision resulting from icy roads does not
raise inference of negligence under res ipsa
loquitur as skidding on ice can occur without
fault of driver); Wilson v. Rushton, 199 Kan.
659, 433 P.2d 444, 449 (1967)(automobile
passenger could not sustain burden under first
prong of res ipsa loquitur test in injury action
arising from accident in which driver passed
another automobile just as the road had suddenly changed to ice); see also 4 Fowler V.
Harper, Flemming James, Jr. & Oscar S.
Gray, The Law of Torts, §19.7 at 57 (2d ed.
1986)(mere fact of vehicle sliding on icy road
insufficient to raise inference of negligence
under first prong of res ipsa loquitur test).
We agree with this authority as we cannot
say that when a driver loses control of a
vehicle on icy roads, the driver, more likely
than not, was negligent. Common experience
and reason suggest black ice is a hazard that
threatens even the most reasonable and
prudent driver. Accordingly, we find that
Kitchen and Phillips have not met their burden
under the first prong of the res ipsa loquitur
test.
Because Kitchen and Phillips have failed to
show that the accident was, more likely than

— —~, «*m>vvA * negligence, thus failing to meet the first prong of
the res ipsa loquitur test, it is unnecessary for
us to consider the other two prongs of the
test. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's
ruling rejecting Kitchen's and Phillip's res
ipsa loquitur claim.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's
summary judgment dismissing Kitchen's and
Phillip's claim. Kitchen and Phillips produced
no evidence that the Cal Gas driver was negligent. Furthermore, they cannot rely on the
evidentiary doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
escape summary judgment as the accident is
not the type which normally does not occur in
the absence of negligence.
Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding
Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Regnal W. Garff, Judge

1. At oral argument, counsel for Cal Gas indicated
that at the same time the trial judge granted Cal
Gas's motion for summary judgment, the judge also
granted Cal Gas's motion in limine to exclude
Kitchen's testimony as to the Cal Gas truck's speed
when the Cal Gas truck passed Kitchen, in bringing
this to our attention, counsel for Cal Gas seems to
suggest the trial judge did not take this evidence into
consideration in ruling on Cal Gas's motion for
summary judgment, and likewise implies that we
should not consider this evidence.
Our independent review of the trial judge's
rulings suggests that the order in limine excluded the
disputed portions of Kitchen's testimony from trial,
not from the consideration of the matter for purposes of the summary judgment ruling. There is no
indication that the trial judge did not consider this
evidence when ruling on Cal Gas's motion for
summary judgment. On appeal, notwithstanding the
order in limine, we consider Kitchen's testimony
regarding the Cal Gas truck's speed in our review of
the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
2. See, e.g., Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531
P.2d 360, 361-62 (Utah 1973) (summary judgment
for defendant proper where pleadings and depositions showed no negligence or omission of duty of
reasonable care); Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc.,
775 P.2d 445, 446-47 (Utah App. 1989)
(summary judgment for defendant proper in slip
and fall case where customer could not offer any
evidence that defendant mall owner had acted negligently); Robinson v. Intennountain Health Care,
Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 266 (Utah App. 1987) (summary
judgment proper on issue of negligence where plaintiff has failed to secure expert testimony in medical
malpractice action).
3. The presumption outlined in DcMille was established in earlier Utah cases. See Mecham v. Allen, 1
Utah 2d 79, 262 P.2d 285, 290 (1953); Compton v.
Ogden Union Ry. & Depot, 120 Utah 453, 235 P.2d
515, 517 (1951). The DeMille presumption was recently reaffirmed in Pearce v. Wistisen, 701 P.2d
489, 495 (Utah 1985)(presumption of due care rebutted where evidence indicated deceased acted negligently^
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-. iviicncn ana Phillips contend the New Mexico
Court of Appeals decision in Kelly v. Montoya, 81
N.M. 591, 470 P.2d 563 (Ct. App. 1970) should
persuade us to remand their case for a jury trial. In
Montoya, a truck passenger was injured when the
truck collided with defendants' vehicles. Defendants
had stopped their vehicles in the center of the road
at the scene of a prior collision that occurred during
a sandstorm. Id. at 564. The New Mexico court
reversed the summary judgment for defendants,
holding that material issues of fact existed as to
whether defendants violated a safety statute prohibiting the leaving of vehicles on the highway.
The facts of Montoya, however, are distinguishable from the facts surrounding the accident in
which Kitchen and Phillips were injured. In Montoya,
there was clear evidence that the defendants violated a safety statute. The nature of defendants' conduct in Montoya was not in dispute: they
had parked their cars on the road during the day. In
our case, however, there is no evidence that the Cal
Gas driver's negligence caused the truck to overturn
and block the road. Thus, Montoya is not applicable here.
Likewise, Kitchen and Phillips argue that the
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592 (Utah 1947),
mandates reversal. Again we find this case distinguishable on its facts. In Horsley, a bus passenger
sued for injuries sustained in an accident between a
car and the bus. Because of snowy and hazardous
road conditions, the car driver lost control of the
car and crossed the center line of a highway. The
bus was coming from the other direction and was
unable to avoid the car. The plaintiff was injured
when the force of the accident threw her head
forward and she struck her neck on the seat in front
of her. Id. at 592-93. A jury returned a verdict for
plaintiff passenger and the bus company appealed.
In affirming, the Utah Supreme Court held there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer the bus
was driving at an excessive speed for the given road
conditions. Id. at 599. There, the plaintiff testified
that when the accident occurred, the bus was traveling fifty miles per hour, and that when the car
crossed the center line, the bus was a city block
away. The Horsley court recognized that a jury
could have reasonably found the bus driver did not
have his vehicle under sufficient control for the
conditions and, therefore, the court affirmed the
jury award./d. at 600.
Unlike this case, the Horsley court was able to
consider substantial evidence of the bus driver's
conduct; therefore, the 'inference1' did not arise
from the "mere happening" of an accident. The
Horsley court was faced with a substantial contradiction in testimony, not with the complete lack of
testimony as to the bus driver's conduct, as is the
case here with regard to the Cal Gas driver's
conduct. Accordingly, Kitchen and Phillips cannot
rely on Horsley to raise an inference that the Cal
Gas driver acted negligently.
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OPINION
This opinion is subject to revision befor
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
GARFF, Judge:
Alan J. Cappo, d/b/a Western Builc
Center, appeals from an order denying
motion to quash service of summons and
aside judgment.
FACTS
Appellees David C. Barlow and Clare
Barlow, d / b / a Barlow's Wood Class
(Barlows), mailed to appellant Alan J. Cap
(Cappo) a complaint, motion and order I
alternative service by mail. The complaint v
filed on June 8, 1989. The motion for altei
ative service by mail, along with the affidav
was filed June 6, 1989 pursuant to Utah Rul
of Civil Procedure 4(0(2) (1989).>
On August 3, 1989, Cappo filed a motion
dismiss Barlows' action on the ground th
the forum was not convenient. Cappo char
cterized this motion as a special appearanc
He requested that the action be dismissed ar
then be filed in Colorado, arguing that variot
warranty claims existed upon Barlows' pro<
ucts sold in Colorado, that all of the witness*
required to prove said claims were in Cole
rado, that much of the evidence was in Cole
rado, and that the expenses of litigation woul
be reduced if the claim were brought in Col
orado.
On September 5, 1989, the court denies
Cappo's motion to dismiss and found that ;
"review of the file indicates that Defendan
appears to have agreed contractually to juris
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